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Introduction	
Climate	change	brings	severe	implications	for	our	health,	wellbeing,	livelihoods	and	the	structure	of	
organised	global	society.	It	threatens	to	undermine	many	of	the	social	and	environmental	
determinants	of	health.	Its	direct	effects	result	from	rising	temperatures,	and	changes	in	the	
frequency	and	strength	of	storms,	floods,	droughts,	and	heatwaves	–	with	the	physical	and	mental	
health	consequences	that	result.	Its	effects	are	also	seen	in	the	form	of	changes	in	crop	yields	and	in	
the	burden	and	distribution	of	infectious	disease,	and	in	population	displacement.4-6	Whilst	many	of	
these	effects	are	being	experienced	today,	it	is	a	future	with	unmitigated	climate	change,	wherein	
the	effects	worsen	and	exacerbate	existing	challenges	and	global	health	inequalities,	that	is	
particularly	concerning.7	The	links	between	climate	change	and	human	health	is	clearly	complex,	and	
heterogeneously	mediated	through	various	economic,	environmental,	and	social	factors.	
However,	a	comprehensive	and	ambitious	response	to	climate	change	will	transform	the	health	of	
the	world’s	population	populations	and	the	way	they	live	their	lives.	The	potential	benefits	are	
enormous,	including	cleaning	up	the	air	of	polluted	cities,	delivering	more	nutritious	diets,	ensuring	
energy,	food	and	water	security,	and	alleviating	poverty	and	social	and	economic	inequalities.	
Monitoring	this	transition	–	from	threat	to	opportunity	–	is	the	central	role	of	the	Lancet	Countdown:	
Tracking	Progress	on	Health	and	Climate	Change.8	The	collaboration	exists	as	a	partnership	of	24	
academic	institutions	from	every	continent,	and	brings	together	individuals	with	a	broad	range	of	
expertise,	including	climate	scientists,	mathematicians,	geographers,	engineers,	energy,	food,	and	
transport	experts,	economists,	social	and	political	scientists,	and	health	professionals.	Ultimately,	
the	Lancet	Countdown	tracks	a	series	of	indicators	of	progress,	publishing	an	annual	‘health	check’,	
from	now	until	2030,	on	the	state	of	the	climate,	and	progress	made	in	meeting	global	commitments	
under	the	Paris	Agreement,	and	adapting	and	mitigating	to	climate	change.	
The	initiative	was	formed	following	the	2015	Lancet	Commission,	which	concluded	that	“tackling	
climate	change	could	be	the	greatest	global	health	opportunity	of	the	21st	century”.7	It	builds	on	the	
foundations	from	by	many	in	the	space,	including	work	from	the	World	Health	Organization’s	(WHO)	
Department	of	Public	Health,	Environmental	and	Social	Determinants	of	Health	and	the	
Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC).	It	also	follows	a	growing	body	of	evidence	
supported	by	The	Lancet,	including	the	Lancet	Series	on	the	health	co-benefits	of	mitigation,	the	
2009	Lancet	Commission	on	managing	the	health	effects	of	climate	change,	the	Rockefeller	
Foundation-Lancet	Commission	on	Planetary	Health,	and	the	recently	launched	Lancet	Planetary	
Health	Journal.9-12	
	
Indicators	of	Progress	on	Health	and	Climate	Change	
The	Lancet	Countdown’s	indicators,	summarised	in	Table	1	below,	are	divided	in	to	five	broad	
themes:	health	impacts	of	climate	change;	health	adaptation	and	resilience;	the	health	co-benefits	
of	mitigation;	economics	and	finance;	and	public	and	political	engagement.	
Following	its	2016	report,	presenting	proposed	indicators,	the	Lancet	Countdown	launched	a	global	
consultation	to	determine	the	indicators	it	can	and	should	track.	A	number	of	factors	determined	
the	eventual	selection	of	these	indicators,	including:	their	relevance	to	public	health,	both	in	terms	
of	the	impacts	of	climate	change	on	health,	and	the	health	effects	of	the	response	to	climate	change;	
and	their	relevance	to	the	anthropogenic	drivers	which	contributed	the	most	to	climate	change;	
their	geographical	coverage	and	relevance	to	a	broad	range	of	countries	and	income-groups.	
Throughout	this	report,	the	results	and	analysis	of	each	indicator	have	been	presented	in	full,	
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alongside	a	brief	description	of	the	data	sources	and	methods.	A	more	complete	account	of	each	
indicator	can	be	found	in	the	corresponding	appendix	(one	section	per	indicator).	
Thematic	Group	 Indicators	
1.	Health	Impacts	of	
Climate	Change	
1.1	Exposure	to	temperature	change	
1.2	Exposure	to	heatwaves	
1.3	Changes	in	labour	productivity	
1.4	Exposure	to	climate-sensitive	infectious	diseases	
1.5	Food	
security	and	
undernutrition	
1.5.1	Vulnerability	to	undernutrition	
1.5.2	Marine	Primary	Production	
1.6	Migration	due	to	climate	change	
2.	Health	Resilience	and	
Adaptation	
2.1	Deaths	from	climate-	and	weather-related	disasters	
2.2	Trends	in	selected	climate-sensitive	diseases	
2.3	Number	of	countries	with	a	national	adaptation	plan	for	health	
2.4	Number	of	cities	with	climate	change	risk	assessments	
2.5	Implementation	of	IHR	Core	Capacity	Requirements	
2.6	Proportion	of	national	meteorological	and	hydrological	agencies	providing	services	
tailored	for	the	health	sector	
2.7	Number	of	countries	that	have	conducted	a	national	assessment	of	vulnerability,	
impacts	and	adaptation	for	health	
2.8	Number	of	countries	implementing	activities	to	build	health	resilient	infrastructure	
2.9	Spending	on	adaptation	for	health	and	health-related	activities	
2.10	Health	adaptation	funding	from	global	climate	financing	mechanisms	
3.	Health	Co-Benefits	of	
Mitigation	
3.1:	Carbon	intensity	of	the	energy	system	
3.2	Coal	phase-out	
3.3:	Zero-carbon	emission	electricity	
3.4:	Access	to	clean	energy	
3.5	Exposure	to	ambient	air	pollution	
3.6:	Fuel	use	for	transport	
3.7	Active	travel	infrastructure	and	uptake	
3.8.1:	Total	food	supply	for	human	consumption	
3.8.2:	Supply	of	ruminant	meat	for	human	consumption	
3.9:	Healthcare	sector	emissions	
4.	Economics	and	
Finance	
4.1:	Change	in	Annual	Investments	in	Renewable	Energy	and	Energy	Efficiency	
4.2:	Change	in	Annual	Investment	in	Coal	Capacity	
4.3:	Value	of	Funds	Divested	from	Fossil	Fuels	
4.4:	Economic	Losses	due	to	Climate-Related	Extreme	Events	
4.5:	Valuing	the	Health	Co-Benefits	of	Climate	Change	Mitigation	
4.6:	Employment	in	Low-Carbon	and	High-Carbon	Industries	
4.7:	Fossil	Fuel	Subsidies	
4.8:	Coverage	and	Strength	of	Carbon	Pricing	
4.9:	Use	of	Carbon	Pricing	Revenues	
5.	Public	and	Political	
Engagement	
5.1	Media	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change		
5.2	Coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	in	scientific	journals	
5.3	Inclusion	of	health	and	climate	change	in	high-level	statements	of	the	UNGA		
	
Table	1.	Thematic	groups	and	indicators	for	the	Lancet	Countdown’s	2017	report.	
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In	all	cases,	a	pragmatic	approach	was	taken,	which	took	in	to	account	the	considerable	data	
availability	constraints,	and	the	resource	and	timing	constraints.	As	a	result,	the	indicators	represent	
what	is	feasible	for	2017.	The	data	sources	and	methods	used	will	be	actively	developed	over	time,	
with	the	express	purpose	of	moving	from	exposure-,	state-,	and	process-based	indicators,	to	health	
outcome-based	indicators,	and	drawing	closer	attribution	to	climate	change.	For	a	number	of	areas	–	
such	as	the	mental	health	impacts	of	climate	change;	or	hydrological	mapping	of	flood	exposure	–	
the	collaboration	is	currently	unable	to	report	a	robust	methodology	for	an	annual	indicator.	This	
reflects	the	complexity	of	the	topic	and	the	paucity	of	data,	rather	than	a	lack	of	importance.	
The	Lancet	Countdown	is	committed	to	an	open	and	collaborative	approach	to	the	improvement	of	
its	current	indicator	set	and	the	development	of	new	indicators,	and	welcomes	new	academic	
partners	with	the	expertise	and	capacity	to	support	this.	This	process	is	one	of	many	currently	
tracking	various	aspects	of	the	response	to	climate	change.	Appendix	1	provides	a	short	overview	of	
a	number	of	parallel	and	complementary	processes	currently	underway.	
	
Delivering	the	Paris	Agreement	for	Better	Health	
The	Paris	Agreement,	which	was	adopted	by	195	countries	and	as	of	May	2017	was	ratified	by	over	
55%	of	countries	representing	55%	of	global	emissions,	has	set	out	a	commitment	of	ambitious	
greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	reduction	to	limit	climate	change	to	well	below	a	global	average	temperature	
rise	of	2°C	above	pre-industrial	levels,	with	an	aim	to	limit	temperature	increases	to	1.5	°C.13		
The	potential	health	benefits	of	implementing	the	Paris	Agreement	are	immense.	As	with	all	policy	
interventions,	it	is	important	to	note	that	unintended	side	effects	–	both	positive	and	negative	–	may	
occur.	
Most	countries	(187)	have	committed	to	near-term	GHG	reduction	actions	up	to	2030,	through	their	
Nationally	Determined	Contributions	(NDC).	Article	4	paragraph	2	of	the	Paris	Agreement	states	that	
each	signatory	“shall	prepare,	communicate	and	maintain	successive	nationally	determined	
contributions	that	it	intends	to	achieve”.13	However,	at	the	present,	the	NDCs	of	the	147	parties	that	
have	ratified	the	agreement	fall	short	of	the	necessary	reductions	by	2030	to	meet	the	2	°C	pathway.	
Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	below	shows	a	~13	GtCO2	emission	gap	for	2030	for	meeting	a	
2°C	pathway	when	examining	the	stated	actions	of	the	submitted	NDCs.	
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Figure	1.	Global	greenhouse	gas	emissions	under	different	scenarios	and	the	emissions	gap	in	2030.14	
	
The	recent	steps	taken	by	the	United	States’	Trump	Administration	to	leave	the	Paris	Agreement	are	
concerning,	with	their	NDC	responsible	for	as	much	as	20-25%	of	the	global	pledge.15	National	
policies	focusing	on	encouraging	coal-fired	power	are	short-sighted,	and	damaging	not	only	to	the	
Paris	Agreement,	but	also	to	the	health	of	Americans	who	breathe	in	the	polluted	air	that	results.	
The	Lancet	Countdown’s	indicators	place	that	decision	within	a	broader	context.	They	highlight	the	
fact	that	globally,	total	power	capacity	of	‘pre-construction’	coal	has	halved	from	2016	to	2017	
alone;	that	every	year	since	2015,	more	renewable	energy	has	been	added	to	the	global	energy	mix	
than	all	other	sources	combined;	that	electric	vehicles	are	poised	to	reach	cost-parity	with	their	
petrol-based	counterparts;	and	that	in	2016,	global	employment	in	renewable	energy	reached	9.8	
million,	over	one	million	jobs	more	than	are	employed	in	fossil	fuel	extraction.	
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These	positive	examples	in	recent	years	must	not	mask	the	dangerous	consequences	of	failing	to	
meet	the	Paris	Agreement,	the	past	two	decades	of	relative	inaction,	the	sectors	currently	lagging	
behind,	and	the	enormity	of	the	task	ahead.	Indeed,	much	of	the	data	presented	should	serve	as	a	
wake-up	call	to	national	governments,	businesses,	and	civil	society.	
However,	as	this	report	demonstrates,	the	world	has	already	begun	to	embark	on	a	path	to	a	low-
carbon	and	healthier	world,	and	the	direction	of	travel	is	set.	
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1.	The	Health	Impacts	of	Climate	Change	
	
Introduction	
This	section	provides	a	set	of	indicators	that	track	health	impacts	of	hazards	(both	rapid	onset	shocks	
and	slow	onset	stresses)	related	to	anthropogenic	climate	change.	Such	impacts	are	dependent	
upon	the	nature	and	scale	of	the	hazard	and	on	the	extent	and	nature	of	human	exposure	to	them.	
Much	of	the	progress	made	in	global	health	has	been	as	a	result	of	developing	and	implementing	
systems	to	reduce	populations’	vulnerabilities	to	various	parts	of	the	environment.	Yet	climate	
change	threatens	to	undo	this	progress,	rendering	the	systems	used	to	manage	existing	exposures	
potentially	insufficient	in	the	future.		
The	indicators	in	this	section	cover	a	selection	of	the	health	impacts	of	climate	change	which,	in	
turn,	inform	protective	adaptation	and	mitigation	interventions	(sections	two	and	three),	the	
economic	and	financial	tools	available	to	enable	such	responses	(section	four),	and	the	public	and	
political	engagement	that	facilitates	them	(section	five).	
Climate	change	affects	human	health	primarily	through	three	pathways:	direct;	ecosystem-
mediated;	and	human-institution-mediated.16	Direct	effects	are	diverse,	being	mediated	(for	
instance)	by		increases	in	the	frequency,	intensity,	and	duration	of	heatwaves,	and	by	rises	in	
average	annual	temperature	experienced	(leading	to	heat-related	mortality	and	reductions	in	
manual	labour	capacity).	Rising	incidence	of	other	extremes	of	weather	such	as	flood	and	storms	risk	
drowning	and	injury,	the	spread	of	water-borne	disease,	and	mental	health	sequelae.17	Ecosystem-
mediated	impacts	of	climate	change	include	changes	in	the	distribution	and	burden	of	various	
vector-borne	diseases,	such	as	malaria	and	dengue,	and	food	and	water-borne	infectious	disease.	
Human	malnutrition	from	crop	failure,	population	displacement	from	sea-level	rise,	and	
occupational	health	risks	are	examples	of	human-institution-mediated	impacts.	Forced	
displacement,	as	opposed	to	migration	as	an	adaptive	response,	is	associated	with	negative	health	
outcomes,	including	increased	risk	of	water	and	food	insecurity,	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	
undernutrition,	and	elevated	rates	of	mental	ill-health.18		
Both	direct	and	indirect	indicators	are	tracked	by	the	Lancet	Countdown,	monitoring	the	extent	to	
which	populations	are	exposed	to,	and	thus	could	be	harmed	by,	extremes	of	weather	(indicators	
1.1-1.3),	the	spread	of	vector-borne	climate-sensitive	disease	(indicator	1.4),	food	insecurity	
(indicator	1.5),	and	population	displacement	(indicator	1.6).		
In	selecting	these	indicators,	the	reality	of	data	limitations	and	the	tensions	and	linkages	between	
mitigation	efforts	and	subsequent	adaptation	costs	are	important	to	consider.	The	indirect	indicators	
each	provide	a	’proof	of	concept’,	rather	than	being	fully	comprehensive,	focusing	variably	on	a	
specific	disease,	population,	or	location.	
The	choice	of	indicator,	and	particularly	the	extent	to	which	an	indicator	focuses	on	exposure	or	
socio-economic	vulnerability,	influences	the	extent	to	which	attention	is	drawn	to	climate	change	
mitigation	or	adaptation,	and	thus	could	influence	where	governments	focus	their	efforts.	Implicit	in	
this	choice	are	efficiency	and	equity	considerations,	across	time	and	spatially	across	different	
communities	and	countries.	Governments	make	choices	between	the	more	immediate	and	known	
costs	of	mitigation	activities	and	the	delayed	and	more	uncertain	costs	that	will	be	imposed	in	the	
future	by	the	need	to	adapt	to	climate	change,	or	indeed	the	inability	to	adapt.	
A	number	of	challenges	associated	with	choosing	indicators	to	track	the	health	impacts	of	climate	
change	are	recognised,	specifically:	dealing	with	signal-to-noise	ratios;	attribution	to	climate	change;	
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and	the	role	of	institutions	and	policies	in	determining	the	impact	of	a	climate	hazard	on	labour	
productivity,	food	security,	nutrition,	and	migration.	Signal	to	noise	ratios	are	of	particular	concern	
here	for	two	reasons.	First,	with	respect	to	climate	warming	and	climate	hazards,	annual	natural	
climate	variability	introduces	noise	into	the	system,	whereas	an	important	signal	is	the	long-term	
climate	trend.19	Attribution,	“the	process	of	establishing	the	most	likely	causes	for	a	detected	change	
with	some	level	of	confidence”20,	thus	becomes	important	when	selecting	indicators.	Second,	with	
respect	to	identifying	the	impact	of	a	climate	hazard	on	human	wellbeing	and	health,	as	reflected	in	
disease,	nutrition,	and	migration,	the	ultimate	impacts	on	health	are	heavily	mediated	by	institutions	
and	policies,	such	that	the	signal-to-noise	ratio	between	climate	hazard	and	health	impact	
decreases.	
Six	indicators	were	selected	and	developed	for	this	section:	
1.1	Exposure	to	temperature	change	
1.2	Exposure	to	heatwaves	
1.3	Change	in	labour	capacity	
1.4	Exposure	to	climate-sensitive	infectious	diseases	
1.5	Vulnerability	of	food	systems	and	undernutrition	
1.6	Migration	and	climate	change	
	
Corresponding	Appendix	2	provide	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	data	and	methods	used.	
	
Indicator	1.1:	Exposure	to	temperature	change	
Headline	Finding:	Human	exposure	to	global	temperature	rise	was	more	than	double	global	average	
temperature	rise	in	2016.	
Rising	temperatures	can	exacerbate	existing	health	problems	among	populations	and	also	introduce	
new	health	threats.	The	extent	to	which	human	populations	are	exposed	to	this	change	and	thus	the	
health	implications	of	temperature	change	depend	on	the	detailed	spatial-temporal	trends	of	
population	and	temperature	over	time.	
Figure	1.1	calculates	mean	warming	between	2000	and	2016,	with	the	exposure-weighted	line	(blue)	
weighted	by	population,	capturing	human	exposure	to	warming,	which	is	significantly	higher	than	
area-weighted	warming	alone,	0.87K	and	0.35K	respectively.	This	is	driven	primarily	by	growing	
population	densities	in	India	(particularly	in	the	Ganges	Basin	and	the	north	east	of	India),	parts	of	
China	and	Sub-Saharan	Africa.	Accounting	for	population	when	assessing	temperature	change	
provides	a	vital	insight	into	how	human	wellbeing	is	likely	to	be	affected	by	temperature	change.	
Although	there	has	been	evidence	for	years	that	global	temperatures	are	increasing,	the	analysis	
here	shows	that	temperature	change	where	people	are	living	is	much	higher.	Populations	are	clearly	
much	more	exposed	to	higher	changes	in	temperatures	than	figures	on	global	warming	alone	have	
previously	shown.	
Further,	areas	where	population	density	is	increasing	tend	to	be	among	the	poorest	and	most	
vulnerable	in	the	world,	with	high	dependencies	on	the	environment	for	basic	needs	such	as	water,	
food	(subsistence	farming)	and	energy	(biomass).	Thus,	greater	exposure	to	temperature	change,	
which	affects	these	environmental	parameters,	in	these	areas	is	of	particular	concern.	Figure	1.2	
overlays	this	on	to	a	map	of	the	globe,	showing	higher	levels	of	warming	around	the	Poles,	Southern	
Africa,	India,	Europe,	Western	Australia	and	Western	Canada.	
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Figure	1.1.	Mean	warming	from	2000	to	2016	area	weighted	and	exposure	weighted,	relative	to	the	1986-2008	
historical	average.	
	
Figure	1.2.	Map	of	global	temperature	change	between	2000	and	2016.	
	
	
Temperature	data	was	calculated	against	the	historical	period	1986	to	2008,	corresponding	to	the	
ERA	climatology	period.	The	time	series	shown	in	Figure	1.1	is	a	global	mean	of	the	gridded	data,	
weighted	by	area	(to	avoid	bias	from	measurements	near	the	poles)	and	also	weighted	by	
population	(to	demonstrate	population	exposure);	these	are	described	as	“area	weighted”	and	
“exposure	weighted”,	respectively.	Changes	in	population	were	obtained	per	country	and	selected	
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for	2005,	as	this	was	the	approximate	middle	for	the	time-period	studied,	and	the	data	was	
projected	onto	the	gridded	population.		
How	exposure	to	temperature	change	alters	in	future	is	dependent	upon	the	responses	of	the	
climate	system	to	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	although	climate	models	have	increasing	agreement	on	
expected	changes	in	temperature	(especially	in	the	short-term).	Long-term,	temperature	changes	
will	be	lower	or	higher	depending	upon	which	emissions	pathways	the	world	takes;	with	higher	
greenhouse	gas	emissions,	there	will	be	greater	temperature	rise.	The	2015	Lancet	Commission	
modelled	future	exposure	to	temperature	change	up	until	2100;	these	models	show	that	
temperatures	will	increase	at	relatively	similar	rates	for	all	emission	scenarios	up	until	2030.	After	
this,	emissions	pathways	become	more	important	in	determining	future	temperature	change	up	to	
2100.	Therefore,	despite	the	rate	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	in	the	next	thirteen	years,	humans	
will	nonetheless	be	exposed	to	a	rise	in	temperatures	of	approximately	0.75°C	between	now	and	
2030.7	
	
Indicator	1.2:	Exposure	to	heatwaves	
Headline	Finding:	In	2016,	vulnerable	populations	were	exposed	to	heatwaves	that	were	on	average,	
1.5	days	longer	than	the	global	average.	
The	European	Heatwave	of	2003	resulted	in	an	additional	70,000	deaths	across	Europe	during	the	
summer	of	that	year,	highlighting	the	importance	of	tracking	global	population	exposure	to	
heatwaves.21	The	health	impacts	of	extremes	of	heat	range	from	direct	heat	stress	and	heat	stroke,	
through	to	exacerbations	of	pre-existing	heart	failure,	and	even	an	increased	incidence	of	acute	
kidney	injury	resulting	from	dehydration	in	vulnerable	populations.	The	elderly,	children	under	the	
age	of	12	months,	and	people	chronic	cardiovascular	and	renal	disease	are	particularly	sensitive	to	
these	changes.17	
Figures	1.3	and	1.4	demonstrate	the	exposure	weighted	value	of	both	the	number	of	heatwaves	and	
the	length	of	heatwaves,	indicating	clearly	that	exposure	to	heatwaves	is	increasing	more	rapidly	
over	time	than	area-weighted	alone.	Most	significantly,	the	length	of	heatwaves	is	5.2	days	in	
exposed	populations,	as	compared	to	3.7	days	when	averaged	globally	(Figure	1.4),	with	the	most	
heavily	populated	areas	experiencing	the	most	severe	effects	of	heatwave	since	the	turn	of	the	
century.	
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Figure	1.3.	The	area	and	exposure	weighted	change	in	the	occurrence	of	heatwaves	per	unit	area	per	person	
from	2000	to	2016.	
	
Figure	1.4.	The	area	and	exposure	weighted	change	in	the	length	of	heatwaves	(measured	by	the	number	of	
days	over	3	days)	globally	from	2000	to	2016.	
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Heatwave	data	were	calculated	against	the	historical	period	1986-2008,	corresponding	to	the	ERA	
climatology	period.	The	time	series	shown	in	Figures	1.3	and	1.4	are	a	global	mean	of	the	gridded	
data,	weighted	by	area	(to	avoid	bias	from	measurements	near	the	poles)	and	also	weighted	by	
population	(to	show	population	exposure);	these	are	described	as	“area	weighted”	and	“exposure	
weighted”,	respectively.	Here,	a	heatwave	is	defined	as	a	period	of	more	than	3	days	where	the	
minimum	temperature	is	greater	than	the	99th	percentile	of	the	historical	minima	(1986-2008	
average).	In	addition,	the	length	of	the	days	a	heatwave	occurs	for	is	summed,	showing	changes	in	
the	length	of	heatwaves	since	the	year	2000.	Thus,	two	measures	of	heatwave	are	shown:	the	
number	of	heatwaves	and	the	length	of	the	heatwaves.	The	population	is	taken	as	the	fraction	of	
people	aged	over	65,	as	this	age	group	is	most	vulnerable	to	the	health	impacts	of	heatwaves.	
Population	data	was	obtained	per	country	and	selected	for	2005,	as	this	was	the	approximate	
middle	for	the	time-period	studied.	The	country	data	are	projected	onto	the	gridded	population.	
Over	the	next	few	decades,	climate	models	agree	that	heat	waves	are	likely	to	increase	in	duration,	
intensity	and	spatial	extent.	In	the	long-term	up	to	2100,	heat	waves	are	very	likely	to	increase	in	
intensity,	frequency	and	duration.22	Much	as	with	temperature	change,	changes	in	the	occurrence	
and	duration	of	heatwaves	up	to	2030	is	already	committed	to.	Beyond	2030,	mitigation	will	be	vital	
to	reduce	the	extent	to	which	the	intensity,	frequency	and	duration	of	heatwaves	changes.	
However,	this	does	not	account	for	human	exposure,	which	the	findings	here	show	significantly	
affect	changing	exposure	to	heatwaves.	Depending	on	future	population	growth	and	density	trends,	
people	may	be	even	more	exposed	to	more	and	longer	heatwaves	than	the	previously.	
	
Indicator	1.3:	Changes	in	labour	Productivity	
Headline	Finding:	Labour	capacity	in	populations	exposed	to	temperature	change	has	decreased	by	
5.3%	from	2000	to	2016.	
Higher	temperatures	pose	significant	threats	to	occupational	health	and	labour	productivity,	
particularly	for	those	undertaking	manual	labour	outside	in	hot	areas.	This	indicator	shows	the	
change	in	labour	capacity	(and	thus	productivity)	globally	and	specifically	for	rural	regions,	weighted	
by	population.	Reductions	in	labour	capacity	have	important	implications	for	the	livelihoods	of	
individuals,	families,	and	communities,	with	particular	impact	on	those	which	rely	on	subsistence	
farming.	
When	population	exposure	is	accounted	for,	labour	capacity	is	estimated	to	have	decreased	by	5.3%	
between	2000	and	2016,	with	a	dramatic	decrease	of	over	2%	in	2015	and	2016.	Although	there	are	
some	peaks	of	increased	labour	capacity	(notably	2000,	2004	and	2008),	the	overwhelming	trend	is	
one	of	reduced	capacity	(Figure	1.6).	As	expected,	these	effects	are	most	notable	around	the	
equator	(Figure	1.7),	where	countries	are	generally	poorer	and	more	reliant	on	manual	work	for	
their	livelihoods	(often	in	the	form	of	subsistence	farming).	
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Figure	1.6.	The	exposure	weighted	labour	capacity	change	(%)	globally	from	2000	to	2016.	
	
Figure	1.7.	Map	of	the	change	in	labour	capacity	loss	globally	from	2000	to	2015.		
Wet	bulb	globe	temperature	data	was	calculated	against	the	historical	period	1986-2008,	
corresponding	to	the	ERA	climatology	period.	This	period	was	taken	as	the	historical	average	and	
capacity	change	was	calculated	from	this.	The	time	series	shown	in	Figure	1.6	is	a	global	mean	of	the	
gridded	data,	weighted	by	population	(to	demonstrate	population	exposure);	described	as	
“exposure	weighted”.	Labour	capacity	was	calculated	from	wet	bulb	globe	temperatures.	Labour	
capacity	is	here	presented	as	a	percentage,	with	100%	meaning	no	labour	lost	due	to	climatic	
conditions.	The	population	was	taken	as	the	rural	population	(as	outdoor	labour	is	largely	
concentrated	here	for	agriculture)	and	the	data	was	obtained	for	every	country	for	the	year	2005,	as	
this	represented	the	approximate	middle	of	the	time-period	studied.	The	country	data	was	projected	
onto	the	gridded	population	data.	
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Labour	capacity	here	is	a	direct	result	of	temperature	change,	and	so	the	changes	in	labour	capacity	
again	are	likely	to	be	committed	to	up	to	2030.	Given	that	over	the	past	fifteen	years	there	has	
already	been	a	5.3%	decrease	in	labour	capacity,	a	similar	or	bigger	loss	of	productivity	could	occur	
between	now	and	2030.	As	with	indicators	1.1	and	1.2,	the	findings	here	have	shown	the	importance	
of	accounting	for	population	when	measuring	exposure	to	changes	in	labour	productivity.	Future	
expected	population	trends	are	therefore	vitally	important	to	consider	when	estimating	future	lost	
labour	capacity.	
	
Exposure	to	drought	and	flooding	
The	Lancet	Countdown’s	2016	report	laid	out	a	framework	for	two	additional	indicators	relating	to	
exposure	to	flood	and	to	drought,	which	we	unfortunately	cannot	report	here.8	This	is	partly	due	to	
resource	constraints,	however,	it	is	also	due	to	the	fact	that		definitions	of	flood	and	drought	are	
more	complex	than	those	relating	to	temperature	change,	heatwaves	and	changes	in	labour	
productivity.	Drought	has	regional	definitions,	which	are	important	to	capture	if	exposure	to	
drought,	and	significant	changes	in	this	exposure,	is	to	be	accurately	reported	on	over	time.	
Measuring	flood	risk	is	also	complicated,	and	is	driven	by	a	variety	of	factors	including	precipitation	
and	land	use,	manifesting	as	fluvial,	pluvial,	coastal	and	groundwater	flooding.	Modelling	exposure	
to	this	would	require	a	combined	hydrological	model	and	climate	model,	using	observed	data	to	
model	past	flood	exposure	and	weight	this	against	population	density.	The	Lancet	Countdown	will	
continue	to	work	on	the	development	of	these	two	indicators	for	2018.	
	
Indicator	1.4:	Exposure	to	climate-sensitive	infectious	diseases	
Headline	Finding:	Relative	vectorial	capacity	for	the	mosquito	vector	Aedes	aeqypti	has	increased	by	
9.4%	globally	since	the	1950s.	
Despite	a	declining	overall	trend,	infectious	diseases	still	account	for	around	20%	of	the	global	
burden	of	disease	and	underpin	more	than	80%	of	international	health	hazards	as	classified	by	the	
WHO.23,24	Climatic	factors	are	routinely	implicated	in	the	epidemiology	of	infectious	diseases,	and	
they	often	interact	with	other	factors,	including	behavioural,	demographic,	socio-economic,	
topographic	and	other	environmental	factors,	to	influence	infectious	disease	emergence,	
distributions,	incidence	and	burden.5,25	Understanding	the	contribution	of	climate	change	to	
infectious	disease	risk	is	thus	complex,	but	necessary	for	advancing	both	climate	change	mitigation	
and	adaptation	policies.18			
Work	for	this	indicator	was	broken	in	to	two	components:	a	systematic	literature	review	of	the	links	
between	climate	change	and	infectious	diseases,	and	a	vector	capacity	model	for	the	climate-
sensitive	vector,	aedes	aegypti.	The	strong	link	between	climate	and	infectious	diseases	is	reflected	
in	the	number	of	publications	addressing	climate	change	and	infectious	disease	associations,	which	
has	dramatically	increased	since	2014	(Figure	1.8,	black	line	in	the	top	plot).	The	number	of	new	
publications	in	2016	(n=89)	was	the	highest	yet	reported,	almost	double	the	number	published	in	
2015	(n=50)	and	more	than	triple	the	number	published	in	2014	(n=25).	Figure	1.9	maps	the	focus	
country	of	publications	on	infectious	disease	and	climate	change	in	2016.	Here,	China	and	North	
America	are	heavily	over-represented,	with	South	America	and	South	East	Asia	underrepresented	in	
2016.	
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Figure	1.8.	Academic	publications	reporting	climate-sensitive	infectious	diseases	by	number	and	impact	
reported	(top	plot)	and	disease	group	(bottom	plot).	
	
Figure	1.9.	Number	of	infectious	disease	and	climate	change	publications	in	2016	by	focus	country.	
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The	second	component	of	this	indicator	examines	trends	in	the	global	potential	for	dengue	virus	
transmission	(as	represented	by	relative	vectorial	capacity,	rVC,	in	the	mosquito	vector	Aedes	
aeqypti).	This	reached	its	equal	highest	average	level	in	2015	(tied	with	2010	and	1998)	against	a	
1950	baseline	(Figure	1.10,	top	panel).	This	consolidates	a	clear	and	significant	increase	(+8.7%)	in	
rVC	since	the	late-1970s.	Nearly	all	countries	in	the	analysis	showed	an	increase	in	rVC	since	1950,	
with	only	a	few	countries	showing	a	decrease	(Figure	1.10,	bottom	panel).	Very	similar	results	were	
obtained	from	a	similarly	parameterised	model	of	rVC	for	dengue	in	Aedes	albopictus	(1950	v	2015	Δ	
rVC	=	+13.0%)	(see	Appendix	2	for	details).	Overall,	2015	exhibited	the	single	highest	globally	
averaged	rVC	for	dengue	in	A.	albopictus	since	1950,	with	a	9.4%	increase	during	this	period.	
	
Figure	1.10.	Average	relative	vectorial	capacity	(rVC)	for	dengue	in	Aedes	aegypti	calculated	globally	(top	
panel)	(relative	to	1950	baseline)	and	for	selected	countries	(lower	panel)	(main	matrix	coloured	relative	to	
country	mean	1950-2015;	right	most	column	coloured	relative	to	global	mean	in	2015;	red	=	relatively	higher	
rVC,	blue	=	relatively	lower	rVC).	Countries	in	lower	panel	ordered	by	centroid	latitude	(north	to	south).	
Two	different	approaches	were	used	as	a	starting	point	for	gauging	the	potential	impacts	that	
climate	change	may	be	having	or	will	have	on	infectious	diseases.	Firstly,	a	systematic	review	of	the	
climate-change	infectious	disease	(CC-ID)	literature,	in	which	trends	in	the	evolution	of	knowledge	
and	direction	(positive	vs	negative	vs	equivocal)	of	climate	change	disease	risk	associations	were	
assessed	(Figures	1.8	and	1.9).	Secondly,	a	global,	mechanistic	investigation	of	changes	in	
transmission	potential	for	a	model,	high	burden,	climate-sensitive	vector-borne	disease,	dengue	
fever	(Figure	1.10).	Cases	of	dengue	have	doubled	every	decade	since	1990,	with	58·4	million	(23·6	
million–121·9	million)	apparent	cases	in	2013,	accounting	for	over	10,000	deaths	and	1·14	million	
(0·73	million–1·98	million)	disability-adjusted	life-years.26	Climate	change	has	been	suggested	as	one	
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potential	contributor	to	this	increase	in	burden.27	Aedes	Aegypti,	the	principal	vector	of	dengue,	also	
carries	other	important	emerging	or	re-emerging	arboviruses,	including	yellow	fever,	chikungunya	
and	zika	viruses,	which	are	also	similarly	responsive	to	climate.			
In	the	near	term,	an	ongoing	increase	in	the	volume	of	publications	exploring	climate	change	
infectious	disease	associations	is	expected,	covering	increasingly	more	dynamic	and	complex	disease	
systems	with	increasing	taxonomic	and	geographic	representativeness.	Climate	change	is	not	
expected	to	be	a	universal	driver	of	increased	disease	risk	and	many	disease	systems	may	exhibit	
overall	declines	in	risk	as	changes	in	climatic	factors	could	similarly	drive	components	of	disease	
transmission	systems	beyond	environmental	optima.28	Understanding	this	broader	range	of	
responses	is	critical	to	tailor	research	and	management	efforts	on	disease	systems	and	populations.	
With	respect	to	dengue	virus	transmission	potential,	there	has	been	a	clear	and	consistent	increase	
in	globally	averaged	VC	since	the	late	1970s.	For	Aedes	aegypti,	VC	was	an	average	of	9.4%	higher	in	
2015	relative	to	a	1950	baseline.	Extrapolating	the	strong	linear	increase	in	VC	for	Aedes	aegypti	
since	1950	(R2	=	0.784)	suggests	that	VC	could	increase	by	a	further	1.6%	by	2030	(i.e.,	~11%	overall	
increase	relative	to	the	1950	baseline).	This	extrapolation	is	based	only	on	the	observed	increase	in	
VC	to	date	and	does	not	take	into	account	actual	projections	of	climate	change	from	global	
circulation	models.	
	
Vulnerability	of	food	systems	and	undernutrition		
Links	between	climate,	food	insecurity,	and	undernutrition	are	well	documented.	Yet	isolating	the	
impact	of	climate	change	on	health	through	the	indirect	impacts	on	food	security	is	complicated,	as	
policies,	institutions,	and	the	actions	of	individuals,	organisations,	and	countries,	strongly	influence	
the	extent	to	which	food	systems	are	resilient	to	climate	hazards	or	can	adapt	to	climate	change,	
and	whether	individual	households	are	able	to	access	and	afford	sufficient	nutritious	food.	For	
example,	with	respect	to	undernourishment,	vulnerability	has	been	shown	to	be	more	dependent	on	
adaptive	capacity	(such	as	infrastructure	and	markets)	and	sensitivity	(such	as	forest	cover	and	rain-
fed	agriculture)	than	exposure	(such	as	droughts,	floods,	storms).29	Given	the	role	of	human	systems	
in	mediating	the	links	between	climate,	food,	and	health,	the	chosen	indicators	focus	on	abiotic	and	
biotic	indicators	and	current	population	vulnerabilities,	considering	both	terrestrial	and	marine	
ecosystems.	The	potential	health	implications	are	many	and	varied,	with	stunting	as	a	result	of	
malnutrition	present	throughout	the	rest	of	life,	predisposing	individuals	to	a	broad	range	of	
communicable	and	non-communicable	disease.		
		
Indicator	1.5.1:	Vulnerability	to	under-nutrition	
Headline	Finding:		
The	purpose	of	this	indicator	is	to	track	the	extent	to	which	health	in	countries	where	dependence	
on	domestic	production	of	food	is	high	and	under-nourishment	is	already	high,	will	be	further	
compromised	by	climate	change-induced	changes	in	temperature	and	precipitation,	manifested	in	
falling	yields.	
Food	markets	are	increasingly	globalised,	and	food	security	–	access	to	sufficient,	affordable,	and	
nutritious	food	–	is	increasingly	driven	by	human	systems.	For	example,	poor	wheat	harvests	in	
Australia	in	2005-6,	resulting	from	successive	droughts,	were	a	key	trigger	in	the	2008	food	crisis.	
Export	restrictions,	‘panic	buying’,	‘hording’,	and	speculation	drove	the	extreme	price	spikes	that	
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increased	food	insecurity	in	many	lower-income	countries,	whilst	record	harvests	the	following	cycle	
eased	the	crisis.	Yet	equally	importantly,	many	lower-income,	food-insecure	countries	still	depend	
primarily	on	growing	a	large	proportion	of	the	food	that	they	consume,	and	localised	crop	losses	will	
increase	levels	of	under-nutrition.	
Temperature	and	precipitation	are	highlighted	as	the	key	impacts	of	climate	change	on	food	
production.	Crop	yields	are	sensitive	to	temperature	increases,	and	globally	the	negative	impacts	
outweigh	the	positive	for	most	of	the	key	staples.	Rising	temperatures	have	been	shown	to	reduce	
global	wheat	production,	which	has	been	estimated	to	fall	6%	for	each	degree	Celsius	of	additional	
temperature	increase.	Rice	yields	are	sensitive	to	higher	night	temperatures,	with	each	1°C	increase	
in	growing-season	minimum	temperature	in	the	dry	season	resulting	in	a	fall	in	rice	grain	yield	of	
10%.	Higher	temperatures	have	been	demonstrated	rigorously	to	have	a	negative	impact	on	crop	
yields	in	lower-latitude	countries.30-32	Moreover,	agriculture	in	lower-latitudes	tends	to	be	more	
marginal,	and	more	people	are	food	insecure.	There	is	less	confidence	in	the	literature	concerning	
the	impact	of	precipitation	on	yields,	in	part	due	to	measurement	difficulties.31	
In	response	to	falling	yields	caused	by	temperature	increases,	governments,	communities,	and	
organisations	can	and	will	undertake	adaptation	activities	that	might	variously	include	breeding	
programmes,	area	expansion,	increased	irrigation,	or	switching	crops.	However,	the	greater	the	loss	
of	yield	potential	due	to	temperature	increases,	the	more	difficult	adaptation	becomes.		
The	indicator	selected	for	this	focuses	on	the	vulnerability	and	exposure	of	populations	to	food	
insecurity,	and	is	presented	in	Figure	1.11,	below.	The	analysis	selected	a	sample	of	countries	with	
three	key	characteristics.	Firstly,	those	with	a	low	cereal	import	dependence	ratio	(and	hence	a	high	
domestic	production	dependence)	are	selected,	as	these	countries	are	most	vulnerable	to	localised	
weather	shocks	(and	indeed,	may	also	be	the	most	vulnerable	to	global	food	shocks).	Secondly,	
countries	in	locations	where	temperature	increases	are	clearly	negatively	affecting	yields	are	
selected.	Thirdly,	countries	with	‘moderately	high’	(18	countries),	‘high’	(15	countries)	and	‘very	
high’	(5	countries)	levels	of	under-nourishment	as	measured	by	the	Food	and	Agricultural	
Organization,	are	selected.33	Data	for	countries	from	the	resulting	five	regions	in	Africa	and	Asia	
presented	below	is	then	analysed,	with	the	percentage	of	the	population	under-nourished,	
multiplied	by	a	country’s	dependence	on	domestic	cereal	production.33	A	detailed	description	of	the	
reasoning	and	potential	additional	and	future	indicators	available	to	complement	this	approach	is	
described	in	Appendix	2.	
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Figure	1.11:	Vulnerability	of	regions	to	climate-driven	yield	losses.33	
	
Three	regions	in	Africa	exhibit	high	and	sustained	vulnerability	and	exposure.	These	regions	also	
coincide	with	areas	where	yield	losses	due	to	warming	are	predicted	to	be	relatively	high,	thus	
increasing	the	vulnerability	of	these	populations	to	the	negative	health	consequences	of	under-
nutrition.	Southern	Asia	and	Western	Africa	exhibit	“high”	levels	of	dependence	on	local	cereal	
production,	but	low	and	falling	levels	of	under-nutrition.	Globally	38	countries	are	currently	
experiencing	under-nutrition	rates	of	over	15%,	and	20	countries	rates	over	25%.	Of	these	38	
countries,	29	depend	on	domestic	production	for	at	least	half	of	their	cereal	consumption.	High	
dependence	on	one	crop	increases	the	vulnerability	of	individual	countries	further.	For	example,	
Kenya	has	a	domestic	production	dependency	for	cereals	of	almost	80%,	is	69%	dependent	on	
maize,	is	experiencing	high	levels	of	under-nutrition,	and	is	particularly	vulnerable	to	climate-related	
yield	losses.	Going	forward,	this	data	will	be	refined	through	country-level	exploration,	incorporation	
of	the	predicted	impact	of	warming	on	yield	losses,	and	aggregated	to	determine	the	extent	to	
which	total	population	exposure	and	vulnerability	is	changing	over	time.	
Maize,	wheat,	rice,	and	soybean	account	for	around	three	quarters	of	human	consumed	calories,.31	
Though	yields	will	be	affected	differentially	depending	on	the	particular	crop	and	location,	overall	
crop	yields	for	staples	(excluding	rice	for	which	no	overall	change	is	expected)	are	predicted	to	
decline	on	average	by	8%	by	the	2050s	in	South	Asia	(-16%	maize,	-11%	sorghum)	and	Africa	(-17%	
wheat,	-5%	maize,	-15%	sorghum,	-10%	millet),	currently	the	most	food	insecure	regions.34	
Considerable	falls	in	total	production	are	predicted	by	2100	for	maize	and	soybean	that	will	affect	
vulnerable	populations	across	the	globe	(30-46%	under	the	slowest	Hadley	III	warming	scenario	and	
63–82%	under	the	most	rapid).35	
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Indicator	1.5.2:	Marine	primary	productivity	
Decline	in	fish	consumption	provides	an	indication	of	food	insecurity,	especially	in	local	shoreline	
communities	which	are	dependent	on	sea	products	for	food,	and	are	thus	particularly	vulnerable	to	
any	declines	in	marine	primary	productivity	affecting	fish	stocks.	This	is	particularly	concerning	for	
the	1	billion	people	around	the	world	who	rely	on	fish	as	their	principal	source	of	protein,	and	are	
hence	at	increased	risk	of	stunting	and	malnutrition	as	a	result	of	any	decline	in	food	security.36	Low	
fish	consumption	is	also	associated	with	a	diet	low	in	seafood	Omega-3	fatty	acids	which	is	a	risk	
factor	for	cardiovascular	diseases.37	
Marine	primary	productivity	is	determined	by	abiotic	and	biotic	factors,	and	measuring	these	
globally	and	identifying	relevant	marine	basins	is	highly	complex.	Factors	such	as	sea	surface	
temperature	(SST),	sea	surface	salinity	(SSS),	coral	bleaching	and	phytoplankton	numbers	are	key	
determinants	of	marine	primary	productivity.	These	are	often	highly	localised	and	other	local	
determinants	have	particularly	strong	influences	on	marine	primary	productivity.	For	example,	
harmful	algal	blooms	(HAB)	occur	as	a	result	of	uncontrolled	algal	growth	producing	deadly	toxins.	
The	consumption	of	seafood	contaminated	with	the	toxins	of	harmful	algal	blooms	such	as	those	
produced	by	Alexandrium	tamarense,	is	often	very	dangerous	to	human	health,	and	potentially	
fatal.38		
Changes	in	SST	and	SSS	from	1985	to	present,	for	twelve	fishery	locations	essential	for	aquatic	food	
security	are	presented	here.	Data	was	obtained	from	NASA’s	Earth	Observatory	Databank,	and	
mapped	across	to	the	significant	basins	outlined	in	Appendix	2.	From	1985	to	2016,	a	1oC	increase	in	
SST	(from	an	annual	average	of	22.74oC	to	23.73oC)	was	recorded	in	these	locations.39	This	indicator	
requires	significant	further	work	to	draw	out	the	attribution	to	climate	change	and	the	health	
outcomes	that	may	result. 
Box	1.1	provides	a	case	study	of	the	impacts	of	degrading	marine	primary	productivity	on	
commercial	fish	stocks	in	the	Persian	Gulf.	
	
Box	1.1	Commercial	fish	stocks	in	the	Persian	Gulf	
One	basin	in	which	fish	stocks	are	an	important	source	of	food	is	the	Persian	Gulf.	Fish	stocks	have	
been	 declining	 in	 the	 Persian	 Gulf	 since	 the	 1970s,	 with	 food	 security	 concerns	 arising	 for	 the	
populations	 here	 dependent	 on	 fish	 for	 food.40	Human	 activities	 are	 influencing	 fish	 stocks	 in	 the	
Persian	 Gulf,	 including	 industrial	 activity,	 dredging	 and	 land	 reclamation.41	 Furthermore,	 recent	
studies	of	fishing	in	the	Persian	Gulf	show	that	actual	fish	catches	in	this	region	are	up	to	six	times	
higher	than	the	reported	quantities	given	to	the	UN.42	These	factors	are	compounding	to	increase	the	
pressure	on	fish	stocks	and	reduce	marine	populations,	which	many	people	in	the	area	are	dependent	
on	as	a	primary	source	of	food.	
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a)	 b) 	
Figure	1.12.	Changes	in	the	SST	in	the	a)	western	and	b)	eastern	regions	of	the	Persian	Gulf	from	2014	to	2017	
vs.	the	coral	reefs	bleaching	threshold	of	35oC.43	
Beyond	these	direct	human	behaviours,	anthropogenic	climate	change	is	also	putting	fish	populations	
in	the	Persian	Gulf	at	risk.	Key	proxies	for	the	influence	of	climate	change	on	fish	stocks	are	SST	and	
SSS.	Changes	to	SST	and	SSS	have	been	found	to	have	been	negatively	impacting	the	coral	reefs	in	the	
Persian	Gulf,	which	fish	populations	are	dependent	upon	for	their	survival;	for	example,	there	were	
mass	coral	bleaching	events	 in	the	Persian	Gulf	 in	1996	and	1998,	which	caused	a	decline	 in	fish.41	
Figure	1.12	compares	the	variations	in	SST	in	the	western	and	eastern	regions	of	the	Persian	Gulf.44	
SST	has	risen	since	2013,	but	also	exceeds	the	coral	bleaching	threshold	of	33°C	in	the	summer	months	
across	both	regions	throughout	the	period	2013	to	2017.	Rising	SST	and	associated	coral	stress	is	likely	
to	have	contributed	to	 lower	fish	populations	and	associated	decreases	 in	the	total	catch	of	major	
commercial	 fish	 species	 in	 the	 Iranian	 waters	 in	 the	 Persian	 Gulf,	 including	 tiger	 tooth	 croaker	
(Otolithes	ruber),	threadfin	(Polynemus	spp.),	and	silver	pomfret	(Pampus	argenteus).	Not	only	does	
this	pose	direct	risks	to	human	health	through	food	insecurity,	but	retail	prices	have	also	spiked	as	a	
result	of	reduced	availability,	further	contributing	to	reduced	fish	consumption	in	coastal	provinces.44	
For	instance,	Bushehr	Province,	the	main	Iranian	fish	catching	site,	has	experienced	a	decrease	in	the	
total	catch	of	the	major	commercial	fish	species,	leading	to	a	sharp	decline	in	annual	fish	consumption	
per	 capita,	 from	 46.8	 kg	 in	 2009	 to	 24.7	 kg	 in	 2016	 (Figure	 1.13).45	 This	 decline	 is	 most	 likely	 a	
combination	 of	 human	 stresses,	 including	 climate	 change	 and	 overfishing,	 but	 nonetheless	 the	
consequences	for	human	health	are	clear	–	reduced	fish	availability	increases	food	insecurity	and	risks	
malnourishment	in	the	region.	If	climate	change	is	not	mitigated,	SST	and	SSS	will	increase	further	in	
future,	placing	coral	reefs	and	dependent	fish	in	the	Persian	Gulf	at	greater	risk	of	depletion.	Fishing	
activities	should	therefore	also	be	mindful	of	the	need	for	sustainable	fish	populations,	as	changes	to	
commercial	 fish	stock	populations	do	not	 result	 from	one	sole	 factor,	but	 rather	a	combination	of	
stresses	reducing	fish	populations	that	will	be	exacerbated	by	climate	change.	
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Figure	1.13.	Annual	fish	consumption	per	capita	in	Bushehr	Province	(main	Iranian	fishing	site)	from	2009-
2016.45	
	
Indicator	1.6:	Migration	and	climate	change	
Headline	Finding:	4,400	people	globally	are	already	being	forced	to	migrate	due	to	sea-level	rise	
caused	by	climate	change.	
Many	factors,	including	climate	change,	influence	human	migration,	and	these	may	interact.	Further,	
climate	change	might	drive	such	migration	through	diverse	mechanisms	that	interact	in	complex	and	
non-linear	ways	(loss	of	habitation	due	to	extreme	weather,	loss	of	land	due	to	sea	level	rise,	
degradation	of	agricultural	land	through	flooding,	drought,	salt	water	ingress,	or	changes	in	resource	
availability	or	disease	burden	to	name	but	a	few).		For	these	reasons,	demonstrating	a	causal	link	
between	climate	change	and	migration,	and	quantifying	such	an	impact,	is	hard.		Further,	it	can	be	
hard	to	even	define	migration	under	such	circumstances.	
For	example,	the	Pingelap	atoll	in	the	Federated	States	of	Micronesia	has	a	significant	amount	of	
land	over	15	metres	above	sea	level,	all	of	which	is	within	300	metres	of	the	coast.	If	its	people	move	
to	different	houses	due	to	sea-level	rise,	a	question	is	raised	as	to	whether	this	would	be	counted	as	
migration,	given	that	the	people	are	still	living	in	effectively	the	same	location.	Consequently,	this	
indicator	is	kept	at	a	country	level,	identifying	the	countries	which	may	not	be	able	to	remain	as	
countries	under	thermal	expansion,	in	addition	to	communities	that	are	currently	migrating	due	to	
climate	change.	
Currently,	a	minimum	of	4,400	people	across	a	minimum	of	fourteen	communities	are	being	forced	
to	migrate	due	to	climate	change	only,	with	many	other	communities	and	countries	experiencing	
climate	change	as	one	of	a	number	of	factors	driving	migration.	(Table	1.1).		By	2050,	a	minimum	of	
584,000	people	across	a	minimum	of	four	countries	will	likely	be	forced	to	migrate	due	to	climate	
change	only	(Table	1.2).	All	four	countries	are	small	island	developing	states	(SIDS).	Whilst	all	
countries	have	been	considered,	these	countries	have	limited	inhabitable	high	ground.	Ice	sheet	
collapse	scenarios	lead	to	the	possibility	of	more	than	one	billion	people	(with	wide	sensitivity	
ranges)	having	to	adapt	to	climate	change	or	be	forced	to	migrate	as	a	result	of	it,	from	2100	
onwards.	
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Location	 Population	 Citation	 Notes	on	causes	
Carteret	Islands,	PNG	 1,200	 Connell	(2016)46	
Strauss	(2012)47	
Migrating	due	to	sea-level	rise	
Alaska	(need	to	migrate	
as	soon	as	possible)*	
	
	
	
Bronen	 and	 Chapin	
III	(2013)48	
Shearer	(2012)49	
Migrating	due	to	changing	ice	
conditions	leading	to	coastal	
erosion	and	due	to	permafrost	
melt,	destabilising	infrastructure	Kivalina	 398-400	
Newtok	 353	
Shaktoolik	 214	
Shismaref	 609	
Alaska	(need	to	migrate	
gradually)*	
	
	
	
Bronen	 and	 Chapin	
III	(2013)48	
	
Migrating	due	to	changing	ice	
conditions	leading	to	coastal	
erosion	and	due	to	permafrost	
melt,	destabilising	infrastructure	Allakaket	 95	
Golovin	 167	
Hughes	 76	
Huslia	 255	
Koyukuk	 89	
Nulato	 274	
Teller	 256	
Unalakleet	 724	
Isle	 de	 Jean	 Charles,	
Louisiana	
25	homes	 	 Coastal	erosion,	wetland	loss,	
reduced	accretion,	barrier	island	
erosion,	subsidence,	and	
saltwater	intrusion	were	caused	
by	dredging,	dikes,	levees,	
controlling	the	Mississippi	River,	
and	agricultural	practices.	Climate	
change	is	now	bringing	sea-level	
rise	
Table	1.1	Locations	migrating	now	due	to	only	climate	change.	*The	village	names	and	populations	are	sourced	
from	the	US	Government	Accountability	Office’s	report,	“Alaska	Native	Villages:	Limited	Progress	Has	Been	
Made	on	Relocating	Villages	Threatened	by	Flooding	and	Erosion”.46-49	
	
Location	 Population	 Notes	
Kiribati	 106,925	 Has	plenty	of	high	ground	above	10	m	above	sea	 level,	but	
little	is	habitable	or	viable	for	large	populations.	
Maldives	 392,960	 Highest	point	is	2.4	m	above	sea	level.	
Marshall	Islands	 73,376	 Highest	point	is	10	m	above	sea	level.	
Tuvalu	 10,959	 Highest	point	is	5	m	above	sea	level.	
Table	1.2.	Locations	possibly	needing	to	migrate	due	to	thermal	expansion	
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These	data	are	derived	from	peer-reviewed	academic	literature	and	books.		The	presumed	link	
between	climate	change	and	migration	is	now	firmly	embedded	in	academic	and	public	consciences.	
Yet	critical	voices	continue	to	highlight	both	the	lack	of	evidence	linking	climate	change	directly	to	
migration	through	linear	causality	and	the	multitude	of	factors	which	influence	any	connections	
between	the	two.	These	criticisms	do	not	deny	interactions	between	climate	change	and	migration,	
nor	the	possibility	of	future	occurrences	of	large-scale	migration	linked	to	climate	change.	They	
simply	point	out	the	several	truisms	from	migration	research	which	are	often	bypassed.	First,	
migration	is	and	always	has	been	part	of	humanity.	Second,	many	factors,	including	climate,	
influence	human	migration.	Third,	where	people	are	forced	to	migrate	or	not	to	migrate	when	they	
would	prefer	otherwise,	this	may	in	part	be	due	to	a	lack	of	support	mechanisms	to	deal	with	
environmental	changes.	
Long-term,	human	exposure	and	vulnerability	to	ice	sheet	collapse	is	increasing,	as	the	number	of	
people	living	close	to	the	coast	and	at	elevations	close	to	sea	level	are	also	increasing.	In	1990,	450	
million	people	lived	within	20	km	coast	and	less	than	20	metres	above	sea	level.50		In	2000,	634,000	
million	(10%	of	the	global	population),	of	whom	360	million	are	urban,	lived	below	10	metres	above	
sea	level,	(the	highest	vertical	resolution	investigated).51	With	2000	as	a	baseline,	the	population	
living	below	10	metres	above	sea	level	and	connected	to	the	ocean	will	rise	from	638	million	to,	
1,005-1,091	million	by	2050	and	830-1,184	million	by	2100.52	Given	ice	sheet	collapse	is	not	
expected	prior	to	2100,	this	would	suggest	no	additional	people,	being	forced	to	migrate	due	to	ice	
sheet	collapse	by	2100.53	However,	beyond	2100,	without	mitigation	and	adaptation	interventions,	
over	one	billion	people	may	need	to	migrate	due	to	ice	sheet	collapse.	
	
Conclusion	
Climate	change	impacts	health	through	diverse	direct	and	indirect	mechanisms.		Potential	positive	
impacts,	particularly	in	higher	latitudes	(such	as	fewer	winter	deaths,	longer	agricultural	growing	
seasons	and	higher	yields	due	to	CO2	fertilisation)	are	likely	substantially	outweighed	by	the	negative	
impacts,	particularly	in	tropical	and	sub-tropical	latitudes.		
Adaptation	pathways	can	negate	help	to	minimise	some	of	the	negative	health	impacts	of	global	
warming,	especially	for	lower	predicted	average	temperature	rises.	Indeed,	for	each	of	the	indicators	
tracked,	the	realised	health	impacts	depend	strongly	on	human	systems	and	societal	choices,	
suggesting	the	appropriate	policy	responses	might	be	best	driven	by	adaptation	opportunities.	
However,	there	are	powerful	limits	to	adaptation,	and	this	section	has	drawn	attention	to	the	non-
linearity	and	the	spatial	distribution	of	the	health	impacts	of	climate	change.	
The	indicators	presented	here	demonstrate	clearly	that	these	impacts	are	being	experienced	across	
the	world	today,	and	provide	a	strong	imperative	for	both	adaptation	and	mitigation	interventions	
to	protect	and	promote	public	health.	
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2.	Health	Resilience	and	Adaptation	
	
Introduction	
The	impact	of	climate	change	on	human	health	will	initially	be	disproportionately	felt	in	developing	
countries,	(due	in	part	to	weaker	health	infrastructures)	and	by	vulnerable	population	groups,	such	
as	the	young,	elderly,	women,	and	those	with	existing	medical	conditions.54	As	demonstrated	in	
section	one,	human	exposure	to	climate	impacts	is	already	much	higher	than	previously	estimated.	
Mitigation	is	therefore	essential	to	reduce	the	burden	on	vulnerable	populations,	lessen	the	need	for	
adaptation,	and	to	improve	the	effectiveness	of	adaptation	now.	
As	humans	respond	to	the	health	threats	of	climate	change,	both	adaptation	and	resilience	are	
essential.		Climate	adaptation	is	defined	by	the	IPCC	as	the	“adjustment	in	natural	or	human	systems	
in	response	to	actual	or	expected	climatic	stimuli	or	their	effects,	which	moderates	harm	or	exploits	
beneficial	opportunities”.55		With	respect	to	health,	adaptation	consists	of	efforts	to	reduce	injury,	
illness,	disability,	and	suffering	from	climate-related	causes.		Resilience	has	been	defined	as	“the	
capacity	of	individuals,	communities	and	systems	to	survive,	adapt,	and	grow	in	the	face	of	stress	
and	shocks,	and	even	transform	when	conditions	require	it”.	In	the	context	of	climate	change	and	
health,	resilience	is	an	attribute	of	individuals,	communities,	and	health	care	systems;	resilience	at	
all	levels	can	reduce	adverse	health	outcomes	of	climate	change.	
Indicators	of	resilience	and	adaptation	are	challenging	to	identify.		Many	relevant	efforts	take	place	
at	the	local	level,	however	relevant	data	is	most	readily	available	at	the	national	level.	Actions	that	
bring	resilience	and	climate	change	adaptation	are	often	embedded	in	broader	initiatives	such	as	
public	health	system	strengthening	and	disaster	preparedness,	and	are	therefore	difficult	to	track	
independently.		Health	protection	that	flows	from	adaptation	in	other	sectors,	such	as	agriculture,	
housing,	and	energy,	may	not	be	identified	as	health	adaptation.	Indicators	of	health	adaptation	
initiatives	are	generally	process	measures,	not	outcome	measures,	and	are	self-reported;	measures	
of	actual	health	improvement	are	more	elusive.	Accordingly,	the	indicators	in	this	section	are	
imperfect	measures	of	health	adaptation	and	resilience.	
The	indicators	presented	here	are	intended	to	track	vulnerability	and	resilience,	leadership	and	
governance,	implementation	and	adaptive	capacity,	and	adaptation	financing	associated	with	health	
resilience	and	adaptation	to	climate	change.	These	indicators	are:	
	
• Vulnerability	to	Climate	Change:	
o 2.1	Deaths	from	climate-	and	weather-related	disasters	
o 2.2	Trends	in	selected	climate-sensitive	diseases	
• Leadership	and	Governance:	
o 2.3	Number	of	countries	with	a	national	adaptation	plan	for	health	
o 2.4	Number	of	cities	with	climate	change	risk	assessments	
• Implementation	and	Adaptive	Capacity:	human	resources,	early	warning	systems,	and	
infrastructure	
o 2.5	Implementation	of	IHR	Core	Capacity	Requirements	
o 2.6	Proportion	of	national	meteorological	and	hydrological	agencies	providing	
services	tailored	for	the	health	sector	
o 2.7	Number	of	countries	that	have	conducted	a	national	assessment	of	vulnerability,	
impacts	and	adaptation	for	health	
o 2.8	Number	of	countries	implementing	activities	to	build	health	resilient	
infrastructure	
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• Adaptation	Finance:	
o 2.9	Spending	on	adaptation	for	health	and	health-related	activities	
o 2.10	Health	adaptation	funding	from	global	climate	financing	mechanisms	
	
Corresponding	Appendix	3	provide	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	data	and	methods	used.	
	
Vulnerability	to	Climate	Change	
The	indicators	in	this	section	track	the	vulnerability	and	resilience	of	populations	and	health	systems,	
to	climate	risks.	Understanding	current	vulnerability	and	resilience	to	climate	change,	and	how	this	
has	changed	over	time	provides	essential	guidance	for	adaptation	planning	and	implementation.	
	
Indicator	2.1:	Deaths	from	climate-	and	weather-related	disasters	
Headline	Finding:	Despite	a	44%	increase	in	annual	climate-related	disasters	from	2000	to	2013,	
compared	with	the	1994-2000	average,	there	has	been	no	accompanying	increase	in	the	number	of	
deaths,	nor	in	those	affected	by	disasters,	nor	in	the	ratio	of	these	two	outcomes.	
Climate-	and	weather-related	events	have	been	associated	with	over	90%	of	all	disasters	worldwide	
over	the	last	twenty	years.	The	continent	most	affected	by	climate	and	weather	related	disasters	is	
Asia,	with	some	2,495	events	between	1995-2015	affecting	3.7	billion	people	and	killing	332,000.	On	
the	whole,	deaths	from	natural	hazard-related	disasters	are	largely	concentrated	in	poorer	
countries.56		
Disaster	impact	is	a	function	of	hazard	and	vulnerability,	with	vulnerability	a	function	of	exposure,	
sensitivity,	and	adaptive	capacity.	This	indicator	measures	the	ratio	of	the	number	of	deaths,	to	the	
number	of	people	affected	by	climate-	and	weather-related	disasters:	droughts,	floods,	extreme	
temperature	events,	storms	and	wildfires.	This	ratio	is	a	proxy	measure	of	disaster	preparedness	and	
response	and	adaptation	in	the	health	care	sector.	Data	come	from	the	Emergency	Events	Database	
(EM-DAT).57,58	Here,	a	disaster	is	defined	as	either:	1)	10	or	more	people	reported	killed,	2)	100	or	
more	people	affected,	3)	a	declaration	of	a	state	of	emergency,	or	4)	a	call	for	international	
assistance.		
Between	1994	and	2013	the	frequency	of	climate-related	events	(mainly	floods	and	storms)	
increased	significantly.		From	2000	to	2013	EM-DAT	recorded	an	average	of	341	climate-related	
disasters	per	annum,	up	44%	from	the	1994-2000	average	and	well	over	twice	the	level	in	1980-
1989.59		However	this	has	not	been	accompanied	by	any	discernible	trend	in	number	of	deaths,	nor	
in	those	affected	by	disasters,	nor	in	the	ratio	of	these	two	(Figure	2.1a).	Separating	out	the	disasters	
by	the	type	of	climate	and	weather	hazard	associated	with	the	disaster	(Figure	2.1b)	shows	there	has	
been	a	statistically	significant	global	decrease	in	the	numbers	affected	by	floods,	equating	to	a	
decrease	of	3	million	people	annually.	Clearly,	the	bulk	of	the	disasters	affecting	people	are	
droughts,	floods	and	storms.	No	significant	trend	is	seen	in	the	ratio	of	those	killed	to	those	affected	
for	any	of	the	different	types	of	disasters,	although	there	appears	to	be	a	slight	upward	trend	since	
2010	in	this	ratio	for	flood	related	disasters	(Figures	2.1c	and	2.1d).	
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This	indicates	that	countries	are	generally	getting	better	at	dealing	with	climatic	hazards,	with	
improved	implementation	and	adaptive	capacity	and	thus	over	time	there	has	been	a	decrease	in	
the	number	of	people	killed	and	affected	by	such	events.	However,	although	climatic	hazards	have	
increased	in	number	over	the	past	three	to	four	decades,	the	data	here	does	not	capture	the	
severity	of	such	events	–	a	factor	directly	relevant	to	a	country’s	ability	to	adapt,	and	that	is	
expected	to	increase	as	a	result	of	climate	change.60	
Turning	to	national	data,	and	comparing	the	periods	1990-2009	and	2010-2016	with	the	ratio	of	
deaths	to	numbers	affected	in	droughts,	floods	and	storm-related	disasters	increased	more	in	high-
income	countries,	than	in	low-	and	middle-income	countries	(Figure	2.2a	and	b).	This	indicates	a	
relative	improvement	in	the	adaptive	capacity	of	low-	and	middle-income	countries	(LMIC)	on	the	
one	hand,	whilst	the	increasing	number	of	deaths	experienced	in	many	high-income	countries	may	
reflect	an	increased	number	of	extreme	events,	perhaps	not	previously	experienced,	in	these	
countries	over	the	past	few	decades.	These	findings	might	suggest	a	lack	of	preparedness	to	climate	
change	even	among	wealthier	nations,	such	as	Germany	and	New	Zealand.	Evidently,	more	work	is	
required	in	countries	of	all	income	groupings	to	reduce	vulnerabilities	to	climate	hazards	and	adapt	
to	extreme	weather	events.	
a) 	b)	 	
c)	 		d)	 	
Figure	2.1.	Deaths	and	people	affected	by	climate-	and	weather-	related	disasters.	2.1a)	Percentage	change	over	time	in	the	global	
number	of	deaths,	the	number	of	those	affected,	and	the	ratio	of	these.	2.1b)	Change	over	time	in	the	number	of	people	affected	
globally	by	different	climate-	and	weather-related	disasters.	2.1c)	Yearly	change	over	time	in	the	percentage	of	people	killed,	as	a	
proportion	of	those	affected	globally	by	different	climate-	and	weather-related	disasters,	as	compared	to	the	average	for	1990-2010.	
2.1d)	Yearly	change	over	time	in	the	percentage	of	people	killed	as	a	proportion	of	those	affected	globally	by	drought	related	
disasters,	as	compared	to	the	average	for	1990-2010.		
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To	date,	there	is	no	international	consensus	regarding	best	practices	for	collecting	disaster	impact	
data.	However,	EM-DAT	represents	one	of	the	most	widely	used	datasets	in	this	area.	The	validity	of	
the	deaths:	affected	ratio	as	an	indicator	rests	on	the	assumption	that	it	reflects	disaster	
management	and	health	system	capacity,	which	is	debatable.	A	key	part	of	this	indicator	is	
estimating	those	affected	by	a	disaster	and	those	exposed,	and	distinguishing	the	two;	a	difficult	task	
in	the	context	of	disasters.	An	important	caveat	is	that	while	the	number	of	people	affected	in	a	
disaster	is	often	reported,	the	operational	definition	of	who	is	“affected”	varies	across	countries,	as	
do	the	methods	of	estimation.	Comparisons	between	countries	should	therefore	be	interpreted	with	
caution.	
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Indicator	2.2:	Trends	in	selected	climate-sensitive	diseases	
Headline	Finding:	Global	health	initiatives	have	overwhelmingly	decreased	deaths	associated	with	
climate-sensitive	diseases	since	1990.	
Disease	occurrence	is	determined	by	a	complex	composite	of	social	and	environmental	conditions	
and	health	service	provision,	all	of	which	vary	geographically.	Nonetheless,	some	diseases	are	
particularly	sensitive	to	variations	in	climate	and	weather,	and	may	thus	be	expected	to	vary	with	
both	longer-term	climate	change	and	shorter-term	extreme	weather	events.17	This	indicator	draws	
a)	 	
b)	 	
Figure	2.2.	2.2a)	Nationally	disaggregated	ratio	of	the	average	number	of	deaths:	to	numbers	affected	for	drought,	flood	and	storm	
related	disasters	for	the	period	2010-2016	compared	to	1990-2009.	2.2b)	The	normalised	difference	in	the	ratio	of	the	average	
deaths	to	numbers	affected	for	2010-2016	compared	to	1990-2009	against	the	average	number	of	deaths	per	climate	and	weather	
related	disaster	for	2009-2010.	The	normalised	difference	is	comprised	of	the	difference	of	the	deaths:	affected	ratio	between	
2010-2016	and	1990-2009	normalised	by	the	sum	of	these	ratios.	Positive	values	indicate	and	increase	in	the	numbers	of	deaths	
per	affected.	
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from	Global	Burden	of	Disease	(GBD)	mortality	estimates	to	show	trends	in	deaths	associated	with	
eight	climate-sensitive	diseases	since	1990	(Figure	2.3).61	
	
Figure	2.3:	trends	in	mortality	from	selected	causes	as	estimated	by	the	Global	Burden	of	Disease	2015,	for	the	
period	1990	to	2015,	by	WHO	region.61		
The	disease	trends	reveal	global	increases	in	dengue	mortality,	particularly	in	the	Asia/Pacific	and	
Latin	America/Caribbean	regions,	with	some	peak	years	(e.g.	1998)	known	to	being	associated	with	
the	El	Niño	conditions.62	Beyond	climate,	likely	drivers	of	dengue	mortality	include	trade,	
urbanization,	global	and	local	mobility	and	climate	variability;	the	association	between	increased	
dengue	mortality	and	climate	change	is	therefore	hard	to	accurately	discern.63	However,	the	spread	
of	dengue	to	new	areas	(for	example,	there	was	a	large	dengue	outbreak	in	Madeira	in	2012)	
demonstrates	the	risks	of	spreading	infectious	diseases	and	the	need	for	health	system	resilience.64	
Malaria	mortality	is	predominantly	an	African	phenomenon,	but	has	decreased	strongly	over	the	last	
15	years,	owing	to	continued	investment	in	prevention.	Despite	this,	possibilities	of	re-emergence	
exist,	and	could	be	weather-driven,	particularly	as	population	immunity	declines	with	declining	
incidence.	Malignant	melanoma	is	a	distinctive	example	of	a	non-communicable	disease	with	a	clear	
link	to	ultraviolet	exposure,	with	mortality	increasing	steadily	despite	advances	in	surveillance	and	
treatment.	Heat	and	cold	exposure	is	a	potentially	important	aspect	of	climate-influenced	mortality,	
although	the	underlying	attribution	of	deaths	to	these	causes	in	the	estimates	is	uncertain.65-70		
Overall,	the	findings	here	highlight	the	effectiveness	and	success	of	global	health	initiatives	since	
1990,	in	largely	reducing	deaths	associated	with	these	diseases.	However,	climate	change	threatens	
to	undo	this	progress	and	outbreaks	of	climate-sensitive	diseases	in	previously	unexposed	areas	
highlight	the	need	for	health	system	adaptation	now,	to	prepare	for	potential	future	shocks.	
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Leadership	and	Governance	
The	following	indicators	monitor	government	commitments	to	health	and	climate	adaptation	
measures,	tracking	the	promulgation	of	a	health	national	adaptation	strategy	(national	level)	and	the	
presence	of	designated	adaptation	personnel	at	the	city	level.	
	
Indicator	2.3:	Number	of	countries	with	a	national	adaptation	strategy	for	the	health	impacts	
of	climate	change	
Headline	finding:	30	out	of	40	responding	countries	have	an	approved	health	component	of	their	
National	Adaptation	Plan	.	
Effective	national	responses	to	climate	risks	require	that	the	health	sector	identify	strategic	goals	for	
building	health	resilience.	A	critical	step	in	achieving	these	strategic	goals	is	the	development	of	a	
national	health	adaptation	plan,	outlining	priority	actions,	resource	requirements	and	a	specific	
timeline	and	process	for	implementation.	This	indicator	tracks	the	policy	commitments	of	national	
governments	for	building	health	resilience	to	climate	change.	Data	are	drawn	from	the	recent	WHO-
United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	Climate	and	Health	Country	
Profile	Survey	(Box	2.1).	
Impressively,	of	the	40	countries	responding	to	the	survey,	30	reported	having	a	national	adaptation	
strategy	for	health,	that	has	been	approved	by	the	Ministry	of	Health	or	relevant	health	authority	
(Figure	2.4).	This	number	includes	countries	with	a	health	component	of	their	National	Adaptation	
Plan	(HNAPs).	Although	this	is	not	representative	of	all	countries,	75%	of	nations	in	the	survey	having	
an	approved	HNAP	is	a	remarkable	achievement	and	evidence	of	the	recognition	of	the	need	to	
adapt	to	climate	change.	Countries	with	HNAPs	are	found	across	all	regions	and,	perhaps	most	
significantly,	among	some	of	the	most	vulnerable	countries	across	Africa,	South	East	Asia	and	South	
America.	
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Figure	2.4:	Countries	with	national	heath	climate	adaptation	strategies	or	plans.	Source:	WHO	Climate	and	
Health	Country	Profile	Survey71	
	
Box	2.1:	WHO-UNFCCC	Climate	and	Health	Country	Profiles	
The	WHO-UNFCCC	Climate	and	Health	Country	Profile	project	is	an	ongoing	effort	to	understand	
national-level	information	on	climate-related	health	threats	and	responses.		As	part	of	this	project,	
the	WHO	surveyed	member	states	in	2015,	with	an	emphasis	on	LMICs.	The	survey	contained	23	
questions	on	the	following	aspects	of	health	and	climate	change:	1)	governance	and	policy,	2)	
vulnerability,	impact	and	adaptation	(health)	assessments,	3)	health	adaptation	strategies	and	action	
plans,	4)	preparedness,	risk	management	and	integrated	risk	monitoring,	5)	awareness	raising	and	
capacity	building,	6)	research,	and	7)	financing.	Forty	nations	responded,	including	countries	from	all	
WHO	regions,	all	income	categories	(for	instance,	high	income	nations	such	as	the	USA,	UK	and	
France,	emerging	economies	such	as	Brazil	and	China,	as	well	as	developing	countries	including	
Ethiopia,	Nepal	and	Peru)	and	with	varying	levels	of	risks	and	vulnerabilities	to	the	health	impacts	of	
climate	change	(for	instance,	Fiji	as	a	small	island	state,	Bangladesh	with	heavily	populated	coastal	
areas	facing	multiple	climate	threats	and	Morocco	with	diverse	climatic	regions	each	facing	unique	
threats).	The	2015	data	were	validated	through	a	consultation	process	seeking	input	from	key	in-
country	stakeholders,	including	representatives	of	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Ministry	of	Environment,	
meteorological	services	and	WHO	country	and	regional	technical	officers.	The	Climate	and	Health	
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Country	Profile	Survey	will	be	conducted	biennially	and	will	aim	to	gather	data	from	all	WHO	
member	States.	
	The	degree	to	which	this	is	representative	of	all	(non-responding)	countries	is	unclear.	Indeed,	
participation	in	this	survey	was	voluntary	and	the	baseline	sample	tended	to	include	countries	with	
active	climate	and	health	projects.	However,	implementation	of	health	adaptation	plans	may	grow	
with	time:	the		Paris	Agreement	states	that	the	‘right	to	health’	is	central	to	national	actions	,	whilst		
developing	countries	will	likely	have	increasing	access	to	adaptation	funds	through	global	
mechanisms,	and	representation	of	health	in	strategic	and	planning	processes	will	facilitate	health	
sector	access	to	them.13	By	2030,	this	indicator	should	reflect	the	commitment	of	all	or	most	nations	
to	develop	a	national	health	adaptation	strategy	to	climate	change.	Going	forward,	this	indicator	will	
be	developed	to	allow	better	understanding	of	the	practical	implications	of	having	national	policies	
in	place.	Data	will	be	gathered	on	the	status	of	policy	implementation,	the	main	priorities	for	health	
adaptation,	internal	monitoring	and	review	processes	and	the	level	of	funding	available	to	support	
policy	implementation.	
	
Indicator	2.4:	Number	of	cities	with	climate	change	risk	assessments	
Headline	Finding:	Globally,	45%	of	cities	have	climate	change	risk	assessments	in	place.	
Globally,	50%	of	the	population	live	in	cities	where	health	infrastructure,	such	as	emergency	and	
acute	hospital	care,	are	predominately	located	in	cities.	Cities	are	increasingly	at	risk	from	climate	
change,	with	negative	impacts	predicted	for	human	health	and	health	services.	These	risks	require	
city-level	responses	to	complement	National	Adaptation	Planning,	in	order	to	improve	cities’	
resilience	to	climate	change.	The	data	presented	in	Figure	2.5	track	the	number	of	cities	with	climate	
change	risk	assessments	using	data	from	the	Carbon	Disclosure	Project,	an	official	reporting	platform	
which	collects	and	analyses	a	global	survey	of	city-based	and	climate	change	data	annually.1	[Can	we	
insert	a	paragraph	on	the	kinds	of	actions	cities	can	take	to	adapt	to	the	health	impacts	of	climate	
change?].	
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The	highest	number	of	cities	with	climate	change	risk	assessments	are	in	high-income	countries	(118	
cities),	with	only	42	cities	in	low-income	countries.	This	partly	reflects	the	fact	that	more	cities	in	
high-income	countries	were	surveyed,	and	partly	the	fact	that	these	cities	will	have	a	greater	
capacity	to	develop	such	plans.	
However,	the	regional	breakdown	of	these	cities	highlights	concerns.	European	cities	have	the	
highest	number	of	climate	change	risk	assessments	(56	cities),	representing	83%	of	European	cities	
in	the	survey.	Conversely,	only	28%	of	African	cities	have	climate	change	risk	assessments.		
	
a)	
	
b)	
	
Figure	2.5.	Number	of	global	cities	undertaking	climate	change	risk	assessments	by	a)	income	grouping,	and	
b)	WHO	region.1		
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Implementation	and	Adaptive	Capacity:	human	resources,	early	warning	systems,	and	
infrastructure	
	
Informed	health	adaptation	requires	climate	information	for	evidence-based	decision-making.	This	
in	turn	depends	upon	having	the	human	resources	and	established	initiatives,	services	and	
infrastructure	to	prepare,	respond,	and	adapt.	Monitoring	the	implementation	of	these	dimensions	
of	adaptation	provides	an	indication	of	health	sector	capacity	to	anticipate	and	prepare	for	climate	
risks,	avoiding	potentially	maladaptive	choices.	
	
Indicator	2.5:	Implementation	of	IHR	Core	Capacity	Requirements	
Headline	Finding:	In	2016	61-87%	of	responding	countries	attained	IHR	Core	Capacity	Requirements	
in	human	resources,	early	detection	and	surveillance,	and	preparing	and	implementing	multi-hazard	
public	health	emergency	preparedness	and	response	plans.	
The	International	Health	Regulations	(IHR)	Core	Capacity	Requirements	indicate	the	extent	to	which	
health	systems	are	implementing	systems	to	improve	their	resilience	to	climate	change,	and	their	
adaptive	capacity	(Box	2.2).	Three	of	the	IHR	Core	Capacity	Requirements	are	reported	here:	‘human	
resources	to	prepare,	respond	and	adapt	to	climate-related	health	impacts’;	‘surveillance	for	the	
early	detection	of	a	public	health	event’;	and	‘the	number	of	countries	reporting	multi-hazard	public	
health	emergency	preparedness	and	response	plans’.72	Full	details	of	all	three	of	these	IHR	Core	
Capacity	Requirements	can	be	found	in	Appendix	3.		
	
Box	2.2:	The	International	Health	Regulations		
The	International	Health	Regulations		support	early	detection	and	control	of	public	health	events	
that	could	have	serious	and	international	consequences.		The	current	IHR	(2005),	which	entered	into	
force	in	2007,	is	legally	binding	on	196	nations,	including	all	WHO	member	states.		It	requires	
countries	to	identify,	report,	and	appropriately	manage	public	health	events	related	to	infectious	
diseases,	food	safety,	and	environmental,	chemical	and	radiation	exposures—and	to	build	and	
maintain	the	capacity	to	perform	these	functions.56	Examples	of	required	core	capacities	include	
national	legislation,	policy	and	financing;	public	health	surveillance;	incident	preparedness	and	
response;	risk	communication;	human	resources;	and	laboratory	services.		An	extensive	monitoring	
and	evaluation	framework73	includes	an	annual	survey	by	WHO.	The	method	of	estimation	calculates	
the	proportion/percentage	of	attributes	(a	set	of	specific	elements	or	functions	that	reflect	the	
performance	or	achievement	of	a	specific	indicator)	reported	to	be	in	place	in	a	country.		Since	2010,	
195	nations	have	submitted	self-reports	at	least	once.		Indicators	2.3,	2.4,	and	2.5	are	drawn	from	
the	results	of	the	2016	survey74,	to	which,	as	of	2017,	120	of	196	nations	had	responded.			
	
Figure	2.6	presents	plots	for	these	three	sub-indicators	drawn	from	the	IHR.	The	first	of	these,	the	
availability	of	adequate	human	resourcing	to	implement	the	rest	of	the	core	capacity	requirements,	
is	a	useful	proxy	in	lieu	of	an	indicator	which	looks	at	specific	capacity	for	health	adaptation	to	
climate	change	(Figure	2.6a).	From	a	starting	point	of	44%	in	2010,	on	average	67%	of	countries	now	
report	having	met	this	capacity,	which	includes	a	foundational	element	(having	a	responsible	unit	
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identified	for	the	development	of	human	resource	capacity);	having	conducted	a	needs	assessment;	
and	a	set	of	key	performance	indicators	to	measure	progress	against.	
Secondly,	the	IHR	Core	Capacity	Requirement	for	the	early	detection	and	surveillance	of	public	
health	events	is	used	here	as	a	proxy	for	a	health	system’s	ability	to	respond	to	outbreaks	and	
changing	patterns	of	climate-sensitive	infectious	diseases.	The	hazards	measured	by	the	indicator	
include:	chemical	events;	radiation	emergencies;	zoonotic	disease	events;	and	food	safety	events.	
The	latter	two	hazards	are	clearly	relevant	to	climate	change	adaptation.	Globally,	196	reporting	
countries	achieved	87%	of	attributes	required	for	surveillance	for	early	detection	of	a	public	health	
event	(Figure	2.6b).	This	proportion	has	increased	steadily	since	2010,	indicating	that	health	systems	
are	increasingly	implementing	early	warning	systems	to	detect	public	health	events.	
Finally,	the	development	and	implementation	of	multi-hazard	national	public	health	emergency	
preparedness	and	response	plans	is	tracked.	These	comprising	the	presence	of	a	plan,	the	
implementation	of	the	plan,	and	the	ability	for	this	plan	to	operate	under	unexpected	stress.	Of	
responding	countries,	75%	reported	achievement	of	IHR	requirements	for	this	(Figure	2.6c),	with	
higher	levels	in	Europe,	South-East	Asia	and	the	Western	Pacific,	and	lower	levels	in	Africa.	
[it	would	be	good	to	have	further	breakdown	and	analysis	of	these	three	indicators	from	someone	familiar	
with	the	IHR]	
There	are	some	very	clear	limitations	to	this	indicator.	Most	importantly,	IHR	survey	responses	are	
self-reported,	with	relatively	modest	national-level	verification	conducted.	Secondly,	IHR	Core	
Capacity	Requirements	are	not	specific	to	climate	change,	and	hence	whilst	they	provide	a	baseline,	
they	do	not	directly	measure	a	country’s	adaptive	capacity.	Thirdly,	these	findings	capture	potential	
capacity	–	not	action.	Finally,	the	quality	of	surveillance	for	early	warning	is	not	shown	and	neither	is	
the	impact	of	that	surveillance	on	public	health.	Nonetheless,	this	indicator	provides	a	useful	starting	
measure	of	potential	adaptive	capacity	of	health	systems	globally.	
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a)	 	
b)	 	
c)	 	
Figure	2.6:	2.6a)	Percentage	attainment		of	human	resources	available	to	implement	the	International	
Health	Regulations	Core	Capacity	Requirements,	by	WHO	Region2.	2.6b)	Percentage	of	countries	reporting	
indicator-based	surveillance	for	early	detection	of	a	public	health	event	under	the	International	Health	
Regulations	Source:3	2.6c)	Achievement	of	IHR	preparedness	core	capacity	(proportion	of	required	
attributes	achieved)	for	multi-hazard	public	health	emergency	preparedness	and	response	plans.		
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Indicator	2.6:	Proportion	of	national	meteorological	and	hydrological	agencies	providing	
services	tailored	for	the	health	sector	
Headline	Finding:	Of	104	responding	countries,	75%	report	providing	tailored	climate	information	to	
the	public	health	sector.	
The	availability	of	climate	information	tailored	to	the	health	sector	is	reported	by	member	states	to	
the	World	Meteorological	Organization	(WMO).75		In	2015,	the	most	recent	year	for	which	data	are	
available,	104	Members	(54%)	responded	to	the	survey.	Response	rates	were	53%	for	Africa,	44%	for	
Asia,	75%	for	South	America,	68%	for	North	America,	Central	America	and	the	Caribbean,	29%	for	
the	South-West	Pacific,	and	63%	for	Europe.	This	indicator	measures	the	proportion	of	countries	
that	report	providing	tailored	climate	information,	products	and	services	to	their	public	health	
sector.	
Of	respondents,	75%	report	providing	tailored	climate	information	to	the	public	health	sector.	
Although	this	is	fewer	than	the	provision	of	climate	information	to	other	sectors,	notably	the	general	
public	and	agriculture/food	security,	this	is	still	an	overwhelming	majority	of	health	services	that	
have	access	to	climate	information	among	those	surveyed	(Figure	2.7).	
	
	
	
Figure	2.7:	Sectors	to	which	National	Meteorological	and	Hydrological	Services	(NHMSs)	provide	
targeted/tailored	climate	information,	products	and	services.76		
	
However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	sample	is	not	representative	or	all	countries	and	these	are	
self-reported	results.	Crucially,	this	indicator	does	not	capture	the	quality	of	the	data	provided,	the	
ways	in	which	the	health	sector	makes	use	of	this	data	(if	at	all),	and	whether	the	data	is	presented	
in	a	format	and	timely	fashion	relevant	to	public	health.	Corresponding	information	from	40	national	
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Ministries	of	Health	on	the	use	of	climate	information	for	integrated	disease	surveillance	systems	
can	be	found	in	Appendix	3.	
	
	Indicator	2.7:	Number	of	countries	that	have	conducted	a	national	assessment	of	
vulnerability,	impacts	and	adaptation	for	health	
Headline	Finding:	Over	two	thirds	of	responding	countries	report	having	conducted	a	national	
assessment	of	vulnerability,	impacts	and	adaptation	for	health.		
National	assessments	of	vulnerability,	impacts	and	adaptation	for	health	allow	governments	to	
understand	more	accurately	the	extent	and	magnitude	of	potential	threats	to	health	from	climate	
change,	the	effectiveness	of	current	adaptation	and	mitigation	policies	and	the	range	of	needs	for	
future	policies	and	programmes.	Although	national	assessments	may	vary	in	scope	between	
countries,	the	number	of	countries	that	have	conducted	a	national	assessment	of	vulnerability,	
impacts	and	adaptation	for	health	is	a	key	indicator	to	monitor	the	global	availability	of	information	
required	for	adequate	management	of	health	services,	infrastructure	and	capacities	to	address	
climate	change.	This	indicator	tracks	the	number	of	countries	that	have	conducted	national	
assessments,	based	on	responses	to	the	WHO	Climate	and	Health	Country	Profile	Survey	(Box	2.1).	
Over	two-thirds	of	countries	sampled	(27	out	of	40)	reported	having	conducted	a	national	
assessment	of	vulnerability,	impacts	and	adaptation	for	health	(Figure	2.8).	These	countries	cover	all	
regions	and	include	countries	that	are	particularly	vulnerable;	for	instance,	seven	countries	in	Africa	
have	national	assessments	of	vulnerability,	impacts	and	adaptation	for	health.	
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Figure	2.8:	Countries	with	national	assessment	of	climate	change	impacts,	vulnerability	and	adaptation	for	
health.71	
	
Again,	these	results	are	not	representative	of	all	countries	and	could	over-estimate	the	proportion	of	
countries	with	these	national	assessments,	as	participation	in	this	survey	was	voluntary	and	the	
sample	tended	to	include	countries	that	had	active	climate	and	health	projects	and	thus	were	more	
likely	to	have	conducted	an	assessment.	
	
Indicator	2.8.	Number	of	countries	implementing	activities	to	build	health	resilient	
infrastructure	
Headline	Finding:	One	in	three	responding	countries	reported	ongoing	efforts	to	increase	the	climate	
resilience	of	their	health	infrastructure.	
Functioning	health	infrastructure	is	essential	during	emergencies.	Climate-related	events,	such	as	
severe	storms	and	flooding,	may	compromise	electrical	and	water	supplies,	interrupt	supply	chains,	
and	disable	transportation	links,	contributing	to	reduced	capacity	to	provide	medical	care.	This	
indicator	measures	efforts	by	countries	to	increase	the	climate	resilience	of	health	infrastructure.	
Data	is	drawn	from	the	WHO	Climate	and	Health	Country	Profile	Survey	(Box	2.1).	Approximately	
one	in	three	(14	out	of	40)	countries	reported	having	ongoing	efforts	to	increase	the	climate	
resilience	of	their	health	infrastructure	(Figure	2.9).	These	results	suggest	widespread	vulnerability	
	 49	
of	health	system	infrastructure	to	climate	change,	with	no	countries	in	South	America	reporting	
efforts	to	improve	the	climate	resiliency	of	health	infrastructure.	
	
	 	
Figure	2.9:	Countries	taking	measures	to	increase	climate	resilience	of	health	infrastructure.71	
	
In	addition	to	previously	mentioned	limitations	of	the	data	from	the	WHO	Climate	and	Health	
Country	Profile	Survey,	this	indicator	does	not	capture	the	quality	or	effectiveness	of	efforts	to	build	
resilient	health	system	infrastructure.	Nonetheless,	it	highlights	the	importance	of	ensuring	that	
countries	working	to	implement	climate	resilient	health	infrastructure,	as	these	findings	suggest	
such	infrastructure	is	generally	lacking,	most	especially	in	low-income	countries.	
	
Adaptation	Finance	
The	indicators	presented	thus	far	have	examined	both	vulnerability	to	climate	change,	and	efforts	to	
reduce	this	vulnerability	through	governance	and	the	improvement	of	adaptive	capacity.	The	extent	
to	which	these	measures	are	successfully	implemented	is	in	large-part	dependent	on	the	funding	
available.	These	last	two	indicators	track	health	adaptation	spend	and	funding.	This	in	turn,	reflects	
national	priorities,	indicating	the	relative	importance	of	health	within	adaptation	spending,	and	
within	the	broader	economy.	Spending	therefore	reveals	regional	and	national	wealth-related	
disparities	in	the	ability	to	deliver	adaptation	activities.	
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Indicator	2.9:	Spending	on	adaptation	for	health	and	health-related	activities	
Headline	finding:	Spending	on	health	and	health-related	adaptation	is	just	4.63%	(16.46	billion	USD)	
and	13.3%	(47.29	billion	USD)	of	the	global	total.	
This	indicator	reports	estimates	of	spending	on	health-related	climate	change	adaptation	and	
resilience.	While	many	kinds	of	adaptation	spending	may	protect	health	indirectly,	this	indicator	
reflects	only	spending	within	the	health	sector	and	in	two	domains	closely	related	to	health:	disaster	
preparedness	and	agriculture.	
This	indicator	draws	data	from	the	health	sector,		agriculture	and	forestry	(due	to	the	centrality	of	
food	and	nutrition	to	health)	and	disaster	preparedness	(due	to	of	the	direct	public	health	benefits	
of	these	efforts).	The	level	of	spending	on	adaptation	and	resilience	in	general,	including	on	the	
three	sectors	most	relevant	to	health,	was	derived	from	analyses	by	kMatrix,	using	a	data	
triangulation	method	which	aggregates	transactional	and	operational	business	data	that	leave	digital	
footprints,	to	estimate	economic	values	in	areas	where	government	statistics	and	standard	industry	
classifications	are	unavailable.77	Here,	180	countries	are	reported	on.	This	method	aggregates	
transactional	and	operational	business	data	to	measure	economic	activities	where	they	leave	a	
“footprint”,	to	estimate	economic	values	in	areas	where	government	statistics	and	standard	industry	
classifications	are	not	available.		Examples	of	data	sources	and	databases	accessed	include	financial	
and	transactional	data,	company	data,	industry	and	trade	association	data	and	data	from	
market/economic	research	organisations	
Global	health	adaptation	spending	for	the	financial	year	2015-2016	studied	totalled	16.46	billion	
USD,	representing	4.63%	of	the	global	aggregate.	Health-related	adaptation	spending	(which	
included	the	health	and	agricultural	sectors,	and	disaster	preparedness)	totalled	47.29	billion	USD,	
or	13.3%	of	the	global	total	adaptation	spend.	While	the	importance	of	health-related	spend	is	clear	
in	contributing	to	health	adaptation,	that	only	4.64%	of	adaptation	spending	is	on	health	adaptation	
specifically	is	concerning.	
Health-related	adaptation	and	resilience	spending,	both	national	totals	and	per	capita	levels,	are	
extremely	low	in	low-income	countries,	and	increase	across	the	continuum	towards	high-income	
countries	(Figures	2.10	and	2.12).	Interestingly,	health	and	health-related	adaptation	spending	as	a	
proportion	of	total	adaptation	spending	is	relatively	constant	across	income	groups.	The	proportion	
of	the	national	GDP	represented	by	health-related	adaptation	spending	is	substantially	higher	in	low-
income	countries,	suggesting	that	the	highest	burden	of	the	cost	of	adaptation	or	borne	by	those	
experiencing	the	greatest	risk,	with	the	least	capacity	to	respond.	
Regional	analysis	(Figure	2.11)	reveals	that	absolute	and	per	capita	spending	on	health	and	health-
related	adaptation	is	highest	in	Europe,	the	Americas	and	Western	Pacific;	although	health	and	
health-related	adaptation	spending	as	a	proportion	of	total	adaptation	is	relatively	consistent	across	
regions.	
The	income	and	regional	groupings	hide	significant	country-to-country	variation.	For	example,	
spending	on	health	and	health-related	adaptation	as	a	proportion	of	total	adaptation	spending	
varies	between	0.0071%	(Timor-Leste)	and	0.2617%	(Ukraine),	and	per	capita	spending	on	health	
and	health-related	adaptation	ranges	from	0.17	USD	(Timor-Leste)	to	42.72	USD	(Luxembourg).	
Future	research	at	the	country-level	will	therefore	be	highly	useful	in	understanding	the	geography	
of	and	the	disparities	in	spending	health-related	adaptation	to	climate.	
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Figure	2.10.	For	the	financial	year	2015-2016.	From	left	to	right	top	and	left	to	right	bottom:	total	health	and	
health-related	A&RCC,	percentage	of	health	and	health-related	A&RCC	as	a	proportion	of	total	spend,	health	
and	health-related	A&RCC	as	a	proportion	of	GDP,	and	health	and	health-related	A&RCC	per	capita.	All	plots	
are	disaggregated	by	World	Bank	Income	Grouping.77	
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Figure	2.11:	For	the	financial	year	2015-2016.	From	left	to	right	top	and	left	to	right	bottom:	total	health	and	
health-related	A&RCC,	percentage	of	health	and	health-related	A&RCC	as	a	proportion	of	total	spend,	health	
and	health-related	A&RCC	per	capita,	and	health	and	health-related	A&RCC	as	a	proportion	of	GDP.	All	plots	
are	disaggregated	by	WHO	region.77	
	
An	important	caveat	is	that	the	method	of	tabulating	expenditures	is	innovative	and	will	benefit	
from	further	validation	and	refinement	over	time.	Second,	while	health	adaptation	spending	
unambiguously	belongs	in	this	indicator,	the	definition	of	which	other	forms	of	adaptation	spending	
should	be	included	is	debatable;	agriculture	and	disaster	preparedness	were	included	here,	but	
other	forms	of	adaptation	spending	also	have	health	implications.	Third,	only	the	financial	year	
2015-2016	of	economic	data	was	available,	precluding	time	trend	analysis.	Fourth,	since	public	
sector	transactions	may	not	leave	a	sufficient	‘digital	footprint’,	adaptation	spending	data	here	may	
exclude	some	public-sector	spending.	
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Indicator	2.10:	Health	adaptation	funding	from	global	climate	financing	mechanisms		
Headline	Finding:	In	2017,	an	all	time	high	of	0.96%	of	total	adaptation	funding	for	development	
flowing	through	global	climate	change	financing	mechanisms,	was	dedicated	to	health	adaptation.	
The	final	indicator	in	this	section	is	designed	in	parallel	with	the	one	above,	and	aims	to	capture	
development	funds	available,	as	distinct	from	private-sector	spending	described	in	indicator	2.9.	It	
reports	on	global	financial	flows	dedicated	to	health	adaptation	to	climate	change,	moving	through	
established	global	climate	financing	mechanisms.	Data	was	drawn	from	the	Climate	Funds	Update	
(CFU),	an	independent	source	which	aggregates	funding	data	from	multilateral	and	bilateral	
development	agencies	since	2003.23,78	CFU	data	is	presented	in	four	categories	(pledged,	deposited,	
approved,	and	disbursed);	this	indicator	uses	data	designated	as	“approved”.		
Between	2003	and	2017,	only	0.96%	of	approved	adaptation	funding	was	allocated	to	health	
adaptation,	corresponding	with	a	cumulative	total	of	$39.55	million	USD	(Figure	2.13).	Total	global	
adaptation	funding	peaked	in	2013	at	$910.36	million	USD	and	declined	thereafter.	However,	
health-related	adaptation	funding	reached	its	highest	level	in	early	2017.	
	
Figure	2.12	Per	capita	spending	on	health-related	adaptation.	
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Figure	2.13:	Year	on	year	multilateral	and	bilateral	funding	for	all	adaptation	projects	and	health	adaptation	
projects	(2003	through	May	2017).78	
	
The	data	presented	does	not	include	funding	from	a	number	of	important	donors,	including	the	US,	
Japan,	and	Denmark,	and	does	not	include	co-financing	arrangements	from	either	the	public	or	
private	sector	in	recipient	countries.	Only	global	flows	labelled	as	explicitly	targeting	public	health	
were	included	in	the	analysis,	meaning	that	it	likely	underestimates	health-related	adaptation	spend.		
	
Conclusion	
This	section	has	presented	indicators	across	four	domains,	each	of	which	informs	the	next:	
vulnerability	and	resilience;	leadership	and	governance;	implementation	and	adaptive	capacity;	and	
adaptation	financing.	Taking	these	as	a	whole,	it	is	clear	that	the	public,	and	the	health	systems	they	
depend	upon,	are	ill-prepared	to	manage	the	health	impacts	of	climate	change.		
Future	work	on	developing	and	improving	these	indicators	will	begin	immediately.	In	many	cases,	
the	data	and	methods	available	provide	only	a	starting-point	for	an	eventual	suite	of	which	better	
captures	health	adaptation	specific	to	climate	change,	and	moves	from	process-based	indicators	to	
outcome-based	indicators.	New	indicators	will	also	be	required	to	better	capture	important	
indicators	of	resilience.	
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This	section	is	the	first	of	three	looking	at	the	policy	responses	to	climate	change.	When	it	comes	to	
adaptation,	human	systems	can	and	do	mediate	the	impacts	of	climate-induced	health	hazards.	
Indeed,	there	is	broad	scope	for	impact	reduction	through	adaptation,	particularly	for	under-
nutrition,	heat,	and	food	and	water-borne	infections,	even	for	global	mean	temperature	increases	of	
4°C	above	pre-industrial	levels.17	Yet	poorer	individuals,	communities,	and	countries	are	typically	the	
least	able	to	adapt,	generating	equity	and	justice	considerations.79,80	Further,	the	greater	the	extent	
of	climate	change,	the	harder	and	more	costly	it	will	be	for	individuals,	communities,	and	
governments	to	adapt.	Systemic	crises,	such	as	the	2010	Arab	Spring,	reflecting	an	inability	of	
systems	to	dampen	through	adaptive	capacity	a	shock	precipitated	by	a	climate	hazard,	will	become	
increasingly	more	common.81	
Whereas	adaptation	activities	tend	to	have	nationally-localised	benefits	(adaptation	activities	in	one	
region	or	country	will	likely	have	little	impact	elsewhere),	the	mitigation	of	climate	change	has	many	
characteristics	of	a	global	public	good	(many	countries	benefit	from	another	country’s	mitigation	
efforts).82	Interventions	to	mitigate	climate	change,	and	the	health	co-benefits	available	from	such	a	
transition	are	the	topic	of	section	three	of	this	report.	
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3.	Health	and	Co-Benefits	of	Mitigation	
	
Introduction	
Sections	one	and	two	of	the	Lancet	Countdown	have	covered	the	health	impacts	of	climate	change,	
the	adaptation	available	and	currently	being	implemented,	and	the	limits	to	this	adaptation.	This	
third	section	presents	a	series	of	indicators	relevant	to	the	short-term	health	co-benefits	of	climate	
mitigation	policies.	Accounting	for	this	enables	a	more	complete	consideration	of	the	total	cost	and	
benefits	of	such	policies,	and	is	essential	in	maximising	the	cumulative	health	benefit	of	climate	
change	mitigation.	
The	health	co-benefits	of	meeting	commitments	under	the	Paris	Agreement	are	immense,	reducing	
the	burden	of	disease	for	many	of	the	greatest	global	health	challenges	faced	today	and	in	the	
future.	The	indicators	presented	in	this	section	tell	two	stories.	Primarily,	they	describe	a	clear	and	
urgent	need	to	increase	the	scope	of	mitigation	ambition	if	the	world	is	to	keep	global	average	
temperatures	“well	below	2°C”.13	
And	yet,	across	the	world,	countries	are	accelerating	their	response	to	climate	change,	with	Finland,	
the	UK,	and	even	China	making	strong	commitments	to	phase-out	or	dramatically	reduce	their	
dependence	on	coal.	83-85	By	the	end	of	2017,	electric	vehicles	are	poised	to	be	cost-competitive	with	
their	petroleum	equivalents,	a	phenomena	that	wasn’t	predicted	to	occur	until	2030.	Globally,	more	
renewable	energy	capacity	is	being	built	every	year	than	all	other	sources,	combined.86		
	
Tracking	the	health	co-benefits	of	climate	change	mitigation	
Meeting	the	Paris	Agreement	will	require	global	GHG	emissions	to	peak	within	the	next	few	years	
and	undergo	rapid	reduction	thereafter,	implying	near-term	actions	and	medium-	and	long-term	
cuts	through	country	level	activities.14	Carbon	emissions	were	at	36.3	GtCO2	in	2015	(60%	higher	
than	in	1990),	with	41%	of	the	total	emissions	estimated	as	coming	from	coal,	34%	from	oil,	19%	
from	gas,	and	6%	from	cement.87	Current	global	annual	emissions	of	methane	(CH4)	are	estimated	to	
be	558	(540-568)	Tg	–	responsible	for	some	20%	of	global	warming	produced	by	all	well-mixed	
gases.88	They	have	recently	begun	to	increase	again	after	a	somewhat	stable	period	between	1999	
and	2006.		
The	actions	needed	to	embark	on	rapid	decarbonisation	include	avoiding	the	‘lock-in’	of	carbon	
intensive	infrastructure	and	energy	systems,	reducing	the	cost	of	‘scaling-up’	low-carbon	systems,	
minimising	reliance	on	unproven	technologies,	and	realising	opportunities	of	near-term	co-benefits	
for	health,	security,	and	the	environment.14	These	actions	will	need	to	also	be	cost-effective	and	
supported	by	non-state	actors	and	industry.	
Indicators	in	this	section	are	considered	within	the	framework	of	Driving	Force-Pressure-State-
Exposure-Effect-Action	(DPSEEA).	The	DPSEEA	framework	is	recognized	as	one	of	the	most	suitable	
frameworks	for	the	development	of	environmental	health	indicators,	and	identification	of	entry	
points	for	policy	intervention.89	Our	adaptation	of	the	framework	for	examination	of	the	health	co-
benefits	of	climate	change	mitigation	is	explained	in	Appendix	4.	
Here,	health	co-benefit	indicators	are	captured	for	four	selected	sectors:	1)	energy,	2)	transport,	3)	
food,	and	4)	healthcare.	Where	possible,	a	baseline	of	1990	has	been	used,	with	further	historical	
data	provided	as	context.		Corresponding	Appendix	4	provides	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	data	
and	methods	used.	
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Future	work	will	look	to	capture	other	relevant	sectors	such	as	the	building	sector	and	
manufacturing;	to	more	fully	identify	the	health	outcomes	associated	with	mitigation	actions;	and	to	
identify	a	complete	set	of	indicators,	for	every	level	of	the	DPSEEA	framework.	This	will	require	
development	of	an	integrated	data	collection	and	analysis	platform	and	the	development	of	
consistent	but	context-relevant	data	collection	and	processing	methodology.	
	
Energy	Supply	and	Demand	Sectors	
Fossil	fuels	comprise	the	largest	single	source	of	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions	globally,	producing	
an	estimated	72%	of	all	GHG	emissions	resulting	from	human	activities.90,91	The	majority	(66%)	of	
these	emissions	arise	in	the	energy	sector	from	the	production	of	thermal	and	electric	power	for	
consumption	across	a	range	of	sectors	including	industry,	commercial,	residential	and	transport.	
To	meet	the	climate	change	mitigation	ambitions	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	it	is	widely	accepted	that	
the	energy	system	will	need	to	transition	towards	near	zero-carbon	emissions	by,	or	soon	after,	
2050.92	Recent	analysis	has	framed	the	necessary	action	as	a	halving	of	CO2	emissions	every	
decade.93	Such	a	rate	of	reduction	is	unprecedented	and	therefore	requires	strong	policies	to	be	put	
in	place	to	drive	the	necessary	change.	Figure	3.1	provides	an	illustration	of	the	type	of	actions	
needed	to	meet	this	ambitious	goal.	Under	this	pathway	there	is	a	heavy	reliance	on	energy	
efficiency	improvements,	fuel	switching,	and	low-	and	zero-carbon	fuels.	
The	potential	health	benefits	of	such	strategies	are	unprecedented,	with	significant	improvements	
from	a	reduction	in	indoor	and	outdoor	air	pollution;	more	equitable	access	to	reliable	energy	for	
health	facilities	and	communities;	and	lower	costs	of	basic	energy	services	for	heating,	cooking,	and	
lighting.	
	
	
Figure	3.1.	Measures	needed	to	surpass	current	NDCs	to	achieve	a	2°C	trajectory,	through	2050.	The	“New	
Policies	Scenario”	takes	into	account	countries’	pledges	under	the	Paris	Agreement.94	
	
The	DPSEEA	diagram	in	Figure	3.2	illustrates	the	process	in	the	energy	sector	that	contributes	to	
climate	change	and	needs	to	be	regulated	by	policies	for	climate	change	mitigation.	In	this	process	
macro-factors	such	as	growth	in	population	and	economic	activity	(driving	forces),	stimulate	
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continuous	increase	in	the	energy	consumption	and	production	levels,	these	in	turn,	produce	
emissions	of	GHGs	and	other	pollutants	(pressures),	leading	to	increased	GHG	concentration	in	the	
atmosphere	and	air	pollution	levels	(state),	which	subsequently	lead	to	human	exposure	to	
pollutants	that	have	negative	impact	on	human	health,	resulting	in	the	a	health	burden	attributable	
to	the	same	processes	that	lead	to	GHG	emissions	from	energy	production.	
Of	particular	importance	to	climate	change	mitigation	in	the	energy	sector	are	factors	determining	
the	extent	to	which	increase	in	the	energy	production	translates	into	the	emissions	of	greenhouse	
gases	and	other	pollutants.	Indicators	3.1-3.4	are	tracking	some	of	the	key	factors	that	determine	
this	extent.	Indicator	3.5	is	tracking	the	state	of	air	pollution	in	cities,	where	exposure	levels	tend	to	
be	highest	and	affecting	largest	fractions	of	the	population.	The	overall	ambient	air	pollution	in	cities	
is	most	relevant	to	human	health	and	is	most	operational,	as	it	is	most	comprehensively	monitored	
by	urban	authorities.	However,	ambient	air	pollution	has	multiple	sources	beyond	energy	
production,	e.g.,	dust,	tyre	wear,	trash	and	agricultural	waste	burning,	smoking.	Therefore,	the	sub-
indicator	3.5.1	illustrates	air	pollution	attributed	specifically	to	the	energy	production	sector.	The	
indicator	3.6	tracks	progress	in	terms	of	the	air	pollution	attributed	health	impact,	thus,	quantifying	
changes	in	the	health	co-benefit	of	cleaner	energy	production.		
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Indicator	3.1:	Carbon	intensity	of	the	energy	system	
Headline	Finding:	Globally,	the	TPES	has	remained	stable	since	1990,	between	55-56	tCO2/Tj.	This	
has	occurred	because	countries,	which	have	achieved	a	reduction	in	carbon	intensity	(USA,	UK,	
Germany),	have	been	offset	by	those	which	have	rapidly	increased	the	carbon	intensity	of	their	
energy	supply	(India	and	China).	
To	achieve	the	2	°C	target	(at	a	66%	probability),	the	global	energy	sector	must	reduce	GHG	
emissions	more	than	70%	below	current	levels	(Figure	3.1).	This	means	a	large	reduction	in	the	
carbon	intensity	of	the	global	energy	system,	which	can	be	measured	as	the	tonnes	of	CO2	for	each	
unit	of	total	primary	energy	supplied	(tCO2/TJ).		Total	Primary	Energy	Supply	(TPES)	reflects	the	total	
amount	of	primary	energy	used	in	a	specific	country,	accounting	for	the	flow	of	energy	imports	and	
exports.95	Commitments	under	the	Paris	Agreement	should	begin	to	lower	the	carbon	intensity	of	
TPES.	
At	the	global	level,	since	the	1990s,	the	carbon	intensity	of	energy	supply	has	remained	between	55-
56	tCO2/TJ.	However,	a	53%	growth	in	energy	demand	over	the	period	has	meant	that	global	CO2	
emissions	have	grown	significantly.	Rapidly	developing	countries	have	seen	an	increase	in	carbon	
intensity	since	the	1970s,	driven	by	increased	coal	use	(Figure	3.3).	For	example,	India’s	TPES	has	
almost	tripled	since	1980,	with	the	share	of	coal	in	the	mix	doubling	(from	22%	to	44%).	Over	the	
same	period,	China’s	TPES	has	quadrupled,	with	the	coal	share	increasing	from	52%	to	68%.	
Other	developed	countries	have	seen	carbon	intensity	fall	since	the	1970s	(for	example,	the	USA,	
Germany	and	the	UK	in	Figure	3.3).	This	decrease	has	resulted	from	a	move	away	from	coal	use	in	
the	power	generation	sector,	reduced	heavy	industrial	output,	and	increased	use	of	lower	carbon	
fuels,	notably	moving	from	coal	to	natural	gas	in	the	power	sector	and	the	use	of	renewable	energy.		
Other	developing	countries	have	remained	at	relatively	low	carbon	intensities,	such	as	those	with	
large	dependence	on	bioenergy,	as	shown	by	the	example	of	Kenya,	typical	of	many	countries	in	
sub-Saharan	Africa.	
	
Figure	2.2.	3.2a)	DPSEEA	Framework	applied	to	Energy	Sector.	3.2b)	Energy	sector	indicators	within	the	
DPSEEA	framework.	A	simple	traffic-light	system	has	been	used	to	provide	a	qualitative	indication	of	global	
progress	to-date,	on	each	of	the	indicators.	
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Figure	3.3.	Carbon	intensity	of	Total	Primary	Energy	Supply	(TPES)	for	selected	countries,	and	total	CO2	
emissions,	1971-2013	(Adapted	from	IEA	data).	Per	unit	of	primary	energy,	coal	has	the	highest	CO2	emissions	
of	any	of	the	fossil	fuels	therefore	if	coal	is	used	to	displace	other	sources	of	energy	or	adds	a	greater	
proportion	of	coal	to	the	mix	then	carbon	intensity	rises.	
	
Indicator	3.2:	Coal	phase-out	
Headline	Finding:	Globally,	total	primary	coal	supply	has	increased	from	356	EJ	in	1990,	to	531	EJ	in	
2015.	This	production	level	in	2015	is	a	reduction	from	a	high	of	548	EJ	in	2013.	
The	primary	means	of	reducing	carbon	intensity	of	the	energy	system	will	be	the	phase	out	of	coal.		
Worldwide,	coal	supplies	30%	of	energy	use	and	44%	of	global	CO2	emissions.	The	dirtiest	coal	
produces	almost	twice	the	carbon	per	unit	of	primary	energy	than	the	cleanest	fossil	fuel,	natural	
gas.	Globally,	63%	of	electricity	supply	comes	from	coal	(40%)	and	gas	(23%)	power	plants.	These	
plants	also	produce	more	than	40%	of	global	CO2	emissions	(13.5	Gt)	from	the	energy	sector,	and	are	
a	worrying	source	of	air	pollution.	
The	primary	indicator	of	coal	phase-out	used	here	is	the	total	primary	coal	supply	(EJ)	in	the	energy	
system.	(Figure	3.4)	A	secondary	indicator	provides	additional	information	on	the	share	of	electricity	
(%)	produced	by	coal	plants.	(Figure	3.5)	The	analysis	and	graphs	for	these	indicators	make	use	of	
recent	data	from	the	International	Energy	Agency’s	(IEA).		
Globally,	coal	use	as	a	share	of	total	primary	energy	supply	increased	markedly	from	24%	to	30%	
between	2000	and	2013.	This	growth	was	largely	driven	by	China’s	increasing	use	of	coal	in	industry	
and	for	electricity	production	(see	East	Asia	trend	in	Figure	3.4).	Crucially,	this	coal	use	has	levelled	
off	in	recent	years,	in	large	part	due	to	a	recognition	of	the	health	effects	of	air	pollution,	slower	
growth	and	structural	changes	in	China’s	economy,	and	a	slowing	in	energy	sector	expansion.96	India	
has	also	seen	significant	growth	in	coal	use,	with	a	doubling	of	the	share	of	coal	in	TPES	since	2000.	
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The	other	large	coal	consuming	regions	are	the	USA	and	Europe.	The	USA	has	had	a	stable	level	of	
consumption	since	the	1990s,	but	experienced	a	recent	fall	in	use,	particularly	in	the	power	
generation	sector,	due	to	the	cost-competitiveness	of	shale	gas.	Europe	has	seen	a	steady	decline	in	
coal	use	since	the	1990s,	again	through	a	move	to	gas	in	economies	such	as	the	UK,	although	this	
overall	downward	trend	has	transitioned	to	a	plateau	in	recent	years.		
Given	that	the	majority	of	coal	is	used	in	power	generation,	it	is	also	worth	considering	an	indicator	
reflecting	the	share	of	electricity	that	is	generated	by	coal	(Figure	3.3.5).	Today,	China	and	India	both	
have	similar	shares,	at	around	75%	of	total	generation,	a	share	that	has	steadily	grown	since	1990.	
Whilst	this	trend	is	plateauing	in	China,	the	rapidly-emerging	economies	of	Indonesia,	Vietnam,	
Malaysia,	and	the	Philippines	are	cause	for	particular	concern.	The	latter	two	countries	have	seen	
their	shares	increase	from	around	10%	in	1990,	to	40%	today.	Indonesia	has	also	seen	strong	growth	
over	this	period,	from	30%	to	50%.	
Meeting	the	IEA’s	2°C	pathway	and	the	Paris	Agreement	requires	that	no	new	coal-fired	plants	be	
built	(beyond	those	with	construction	currently	underway),	with	a	complete	phase-out	of	unabated	
plants	occurs	by	2040.	Crucially,	such	a	transition	appears	to	be	underway,	with	the	amount	of	coal	
power	capacity	in	pre-construction	planning	at	570	gigawatts	(GW)	in	January	2017,	compared	to	
1,090	GW	in	January	2016.97	There	are	a	range	of	reasons	for	this	reduction,	including	a	historically	
optimistic	capacity	expansion	planning,	a	desire	to	tackle	air	pollution,	and	active	efforts	to	expand	
renewable	investment.		
	
	
Figure	3.4.	Total	primary	coal	supply	by	region,	1990-2013	(Source	IEA)	[Steve	to	update]	
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Figure	3.5.	Percentage	of	electricity	generated	from	coal,	1990-2013	(Source	IEA)	[Steve	to	update]		
	
Indicator	3.3:	Zero-carbon	emission	electricity	
Headline	Finding:	Globally,	renewable	energy	as	a	share	of	total	generation	has	increased	by	over	
20%	from	1990	to	2013.	In	2015,	renewable	energy	capacity	added	exceeded	that	of	new	fossil	fuel	
capacity,	with	80%	of	global	renewable	energy	capacity	currently	located	in	China.	To	the	extent	that	
this	transition	displaces	fossil	fuels,	it	represents	the	beginning	of	unprecedented	reductions	in	
morbidity	and	mortality	from	air	pollution,	and	a	potentially	remarkable	victory	for	global	health.	
As	coal	is	phased	out	of	the	energy	system,	in	particular	the	power	generation	sector,	the	rapid	
scaling	up	of	zero-carbon	power	generation	will	be	crucial,	in	particular	for	electricity	generation.	To	
remain	on	a	2°C	pathway,	renewables-based	capacity	additions	will	need	to	be	sustained	over	the	
next	35	years,	reaching	400	GW	by	2050,	which	is	four	times	the	current	level.	Critical	renewable	
technologies	for	achieving	this	will	be	solar,	wind	and	hydroelectric.	Nuclear	generation	may	also	
continue	to	play	a	role	in	those	countries	where	it	has	traction	and	the	capacity	to	maintain,	such	as	
Russia,	China,	India	and	South	Korea.	
Indicator	3.3	considers	both	renewable	and	zero-carbon	electricity.	Renewable	energy,	as	defined	by	
the	International	Renewable	Energy	Agency	(IRENA),	refers	to	“all	forms	of	energy	produced	from	
renewable	sources	in	a	sustainable	manner,	which	include:	bioenergy,	geothermal,	hydropower,	
ocean	energy	(tidal,	wave,	thermal),	solar	energy	and	wind	energy”.		By	comparison,	zero-carbon	
energy	means	no	GHG	emissions	(i.e.	zero-carbon	and	carbon	equivalent)	at	the	point	of	power	
generation,	which	therefore	also	includes	nuclear-powered	electricity,	but	excludes	biomass.	
As	both	displace	the	use	of	fossil	fuels,	improving	air	pollution	and	GHG	emissions,	both	are	
important	indicators	for	climate	change	and	for	health.	One	caveat	is	that	the	combustion	of	solid	
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biomass	fuels	such	as	wood,	sometimes	promoted	for	climate	change	mitigation	purposes,	may	
increase	fine	particulate	air	pollution	exposure.	
As	a	share	of	total	generation,	renewable	energy	has	increased	by	over	20%	from	1990	to	2013.		
Renewable	energy	continues	to	grow	rapidly,	mainly	from	increasing	wind	and	solar	PV	investment,	
most	notably	in	the	USA,	China	and	Europe	(Figure	3.6).	In	2015,	more	renewable	energy	capacity	
(150GW)	was	added	than	fossil	fuel	plant	capacity	globally.	Overall,	there	is	now	more	renewable	
energy	capacity	installed	globally	(almost	2000	GW)	than	coal,	with	about	80%	of	this	capacity	
located	in	China.	The	total	investment	in	renewables	of	$288	billion	in	renewables	in	2015	meant	it	
accounted	for	70%	of	total	electricity	generation	investment	in	that	year.	98	
	
	
	
Figure	3.6.-	Renewable	and	zero-carbon	emission	energy	sources	
	
Indicator	3.4:	Access	to	clean	energy	
Headline	Finding:	In	2016,	it	was	reported	that	1.2	billion	people	did	not	have	access	to	electricity,	
with	2.7	billion	people	relying	on	the	burning	of	unsafe,	unsustainable,	and	inefficient	solid	fuels.	
Increased	access	to	clean	fuels	and	clean	energy	technologies	will	have	the	dual	benefit	of	reducing	
indoor	air	pollution	exposure,	and	reducing	GHG	emissions	by	displacing	fossil	fuels.99	The	use	of	
clean	energy	for	heating,	cooling,	cooking	and	lighting	plays	an	important	role	in	improving	global	
health	and	wellbeing,	economic	productivity,	and	reducing	the	risk	of	harm	from	living	in	energy	
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poverty.100	While	access	to	any	form	of	secure	and	cheap	energy	will	have	health	benefits,	access	to	
clean	energy	will	have	additional	health	benefits	through	the	reduction	of	poor	air	quality.	
It	is	estimated	that	1.2	billion	people	do	not	currently	have	access	to	electricity	and	2.7	billion	people	
rely	on	burning	unsustainable	and	inefficient	solid	fuels,	which	contributes	to	poor	indoor	air	quality,	
estimated	to	result	in	4.3	million	premature	deaths	related	to	pneumonia,	stroke,	lung	cancer,	heart	
disease,	and	chronic	obstructive	pulmonary	disease	(COPD)	each	year.101,102	Access	to	electricity,	an	
energy	source	that	emits	no	direct	airborne	particles	(though	particles	ma	be	emitted	indirectly	
through	the	fuel	used	to	generate	the	electrical	power),	is	currently	at	85.3%	but	varies	widely	
among	countries	and	urban	and	rural	settings.	This	indicator	draws	on	and	aligns	with	the	proposed	
SDG	indicator	7.1.2,	defining	‘clean	energy’	as	the	emission	rate	targets	and	specific	fuel	
recommendations	(i.e.	against	unprocessed	coal	and	kerosene)	included	in	the	normative	guidance,	
WHO	guidelines	for	indoor	air	quality:	household	fuel	combustion.	This	same	indicator	estimates	the	
proportion	of	the	population	with	primary	reliance	on	clean	fuels	and	technologies	for	cooking,	
heating	and	lighting	compared	to	all	people	accessing	those	services.	The	data	used	for	this	indicator	
comes	from	estimates	of	fuel	use	from	WHO	household	survey	data	from	roughly	800	nationally	
representative	surveys	and	censuses,	and	is	modelled	to	estimate	the	proportion	of	their	reliance	on	
clean	fuels.103		
Furthermore,	access	to	electricity	is	an	important	comparator	to	access	to	clean	energy,	and	so	is	
also	tracked	here.	Globally,	85%	of	the	population	has	access	to	electricity,	but	this	differs	
substantially	between	urban	and	rural	areas	and	by	country.	For	urban	households,	global	access	to	
electricity	is	estimated	to	be	96%,	however	Sub-Saharan	Africa	has	an	urban	electrification	rate	of	
just	60%.95		Many	of	the	least-developed	countries	(LDC)	have	very	low	levels	of	urban	access	to	
electricity,	and	whilst	the	average	for	African	LDCs	is	48%,	estimates	range	as	low	as	4%	in	South	
Sudan,	Liberia,	and	the	Central	African	Republic.	It	is	estimated	that	80%	of	the	1.06	billion	people	
without	access	to	electricity	live	in	only	20	countries,	most	in	Sub-Saharan	Africa.			
Moving	towards	2030,	progress	towards	universal	access	to	clean	fuels	and	technologies	for	heating,	
lighting	and	cooking	must	increase	beyond	the	current	global	average	rate	of	1-2%	per	year.100		This	
challenge	will	be	particularly	pressing	in	urban	areas	that	continue	to	come	under	population	growth	
pressures	and	where	energy	infrastructure	is	already	stressed.	
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Figure	3.7.	Proportion	of	population	with	primary	reliance	on	clean	fuels	and	technology	
	
Figure	3.8.	Mean	residential	electricity	use	(MWh/year).	
	
Indicator	3.5:	Exposure	to	ambient	air	pollution		
Headline	Finding:	83.5%	of	the	121	cities	in	the	SHUE	database	do	not	satisfy	WHO	annual	
particulate	matter	exposure	recommendations;	global	population-weighted	PM2.5	exposure	has	
increased	by	11.2%	since	1990.104	
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Air	pollutants	harmful	to	health	are	emitted	by	combustion	processes	that	also	contribute	to	
emissions	of	GHGs.	As	such,	properly	designed	actions	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	will	lead	to	
improvements	in	ambient	air	quality,	with	associated	benefits	for	human	wellbeing.105		We	divide	
this	indicator	into	two	parts:	total	exposure	to	air	pollution	in	cities	and	contributions	to	exposures	
from	specific	sectors.	To	represent	levels	of	exposure	to	air	pollution,	this	indicator	collects	
information	on	annual	average	urban	background	concentrations	of	fine	particulate	matter	(PM2.5)	
in	urban	settings	across	the	world.	
	
3.5.1	Exposure	to	air	pollution	in	cities	
The	data	for	this	indicator	makes	use	of	the	WHO’s	Urban	Ambient	Air	Pollution	Database,	which	
compiles	information	form	a	range	of	public	sources,	including	national	and	subnational	reports	and	
websites,	regional	networks,	intergovernmental	agencies,	and	academic	publications.106	The	air	
pollution	measurements	are	taken	from	monitoring	stations	located	in	urban	background,	
residential,	commercial,	and	mixed	areas.	The	annual	average	density	of	emission	sources	in	urban	
areas	and	the	proximity	of	populations	to	those	sources	led	the	Lancet	Countdown	to	focus	on	
exposure	in	cities.	Average	air	pollution	levels	in	cities	are	driven	by	a	wide	range	of	factors,	with	the	
degree	of	socio-economic	development	being	of	particular	importance	with	lower	air	pollution	levels	
generally	found	in	cities	with	higher	per	capita	GDP	on	average	(Figure	3.9).		
For	this	indicator	of	ambient	air	pollution	exposure,	the	Lancet	Countdown	has	combined	the	WHO	
database	with	the	Sustainable	Health	Urban	Environments	(SHUE)	database,	presenting	data	on	143	
randomly	sampled	cities	across	the	world.107	
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Figure	3.9.	Annual	mean	PM2.5	concentration	vs	per	capita	GDP	for	143	cities	in	the	SHUE	database.	Colours	
indicate	WHO	regions:	blue	–	Africa;	red	–	Europe;	green	–	the	Americas;	Lime	–	Eastern	Mediterranean;	
orange	–	Western	Pacific;	purple	–	South	East	Asia.106,107	
	
PM2.5	levels	in	the	majority	of	global	cities	are	currently	well	above	the	WHO’s	annual	guideline	level	
of	10	µg.m-3,	with	particularly	high	levels	in	cities	in	central,	South	and	East	Asia.	There	is	relatively	
little	data	on	recent	trends	in	air	pollution	exposures	and	this	indicator	represents	only	an	estimate	
of	the	current	situation.	The	data	suggest	that	air	pollution	levels	have	generally	decreased	in	high	
income	settings	over	recent	decades,	whilst	they	have	marginally	increased,	globally.108	
Correspondingly,	estimates	from	the	Global	Burden	of	Disease	(GBD)	study	suggest	a	modest	
increase	in	the	health	burden	due	to	air	pollution,	from	3.5	million	deaths	worldwide	in	1990	to	4.2	
million	in	2015,	though	this	is	in	part	due	to	factors	such	as	population	growth	and	aging.	Future	
work	will	look	to	build	on	these	preliminary	efforts	by	tracking	air	pollution	over	a	more	regular	and	
frequent	time	period,	and	establishing	attribution	between	changes	in	air	pollution	and	
interventions	to	mitigate	climate	change.	This	will	necessitate	the	development	of	new	modelling	
techniques	and	improved	source	apportionment	data	to	better	identify	key	targets	for	policy	action	
(see	Box	3.1	below).		
Furthermore,	tracking	exposure	to	household		air	pollution	could	also	help	to	quantify	important	
health	co-benefits	of	climate	change	mitigation	strategies	due	to	exposure	to	short-lived	climate	
pollutants,	most	notably	black	carbon.109	While	currently	there	is	no	systematically	collected	data	
that	is	comparable	at	a	national	level,	a	future	indicator	could	draw	on	existing	studies	to	monitor	
personal	exposure	to	indoor	carbon	monoxide	(indicating	exposure	to	combustion	products)	in	a	
number	of	different	settings.110		
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Box	3.1	Source	apportionment	of	air	pollution	in	Delhi	
	
Recent	work	led	by	the	International	Institute	for	Applied	Systems	Analysis	(IIASA)	has	
attempted	to	identify	the	primary	sources	of	PM2.5	in	Delhi	and	their	relative	
contributions	to	concentrations	and	attributable	health	impacts	in	the	city.	Using	the	
GAINs	model,	the	work	demonstrates	the	large	contribution	(60%)	to	air	pollution	in	Delhi	
from	outside	the	city,	emphasising	the	need	for	cities	to	work	in	collaboration	with	
neighbouring	areas	to	reduce	air	pollution.	A	large	proportion	of	Delhi’s	air	pollution	is	
also	due	to	secondary	PM2.5	from	agriculture,	suggesting	that	current	strategies	focused	
predominantly	on	vehicle	sources	will	have	a	limited	impact.		
	
Based	on	scenario	modelling,	the	most	effective	policy	responses	involved	extending	
clean	air	strategies	to	neighbouring	states.	By	2030,	such	strategies	would	reduce	the	
number	of	premature	deaths	due	to	air	pollution	each	year	in	Delhi	(from	about	14,000	
under	business-as-usual	to	about	11,000),	reduce	GHG	emissions,	and	provide	additional	
benefits	including	accelerated	infrastructure	development	and	job	creation.	
	
	
3.5.2	Sectoral	contributions	to	air	pollution	exposures	
[Melissa]	
	
Transport	Sector	
Transportation	systems—including	road	vehicles,	rail,	shipping,	and	aviation—are	a	key	source	of	
GHG	emissions,	contributing	14%	of	global	emissions	in	2010.	95,111	In	order	to	meet	the	2°C	target	
(at	a	66%	probability),	the	global	transport	sector	must	reduce	its	total	GHG	emissions	by	more	than	
20%	below	current	levels,	by	2050.98	The	DPSEEA	diagram	in	Figure	3.10	illustrates	the	process	in	the	
transport	sector	that	contributes	to	climate	change	and	needs	to	be	regulated	by	policies	for	climate	
change	mitigation.	
The	transport	sector	is	also	a	major	source	of	air	pollutants,	including	particulate	matter,	nitrogen	
oxides,	sulphur	dioxide,	carbon	monoxide,	volatile	organic	compounds,	and	indirectly,	ozone.	
Furthermore,	exposure	to	air	pollution	from	road	transport	is	particularly	challenging	in	cities	where	
vehicles	emit	street-level	air	pollution	in	close	proximity	to	where	people	live,	walk	and	breathe.	In	
turn,	significant	opportunities	for	health	exist	through	the	reduction	of	GHG	emissions	from	
transport	systems,	both	in	the	near-term	through	cleaner	air	and	increased	physical	activity,	and	the	
long-term	through	the	mitigation	of	climate	change.	
Today,	the	transport	sector	is	heavily	dependent	on	motorized	transport	powered	by	the	
combustion	of	petrol	and	diesel	fuels.	This	dependence	contributes	both	to	the	emission	of	GHGs	
and	also	to	poor	air	quality	(especially	particulate	matter	and	NO2).	Overdependence	on	motorized	
transport	rather	than	active	travel	(walking	and	cycling)	is	a	significant	contributing	factor	to	low	
levels	of	physical	activity,	high	rates	of	obesity,	and	the	associated	health	risks	of	chronic	disease,	
including	diabetes,	ischaemic	heat	disease,	and	selected	cancers.	It	is	therefore	appropriate	to	
reflect	trends	in	vehicle	usage,	the	deployment	of	low-emission	vehicles,	levels	of	active	travel,	and	
exposure	to	fine	particle	air	pollution,	as	well	as	the	associated	health	outcomes	attributable	to	
transport-related	pollution.	
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Figure	3.10.	3.10a)	DPSEEA	Framework	applied	to	Transport	Sector.	3.10b)	Transport	sector	indicators	within	
the	DPSEEA	framework.	A	simple	traffic-light	system	has	been	used	to	provide	a	qualitative	indication	of	global	
progress	to-date,	on	each	of	the	indicators.	
Indicator	3.6:	Fuel	use	for	transport	
Headline	Finding:	Global	transport	fuel	use	(TJ)	has	increased	by	almost	24%	since	1990	on	a	per	
capita	basis.	While	petrol	and	diesel	continue	to	dominate,	non-conventional	fuels	have	been	rapidly	
expanding,	with	more	than	1.2	million	electric	vehicles	being	sold	between	2010-2015.	
The	International	Energy	Agency’s	(IEA)	2016	report	“Energy	and	Air	Pollution”	makes	clear	that	
fuels	used	for	transport	currently	produce	more	than	half	the	nitrogen	oxides	emitted	globally.95,111	
Switching	to	low-emission	transport	systems	is	an	important	component	of	climate	change	
mitigation	and	will	help	to	reduce	concentrations	of	most	ambient	air	pollutants.	However,	the	
transport	sector’s	extremely	high	reliance	on	petroleum-based	fuels	makes	this	transition	
particularly	challenging.	
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This	indicator	focuses	on	monitoring	global	trends	in	levels	of	fuel	efficiency,	and	on	the	transition	
away	from	the	most	polluting	and	carbon	intensive	transport	fuels.	More	specifically,	this	indicator	
follows	the	metric	of	fuel	use	for	transport	on	a	per	capita	basis	(TJ/person)	by	type	of	fuel.	To	
develop	this	indicator,	the	Lancet	Countdown	draws	on	transport	fuel	data	from	the	IEA	and	
population	data	from	the	World	Bank.	This	indicator	is	particularly	relevant	to	three	sustainable	
development	goals	(3.9,	11.6,	and	13),	which	are	focused	on	reductions	in	morbidity	and	mortality	
from	pollution,	reductions	in	the	environmental	impact	of	cities,	and	enhanced	action	on	climate	
change.112	
While	some	transition	away	from	carbon-intensive	fuel	use,	towards	increasing	levels	of	fuel	
efficiency	has	occurred	in	select	countries	(e.g.	the	USA),	transport	is	still	heavily	dominated	by	
gasoline	and	diesel	(Figure	3.11).	Global	transport	fuel	use	has	increased	by	almost	65%	since	1970	
on	a	per	capita	basis.	However,	as	seen	on	the	right	in	Figure	3.4,	non-conventional	fuels	(e.g.	
electricity,	biofuels,	and	natural	gas)	have	been	rapidly	gaining	traction	since	the	2000s,	with	more	
than	one	million	electric	vehicles	have	been	sold	around	the	globe	since	2010,	mostly	in	the	United	
States,	China,	Japan	and	some	European	countries	(
	
Figure	3.5).113		These	figures	remain	modest	when	compared	to	the	overall	number	of	cars	sold	per	
year,	77	million	in	2017,	and	the	total	global	fleet	of	1.2	billion	cars.		
	
		
	
Figure	3.4.	Per	capita	fuel	use	by	type	(TJ/person)	for	transport	sector	with	all	fuels	(left)	and	for	less-
conventional	fuels	only	(right).114,115.	
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Figure	3.5.	Cumulative	Global	Electric	Vehicle	Sales.116	
	
Indicator	3.7:	Active	travel	infrastructure	and	uptake	
Promoting	active	travel	(walking	and	cycling)	for	short	journeys	not	only	reduces	GHG	emissions	
from	vehicles	but	also	leads	to	appreciable	improvements	physical	activity	at	the	population	level,	
reducing	the	risk	of	conditions	related	to	sedentary	lifestyle	(e.g.	ischaemic	heart	disease,	stroke,	
diabetes,	some	types	of	cancer),	such	benefits	generally	exceeding	any	increased	risk	through	road	
injury.117,118	
Whilst	this	indicator	would	ideally	track	the	proportion	and	distance	of	journeys	undertaken	on	foot	
and	bicycle,	data	availability	for	national-	and	city-level	modes	of	travel	is	particularly	scarce.	As	
such,	the	Lancet	Countdown	will	instead	present	data	for	selected	locations,	across	a	limited	time-
scale,	in	place	of	an	indicator.	Figure	3.13	presents	data	from	[please	insert	brief	description	of	data	
source,	references,	and	of	the	kind	of	cities	represented	here.	A	full	description	to	be	included	in	the	
appendices].		At	the	national	level,	Figure	3.14	collates	data	from	published	proportions	of	travel	
surveys	and	census	data,	although	even	wider	data	gaps	exist	for	Asia	and	South	America.119		
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Figure	3.13.	Proportion	of	all	journeys	made	by	walking	and	cycling,	selected	world	cities.	Importantly,	this	
does	not	capture	the	distance	travelled	for	each	journey.	Colours	indicate	regions	as	follows:	blue	–	Africa;	red	
–	Europe;	green	–	Americas;	orange	–	Oceania;	purple	–	Asia.107,120-124	
	
Figure	3.14.	Proportion	of	commuters	by	usual	mode	of	transport	to	work	(South	Africa	did	not	report	on	
journeys	to	work	by	cycling).125-133	
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Travel	patterns	depend	on	a	variety	of	factors	including	transport	infrastructure,	urbanization,	
mobility	needs,	availability	of	motor	vehicles	and	personal	preferences,	with	levels	of	active	travel	
vary	widely	across	cities.	As	indicated	in	the	figure,	cities	in	Africa	tend	to	have	higher	levels	of	
walking,	while	cities	in	the	Americas	and	Europe	have	relatively	low	levels	of	both	walking	and	
cycling.	Across	Europe	and	Asia,	more	than	20%	of	trips	are	made	by	foot	in	most	cities,	while	the	
proportion	of	cycling	journeys	ranges	from	1-35%.	
Globally,	trends	of	increasing	urbanization,	suburbanization	and	motorization	are	likely	to	continue	
the	global	direction	of	the	previous	century,	leading	to	further	declines	in	active	travel	in	the	
future.134	Organization	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD)	countries	are	beginning	
to	modestly	increase	their	reliance	on	active	travel	with	obvious	European	examples	found	in	
Germany,	the	Netherlands,	and	Denmark.	However	current	indications	of	any	potential	modal	shift	
suggest	it	is	likely	to	be	insufficient	to	meet	global	commitments	under	the	Paris	Agreement.	Choice	
of	transport	mode	has	explicit	links	to	poverty,	with	the	more	disadvantaged	often	unable	to	afford	
private	or	even	public	modes	of	transport.	
To	this	end,	a	rapid	decline	in	the	proportion	of	journeys	by	foot	and	cycle	is	expected	in	emerging	
economies	as	countries	develop.	As	this	transition	occurs,	ensuring	the	mistakes	made	in	OECD	
countries	are	not	repeated,	will	be	vital.	Recent	United	Nations	(UN)	guidance	recommends	devoting	
20%	of	transport	budgets	to	fund	non-motorized	transport	at	national	and	local	levels	in	low-	and	
middle-income	countries.135		
	
Food	sector	
The	availability	of	food	(in	sufficient	quantity	and	of	appropriate	type	and	quality)	is	central	to	
human	health.	Its	production,	however,	is	also	a	major	contributor	climate	change,	with	the	
agricultural	sector	alone	contributing	29%	of	anthropogenic	GHG	emissions.16	
Dietary	choices	determine	food	energy	and	nutrient	intake,	which	are	essential	for	human	health,	
with	inadequate	and	unhealthy	diets	clearly	associated	with	health	outcomes	ranging	from	
malnutrition,	diabetes,	cardiovascular	diseases,	and	cancer.	Globally,	dietary	factors	were	estimated	
to	account	for	over	10%	of	all	Disability	Adjusted	Life	Years	(DALYs)	in	2013.136	A	transition	to	
healthier	diets,	with	reduced	red	meat	consumption,	and	high	in	locally	and	seasonally	produced	
fruit	and	vegetable	consumption,	could	provide	significant	emissions	savings.	This	may	in-turn	
reduce	the	health	impact	of	excessive	and	unregulated	pesticide	application,	which	is	in	and	of	itself,	
GHG	emission	intensive.137-141	
Various	dietary	options	have	been	examined	in	terms	of	their	health	impact	and	carbon	footprint,	
with	one	in	the	UK	indicating	as	much	as	a	36%	reduction	in	GHG	emissions,	under	reasonable	
constraints	on	food	group	diversity.142-144	Despite	this,	further	research	is	clearly	required	to	identify	
what	constitutes	sustainable	diets,	which	must	be	culturally	acceptable,	accessible,	economically	fair	
affordable,	nutritionally	adequate,	safe	and	healthy,	and	protective	of	biodiversity	and	ecosystems	
in	those	settings.142,143	
Figure	3.15	makes	use	of	DPSEEA	to	outline	the	key	pressures	exerted	on	the	food	sector,	and	
subsequent	implications	for	health	and	climate	change.	GHG	emissions	in	the	food	sector	can	be	
altered	both	through	a	reduction	in	the	production	of	food	types	with	the	highest	life-cycle	carbon	
intensity,	and	through	specific	adjustments	to	production	and	supply	processes.145		
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Tracking	progress	towards	more	sustainable	diets	requires	consistent	and	continuous	data	on	food	
consumption,	and	relatged	GHG	emissions	throughout	food	product	life	cycles.	On	the	consumption	
side,	this	would	require	annual	nationally	representative	dietary	survey	data	reflecting	food	
consumption	at	the	individual	level.	However,	due	to	the	complexity	and	cost	of	such	data	
collection,	dietary	surveys	are	available	for	a	limited	number	of	countries	and	years	only.146	Although	
efforts	of	compiling	and	ensuring	comparability	of	these	data	are	under	way,	their	current	format	is	
not	suitable	for	global	monitoring	of	progress	towards	optimal	dietary	patterns	in	terms	of	health	
benefits	of	climate	change	mitigation.147,148	The	SDG	indicator	2.4.1	is	designed	to	track	the	
proportion	of	agricultural	area	under	productive	and	sustainable	agriculture.112	With	some	
limitations,	progress	here	can	also	be	estimated	from	aggregate	data	on	commodity	production.	
Both	indicators	3.8a	and	3.8b,	below,	were	constructed	using	data	from	the	Food	and	Agriculture	
Organization	of	the	United	Nations	(FAO)	food	balance	sheets,	which	comprises	of	national	supply	
and	utilization	accounts	of	primary	foods	and	processed	commodities.149		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3.15.	3.15a)	DPSEEA	Framework	applied	to	Food	Sector.	3.15b)	Food	sector	indicators	within	the	
DPSEEA	framework.	A	simple	traffic-light	system	has	been	used	to	provide	a	qualitative	indication	of	global	
progress	to-date,	on	each	of	the	indicators.	
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Indicator	3.8.1:	Total	food	supply	for	human	consumption	
Headline	Finding:	Globally,	total	food	supply	has	increased	by	10%,	from	2621	kcal/capita/day	in	
1990,	to	2884	kcal/capita/day	in	2013.	
Total	food	supply	for	human	consumption	(kcal/capita/day)	indicates	trends	in	food	production,	
defining	pressure	on	GHG	emission	intensity,	and	approximates	trends	in	food	energy	availability,	for	
human	consumption.	
[Please	insert	a	brief	(2-3	sentence)	description	of	the	data	used	for	this	indicator	and	the	reference]	
Overall	food	supply	for	human	consumption	has	been	increasing	in	most	parts	of	the	world,	with	
notably	flatter	trends	in	Oceania	and	Europe,	since	the	1960s.	(Figure	3.16)	Average	levels	have	been	
lower	in	Africa	and	Asia,	and	higher	in	the	Americas,	Europe,	Oceania.	Current	levels	are	still	below	
recommended	levels	of	food	energy	intake	in	Africa	and	Asia,	and	in	excess	in	the	Americas,	Europe,	
and	Oceania,	reflecting	persistent	inequality.	This	corresponds	to	inequality-related	health	outcomes	
across	these	regions,	with	the	highest	levels	of	child	undernutrition	in	Africa	and	Asia,	and	higher	
prevalence	of	obesity	in	the	Americas,	Europe,	and	Oceania.150-152	However,	there	are	regional	
disparities	and	the	prevalence	of	overweight	and	obesity	is	increasing	globally:	two	thirds	of	the	
worlds’	obese	people	now	live	in	developing	countries.	
	
	
Figure	3.16	-	Total	food	supply	for	human	consumption	(kcal/capita/d)	by	UN-defined	regions.150	
	
Indicator	3.8.2:	Supply	of	ruminant	meat	for	human	consumption	
Headline	Finding:	Globally,	ruminant	meat	consumption	has	been	stagnant	since	1960.	
Annual	change	in	ruminant	meat	supply	reflects	trends	in	the	production	of	the	most	impactful	food	
group	in	terms	of	its	GHG	emissions153-155	(Figure	3.17).	Assuming	correlation	between	ruminant	
meat	supply	and	its	consumption,	the	indicator	will	also	inform	on	the	health	aspect	of	variations	in	
diet	(i.e.	risk	of	colorectal	cancer,	or	heart	disease).156,157	However,	this	should	be	viewed	in	relation	
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to	the	context	of	any	setting	where	this	trend	is	examined,	as	in	some	populations,	meat	
consumption	is	the	only	core	food	energy	and	provides	essential	micronutrients	as	well	as	
livelihoods	for	pastoralist	communities.	
Ruminant	meat	supply	for	human	consumption	has	been	notably	higher	in	Oceania	than	other	
regions	since	the	1960s,	although	the	trend	has	been	decreasing	over	time.	By	contrast,	the	trend	
has	been	increasing	in	Asia,	possibly	reflecting	the	increasing	trend	in	beef	consumption	in	China	at	a	
rate	of	16%	per	annum.152	In	Europe,	the	trend	has	been	increasing	until	1995	and	decreasing	
thereafter.	
	
	
Figure	3.17.	Ruminant	meat	supply	for	human	consumption	(kg/capita/year)	by	UN-defined	regions.150	
	
Future	indicator	development	requires	better	quality	data	and	closer	examination	of	actual	
consumption	patterns,	identifying	potential	setting-specific	shifts	in	diets	towards	more	sustainable	
patterns	as	well	as	sophisticated	analyses	of	GHG	emissions	along	the	food	product	life	cycle.	
	
Healthcare	sector		
The	healthcare	sector	is	a	considerable	contributor	to	GHG	emissions,	and	has	both	a	responsibility	
and	an	appreciable	opportunity	to	lead	by	example	in	reducing	its	carbon	footprint.	In	2013	the	
estimated	US	health	care	sector	emissions	were	655	MtCo2e,	which	exceeded	emissions	of	the	
entire	UK.158	GHG	emissions	in	the	health	care	sector	illustrate	an	obvious	externality	which	
contributes	to	climate	change,	which	contradicts	the	sector’s	aim	of	improving	population	health.		
The	World	Bank	estimates	that	a	25%	reduction	from	existing	healthcare	emissions	in	Argentina,	
Brazil,	China,	India,	Nepal,	Philippines,	and	South	Africa	would	equate	to	116-194	million	metric	tons	
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of	CO2e	emission	reduction,	in	other	terms	equal	to	decommissioning	of	34-56	coal	fired	power	
plants	or	removing	24-41	million	passenger	vehicles	from	the	road.158		
	
Figure	3.18.	3.18a)	DPSEEA	Framework	applied	to	Health	Sector.	3.18b)	Health	sector	indicator	within	the	
DPSEEA	framework.	A	simple	traffic-light	system	has	been	used	to	provide	a	qualitative	indication	of	global	
progress	to-date,	on	each	of	the	indicators.	
	
Indicator	3.9:	Healthcare	sector	emissions	
Several	health	sector	emission	reduction	targets	can	be	highlighted	as	positive	examples.	The	
National	Health	Service	(NHS)	in	the	UK	set	an	ambitious	target	of	34%	health-system	wide	GHG	
emission	reduction	by	2020;	the	Western	Cape	Government	health	system	in	South	Africa	
committed	to	10%	emission	reduction	by	2020	and	30%	by	2050	in	government	hospitals;	and	Albert	
Einstein	Hospital	in	Sao	Paulo,	Brazil,	is	aiming	to	reduce	its	annual	emissions	by	41%.158	
Monitoring	healthcare	system	emissions	is	an	essential	step	towards	accounting	for	the	externality	
of	health	sector	emissions.	Comprehensive	national	GHG	emissions	reporting	by	the	healthcare	
systems	is	currently	only	routinely	performed	in	the	UK.	Elsewhere,	select	healthcare	organisations,	
facilities,	and	companies	provide	self-reported	estimates	of	emissions,	however	this	is	rarely	
standardized	across	sites.	
In	the	UK,	comprehensive	GHG	emission	reporting	was	facilitated	by	the	centralized	structure	of	the	
NHS.	Sustainable	Development	Unit	(SDU)	of	the	NHS	has	been	monitoring	greenhouse	gas	
emissions	from	a	1992	baseline.	Due	in	large	part	to	their	work	and	many	others,	NHS	emissions	
reduced	by	11%	from	2007	to	2015,	despite	an	18%	increase	in	activity.159	In	2015,	GHG	emission	of	
the	health	care	system	represented	39%	of	public	sector	emissions	in	England.160		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Increased	
health	care	
system	
operations	
 
Population	
exposure	to	
air	pollution	
Increased	
frequency	
and	
intensity	of	
weather	
extremes	
Health	
impacts	
attributable	
to	GHG	and	
air	pollution 
Policies	for	
sustainable	
building	energy	
use,	
transportation,	
and	other	
operations 
Drivers/exposures Health	impact 
Increased	
atmospheric	
GHG	
concentrations	
Increased	air	
pollution	
concentration	
attributable	to	
health 
Pressures States Exposures Effects Actions 
a)	Healthcare	sector 
b)	Indicators	
Greenhouse	gas	
emissions	of	
healthcare	systems	
3.9	
	 78	
A	future	set	of	indicators	would	need	to	reflect	country-wide	GHG	emissions	of	health	care	systems	
with	denominators	of	the	system	size	and	volume	of	health	care	service	provision.	Indicators	should	
be	available	at	each	level	of	policy	and	managerial	decision-making	to	inform	choices	and	facilitate	
the	selection	of	policies	and	organizational	operations	with	lowest	GHG	emission	levels.	
Understanding	the	emissions-intensity	of	healthcare	activities	under	varying	contexts	would	
potentially	allow	for	‘top-down’	national-level	estimates,	with	countries	grouped	by	region	or	
income.	
	
Conclusion	
The	indicators	and	analysis	presented	in	this	section	have	provided	an	overview	of	the	current	and	
historical	mitigation	ambitions	relevant	to	public	health	for	the	energy,	transport,	food	and	
healthcare	sectors.	They	have	been	selected	for	their	relevance	to	both	climate	change	and	to	
human	health	and	wellbeing.	The	Lancet	Countdown	will	work	to	develop	these	indicators	for	future	
reports,	drawing	closer	attribution	to	both	climate	change	mitigation,	and	to	the	health	outcomes	
that	results	from	these	interventions.	
The	first	section	covered	the	negative	health	impacts	of	climate	change,	providing	a	strong	
imperative	for	accelerated	action.	To	this	end,	a	number	of	areas	show	remarkable	promise	–	each	
of	which	are	already	yielding	impressive	benefits	for	human	health.	Globally,	there	is	now	more	
renewable	energy	generation	capacity	installed	than	there	is	for	coal-related	capacity,	and	the	total	
power	capacity	of	‘pre-construction’	coal	has	halved	from	2016	to	2017,	reflecting	potentially	
seismic	shifts	in	global	energy	investment	patterns.	The	transport	sector,	which	has	been	historically	
slow	to	respond,	is	approaching	a	threshold.	In	late-2017/early-2018,	electric	vehicles	are	expected	
to	reach	cost-parity	with	their	non-electric	counterparts	–	a	phenomena	that	wasn’t	expected	to	
occur	until	2030.	
However,	these	positive	examples	must	not	distract	from	the	enormity	of	the	task	at	hand.	The	
indicators	presented	in	this	section	serve	as	a	reminder	of	the	scale	and	scope	of	increased	ambition	
required	to	meet	commitments	under	the	Paris	Agreement.	They	demonstrate	a	world	which	is	only	
just	beginning	to	respond	to	climate	change,	and	hence	only	just	unlocking	the	opportunities	
available	for	better	health.	
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4.	Finance	&	Economics	
	
Introduction	
Interventions	to	protect	human	health	from	climate	change	impacts	have	now	been	presented.	,		
This	section	focuses	on	the	economic	and	financial	mechanisms	necessary	for	them	to	be	
implemented.	A	number	of	the	indicators	here	do	not	have	an	explicit	link	to	human	health,	and	yet,	
for	example,	investment	in	renewable	energy	and	a	declining	investment	in	coal	capacity	is	essential	
in	displacing	fossil	fuels	and	reducing	their	two	principal	externalities	–	the	social	cost	of	carbon	and	
the	health	costs	from	air	pollution.	Other	indicators	–	those	looking	at	valuing	the	health	benefits	of	
mitigation	interventions,	or	economic	and	social	losses	from	extreme	weather	events	–	have	more	
explicit	links	to	human	wellbeing.	
The	landmark	2006	Stern	Review	on	the	Economics	of	Climate	Change	estimated	that	the	impacts	of	
climate	change	would	cost	the	equivalent	reducing	annual	global	Gross	World	Product	(GWP)	–	the	
sum	of	total	global	economic	output	–	by	“5-20%	now,	and	forever”,	compared	to	a	world	without	
climate	change.161	The	IPCC’s	AR5	estimates	an	aggregate	loss	of	up	to	2%	GWP	even	if	the	rise	in	
global	mean	temperatures	is	limited	to	2.5°C	above	pre-industrial	levels.60	However,	such	estimates	
depend	on	a	range	of	assumptions,	such	as	the	rate	at	which	future	costs	and	benefits	are	
discounted,	and	derive	from	economic	models	built	upon	physical	models	that	cannot	fully	
characterise	all	the	dynamic	physical	processes	of	importance.162	Indeed,	Weitzman	concluded	that	
due	to	the	‘fat	tails’	of	the	climate-risk,	and	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	potentially	systemic	
effects	of	such	high-risk	phenomena	(e.g.	regional	societal	collapse,	famine	or	widespread	conflict),	
existing	analytical	approaches	poorly	suited	to	capture	estimates	of	the	economic	impact,	potentially	
drastically	underestimating	its	effect.163	
In	the	presence	of	such	uncertainty,	with	potentially	catastrophic	outcomes,	prevention	will	always	
be	better	that	cure.		The	prescription	is	investment	in	a	long-term	course	of	low-emission	
infrastructure	and	activities,	administered	through	enabling	policy	action.	The	nature	of	the	side	
effects	on	the	economy	and	social	welfare	this	course	of	action	produces	will	depend	on	the	form	of	
the	low-emission	infrastructure	and	activities	adopted,	and	how	these	investments	are	made.		
The	indicators	in	this	section,	which	seek	to	track	flows	of	finance	and	impacts	on	the	economy	and	
social	welfare	resulting	from	(in)action	on	climate	change,	fall	into	three	broad	themes:	
	
a)	Investing	in	a	Low-Carbon	Economy	
Significant	investment	in	energy	systems	over	time	is	required	simply	to	maintain	existing	services	
(as	infrastructures	age	and	needs	to	be	replaced),	and	to	meet	growing	demand	with	access	to	
modern	energy	services	(in	the	case	of	emerging	economies).	An	increasing	proportion	of	this	
investment	must	be	directed	towards	low-carbon	energy,	and	energy-efficiency	interventions,	whilst	
investment	in	carbon-intensive	sources	must	be	minimized,	to	prevent	high-carbon	‘lock-in’	and	the	
risk	of	‘stranded	assets’	(see	Box	4.1,	below).	The	first	two	indicators	under	this	theme	track	
investment	in	renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency,	and	investment	in	new	coal-fired	electricity	
generation	capacity.	The	third	and	final	indicator	tracks	the	value	of	funds	divested	from	fossil	fuel	
assets,	including	by	health	institutions.	
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b)	Economic	Benefits	of	Tackling	Climate	Change	
Action	to	tackle	climate	change	may	produce	a	wide	range	of	economic	benefits.	These	will	be	
direct,	such	as	reducing	the	risk	of	increasing	human	and	economic	loss	from	extremes	of	weather.	
The	first	indicator	under	this	theme	tracks	the	economic	losses	due	to	climate-related	events.	
Benefits	of	action	on	climate	change	may	also	be	indirect.	This	includes	health-related	co-benefits	of	
mitigation	action,	such	as	a	reduction	in	local	pollution	levels	associated	with	the	combustion	of	
fossil	fuels.	The	second	indicator	under	this	theme	tracks	the	economic	value	of	health-related	co-
benefits	of	mitigation	action.	Another	indirect	benefit	is	the	emergence	of	new	low-carbon	
industries	and	employment	opportunities,	and	the	decline	of	carbon	intensive	industries	that	may	
have	negative	impacts	on	human	health.	The	third	and	final	indicator	under	this	theme	tracks	global	
employment	levels	in	high-	and	low-carbon	industries.	
	
c)	Pricing	the	GHG	Emissions	from	Fossil	Fuels	
The	Stern	Review	refers	to	the	market	externality	of	GHG	emissions	‘the	greatest	and	widest-ranging	
market	failure	ever	seen’.Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.	An	economist’s	principal	approach	to	tackling	this	is	
through	GHG	(or	carbon)	pricing.	In	addition,	environmentally	harmful	subsidies	to	fossil	fuels	must	
be	removed.	The	first	two	indicators	under	this	theme	track	the	global	value	of	fossil	fuel	subsidies,	
and	the	global	coverage	of	carbon	pricing	instruments	including	the	weighted	average	global	carbon	
price	produced.	The	third	and	final	indicator	under	this	theme	tracks	the	total	revenue	generated	by	
carbon	pricing	instruments	around	the	world,	and	how	this	revenue	is	used.	
Corresponding	Appendix	5	provide	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	data	and	methods	used.	
Indicator	4.1:	Change	in	annual	investments	in	renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	
To	be	completed	when	2016	data	for	this	indicator	will	be	available,	during	the	first	week	of	July	(made	
available	in	advance	of	its	scheduled	publication	date,	for	the	Lancet	Countdown),	at	which	point,	this	will	be	
added	to	the	draft	publication.	
The	combustion	of	fossil	fuels	for	the	production	of	energy	is	the	principal	source	of	anthropogenic	
CO2	emissions	(and	other	emissions	with	harmful	consequences	for	human	health)	that	lead	to	
climate	change.	Transitioning	to	a	low-carbon	energy	system	through	the	rapid	deployment	of	
renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	is	therefore	central	to	tackling	climate	change.	This	
indicator	tracks	the	level	of	global	investment	in	renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	in	absolute	
terms,	and	as	a	proportion	of	total	energy	system	investment.	Figure	4.6	illustrates	the	data	for	2015	
and	2016.	
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Figure	4.6.	Annual	Investment	in	the	Global	Energy	System.164.	
	
Indicator	4.2:	Change	in	annual	investment	in	coal	capacity	
To	be	completed	when	2016	data	for	this	indicator	will	be	available,	during	the	first	week	of	July	(made	
available	in	advance	of	its	scheduled	publication	date,	for	the	Lancet	Countdown),	at	which	point,	this	will	be	
added	to	the	draft	publication.	
The	combustion	of	coal	is	the	most	CO2-intesive	process	for	the	generation	of	electricity,	with	coal-
fired	power	stations	responsible	for	a	third	of	global	CO2	emissions	in	2015.165	In	addition,	air	
pollution	from	coal	plants	led	to	over	18,200	premature	deaths,	8,500	new	cases	of	chronic	
bronchitis	and	over	4	million	lost	working	days	in	Europe	in	2012	alone,	producing	an	annual	
economic	cost	of	up	to	€43	billion.166	These	numbers	would	increase	dramatically	if	expanded	to	the	
global	scale.	A	reduction	in	the	use	of	coal	for	electricity	generation	should	therefore	be	a	priority	for	
the	low-carbon	transition.	This	indicator	tracks	annual	investment	in	new	coal-fired	power	capacity	
in	absolute	terms,	and	as	a	proportion	of	total	energy	system	investment.	
	
Indicator	4.3:	Value	of	funds	divested	from	fossil	fuels	
Headline	Finding:	Global	Value	of	Funds	Committing	to	Divestment	in	2016was	$1.24	trillion,	of	
which	Health	Institutions	represent	$2.58	million;	this	represents	a	cumulative	sum	of	$5.45	trillion	
(with	health	accounting	for	$859	billion)	
The	fossil	fuel	divestment	movement	seeks	to	encourage	institutions	and	investors	to	divest	
themselves	of	assets	(including	equity,	stocks,	bonds	and	other	income-generating	investments)	
involved	in	the	extraction	of	fossil	fuels.	Proponents	cite	divestment	as	embodying	both	a	moral	
purpose	(e.g.	reducing	the	fossil	fuel	industry’s	‘social	licence	to	operate’),	and	an	economic	risk	
reduction	strategy	(e.g.	through	reducing	the	investor’s	exposure	to	the	risk	of	‘stranded	assets’	–	
see	Box	4.1).	However,	others	believe	active	engagement	between	investors	and	fossil	fuel	
businesses	is	a	more	appropriate	course	of	action	(e.g.	the	encouragement	of	diversification	into	less	
carbon-intensive	assets,	through	stakeholder	resolutions).167	
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Box	4.1.	The	Low-Carbon	Transition	and	Stranded	Assets	
‘Stranded	assets’	are	assets	which,	at	some	point	before	the	end	of	their	economic	life	(as	assumed	
when	the	initial	investment	was	made),	are	no	longer	able	to	make	an	economic	return	as	a	result	of	
changes	in	the	market	or	regulatory	environment.	
If	climate	change	is	to	be	limited	to	2°C,	analysis	by	McGlade	and	Ekins	suggests	that	a	third	of	global	
oil	reserves,	half	of	natural	gas	and	80%	of	coal	reserves	must	remain	unused	by	2050.168	Such	
reserves	would	thus	cease	to	hold	any	economic	value.	The	IEA	&	IRENA	estimate	the	cost	incurred	
to	‘prove	up’	these	unburnable	reserves	(i.e.	exploration	costs)	to	be	$520	billion	for	oil	and	gas	
alone.94	In	addition,	Muttitt	estimates	that	an	additional	$10.6	trillion	in	capital	expenditure	
between	2014	and	2035	on	developing	oil	and	gas	fields	and	coal	mines	may	be	at	risk	of	stranding,	
with	a	further	$3.9	trillion	in	transportation	infrastructure	(e.g.	pipelines).169	‘Downstream’	fossil	fuel	
assets	are	also	at	risk	of	stranding.	For	example,	IEA	&	IRENA	also	project	stranded	assets	of	$320	
billion	by	2050	resulting	from	the	closure	of	fossil	fuel	power	stations	before	they	are	able	to	recover	
their	capital	investment.Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.		
This	indicator	tracks	the	global	total	value	of	funds	committing	to	divestment	in	2016,	and	the	value	
of	funds	committed	to	divestment	by	health	institutions	in	2016,	which	was	$1.24	trillion,	and	$2.58	
million	respectively.	
The	values	presented	above	are	calculated	from	data	collected	and	provided	by	350.org.	They	
represent	the	total	assets	(or	assets	under	management,	AUM)	for	institutions	that	have	committed	
to	divest	in	2016,	and	thus	do	not	directly	represent	the	sums	divested	from	fossil	fuel	companies.	
‘Divestment’	is	defined	relatively	broadly,	ranging	from	an	organisation	that	has	made	a	binding	
commitment	to	divest	from	coal	companies	only,	to	those	who	have	fully	divested	themselves	of	any	
investments	in	fossil	fuel	companies	and	have	committed	to	avoiding	such	investments	in	future.	It	
also	includes	only	those	institutions	for	which	such	information	is	publicly	available	(or	provided	by	
the	institution	itself),	with	non-US$	values	converted	using	the	market	exchange	rate	when	the	
commitment	was	made.	See	Appendix	5	for	more	information.	
Asset	data	is	available	for	93	of	the	124	organisations,	and	for	1	of	the	3	healthcare	institutions	
(Chicago	Medical	Society)	that	committed	to	divestment	in	2016.	By	the	end	of	2016,	a	total	of	695	
organisations	with	cumulative	assets	worth	at	least	$5.45	trillion,	including	11	health	organisations	
with	assets	of	at	least	$859	billion,	had	committed	to	divestment.	From	the	start	of	January	2017	to	
the	end	of	March	2017,	a	further	12	organisations	(none	of	which	were	health	organisations)	with	
assets	worth	$46.87	billion	joined	this	total.	The	vast	majority	of	these	organisations	are	educational	
institutions,	faith-based	organisations,	local	(city)	government	entities	and	philanthropic	
foundations,	mostly	based	in	the	USA,	Western	and	Northern	Europe,	and	Australia.	
Just	18	organisations	recorded	as	committed	to	divestment	above	are	‘for-profit’	corporations	
(however,	these	account	for	$3.16	trillion	(58%)	of	the	total	asset	value	presented	above).	Pension	
funds	and	other	institutional	investors	(e.g.	insurance	companies),	which	in	2013	held	assets	under	
management	worth	$93	trillion	in	the	OECD	alone	(larger	than	the	sum	of	global	economic	output	in	
that	year	-	$76.8	trillion),	also	account	for	a	small	proportion	of	the	organisations	committed	to	
divestment	(12%	at	the	end	of	2016).170,171	Institutional	investors	are	substantial	investors	in	fossil	
fuel	companies,	due	to	the	historically	substantial,	yet	stable	returns	generated.	
Policy	makers	are	increasingly	keen	to	encourage	(or	require)	institutional	investors	to	properly	
assess	and	disclose	their	exposure	to	climate-related	risk.	In	December	2015,	the	Financial	Stability	
Board	established	the	‘Task	Force	on	Climate-Related	Finance	Disclosures’,	with	the	aim	of	
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developing	financial	risk	assessment	and	disclosure	approaches	related	to	the	physical,	liability	and	
transition	risks	associated	with	climate	change.	In	2016,	the	Task	Force	published	their	first	set	of	
recommendations	to	achieve	this	objective.172	In	January	2017,	the	European	Union	(EU)	introduced	
the	recast	IORP	(‘Institutions	for	occupational	retirement	provision’)	Directive,	which	states	that	
IORPs	(pension	funds)	‘…as	part	of	their	risk	management	system…	should	include…risks	related	to	
climate	change…[and]	to	the	depreciation	of	assets	due	to	regulatory	change	(‘stranded	assets’).173		
It	is	expected	that	fossil	fuel	assets	held	by	institutional	and	other	investors	will	decrease	to	2030,	as	
associated	risks	increase	and	become	more	apparent,	and	action	is	subsequently	taken	to	reduce	
risk	exposure.	For	institutional	investors,	the	evidence	suggests	that	this	is	happening,	with	60%	of	
the	world’s	500	largest	asset	owners	and	managers	(with	$40	trillion	in	AUM)	now	taking	active	
action	to	protect	their	portfolios	from	high-carbon	risk	(a	rise	from	50%	in	2016).174	
	
Indicator	4.4:	Economic	losses	due	to	climate-related	extreme	events	
Headline	Finding:	In	2016,	a	total	of	xxx	events	resulted	in	xxx	billion	in	overall	economic	losses,	and	
XX,XXX	fatalities.	XX%	of	these	were	uninsured	in	LICs.	
Climate	change	will	continue	to	increase	the	frequency	and	severity	of	extreme	weather	events,	
including	meteorological	(e.g.	tropical	storms),	climatological	(e.g.	droughts)	and	hydrological	(e.g.	
flooding)	phenomena,	across	the	world.	This	indicator	tracks	the	number	of	events	and	the	total	
economic	losses	(insured	and	uninsured)	resulting	from	such	events.	In	addition	to	the	health	
impacts	of	these	events	(discussed	in	the	first	section),	economic	losses	(particularly	uninsured	
losses)	will	have	potentially	devastating	impacts	on	the	wellbeing	and	mental	health	of	those	who	
incur	them.	Whether	it	is	through	reduced	public	funds	available	for	healthcare,	or	the	disruptions	to	
livelihoods,	shelter,	adequate	nutrition,	or	schooling	and	education,	the	economic	impacts	of	
extreme	weather	events	undermine	many	of	the	social	determinants	of	health.175	
The	data	upon	which	this	indicator	is	based	is	sourced	from	Munich	Re.176	Economic	losses	(insured	
and	uninsured)	refer	to	physical	assets,	and	do	not	include	the	economic	value	of	loss	of	life	or	ill	
health,	or	health	and	casualty	insurance.	Values	are	first	denominated	in	local	currency,	converted	
to	US$	using	the	market	exchange	rate	in	the	month	the	event	occurred,	and	inflated	to	US$2016	
using	country-specific	Consumer	Price	Indices	(CPI).	This	indicator	and	underlying	data	does	not	seek	
to	attribute	events	and	associated	fatalities	and	economic	losses	to	climate	change.	For	further	
methodological	details	and	tabulated	data,	see	Appendix	5.	
Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	presents	insured	and	uninsured	economic	losses	(left	axis)	and	
total	fatalities	(right	axis)	resulting	from	all	significant	meteorological,	climatological	and	
hydrological	events	across	the	world,	from	2010	to	2016,	by	country	income	group.	An	annual	
average	of	700	events	resulted	in	an	average	of	20,000	fatalities	and	$127	billion	in	overall	economic	
losses	per	year	over	this	timeframe.	Upper-middle	and	high-income	countries	experienced	around	
two-thirds	of	the	recorded	events.	Around	half	of	the	total	fatalities	occurred	within	upper-middle	
income	countries,	and	around	a	third	in	lower-middle	income	countries.	The	remainder	occurred	in	
approximately	equal	proportions	between	the	highest	and	lowest	income	countries.	However,	
around	90%	of	economic	losses	occurred	in	upper-middle	and	high-income	countries,	with	<1%	
attributable	to	those	of	low-income.	The	same	ratios	for	the	number	of	events	and	economic	losses	
between	income	groups	is	present	in	the	data	for	the	period	1990-2016,	despite	an	increasing	trend	
in	the	total	global	number	of	events	and	associated	total	value	economic	losses	(in	real	terms)	over	
this	period.	
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Figure	4.2.	Economic	Losses	and	Fatalities	from	Climate-Related	Events	–	Absolute.176	
	
However,	the	data	as	presented	in	Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	does	not	indicate	the	
relativity	of	impact	across	different	income	groups.	For	example,	although	the	majority	of	fatalities	
and	economic	losses	have	occurred	in	upper-middle	and	high-income	countries,	these	countries	are	
among	the	most	populous,	with	more	economically	valuable	property	and	infrastructure	(in	absolute	
terms).	Therefore,	it	might	be	expected	that	absolute	fatalities	and	economic	damages	would	be	
greatest	in	these	countries	(ceteris	paribus).	As	such,	Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	presents	
the	data	in	terms	of	‘intensity’,	i.e.	and	insured	and	uninsured	economic	losses	per	$1000	GDP	(left	
axis,	in	US$2016),	and	fatalities	per	million	population	(right	axis).	
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Figure	4.3.	Economic	Losses	and	fatalities	from	Climate-Related	Events	-	Intensity.176	
	
Between	2010	and	2016,	high	and	upper-middle	income	countries	experienced	the	least	average	
annual	economic	loss	as	a	proportion	of	GDP	($1.45/$1000	GDP	and	$1.95/$1000	GDP,	respectively),	
with	low	and	lower-middle	income	countries	subject	to	higher,	but	relatively	comparable	values	
($2.65/$1000	GDP	and	$2.3/$1000	GDP,	respectively).	However,	for	1990-2016,	average	annual	
values	vary	substantially.	Whilst	high	and	upper-middle	income	countries	maintain	relatively	similar	
values	($1.60/$1000	GDP	and	$2.9/$1000	GDP,	respectively),	economic	losses	experienced	by	
(particularly)	low	and	lower-middle	income	countries	increase	substantially	(to	$10.95/$1000	GDP	
and	$4.22/$1000	GDP,	respectively).	
It	is	clear	that	on	average,	lower	income	countries	tend	to	experience	a	higher	fatality	rate	and	
economic	loss	as	a	proportion	of	GDP	as	a	result	of	climate-related	events	than	higher-income	
countries.	However,	a	more	striking	result	is	the	difference	in	the	proportion	of	economic	losses	that	
are	uninsured.	In	high-income	countries,	on	average	around	half	of	economic	losses	experienced	are	
insured.	This	drops	rapidly	to	under	10%	in	upper-middle	income	countries,	and	to	well	under	1%	in	
low-income	countries.	Over	the	period	1990-2016,	uninsured	losses	in	low-income	countries	were	
on	average	equivalent	to	over	1.5%	of	their	GDP.	For	contrast,	expenditure	on	healthcare	in	low-
income	countries	on	average	for	the	period	1995-2015	was	equivalent	to	5.3%	of	GDP.177	
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Indicator	4.5:	Valuing	the	health	co-benefits	of	climate	change	mitigation	
Air	pollution	data	enabling	the	calculation	of	this	indicator	is	to	be	provided	by	LSHTM/IIASA	in	the	coming	
weeks.	
The	consequences	for	human	health	from	the	combustion	of	fossil	fuels	and	climate	change	may	be	
valued	in	economic	terms.	One	part	of	the	equation	is	the	elements	that	directly	impact	the	
economy	and	economic	activity,	such	as	lost	labour	productivity	and	the	cost	of	treating	ill	health.	
Another	part	is	the	value	lost	based	on	the	monetary	value	individuals	and	society	place	on	a	healthy	
life	and	a	high	quality	environment,	which	are	diminished.	As	such,	action	to	mitigate	climate	change	
and	improve	human	health	reduces	this	cost	(against	a	baseline	of	‘no	action’).	This	indicator	places	
an	economic	value	on	the	changes	in	health	outcomes	tracked	by	Indicator	3.5.	
	
Indicator	4.6:	Employment	in	low-carbon	and	high-carbon	industries	
Headline	Finding:	In	2016,	global	employment	in	renewable	energy	reached	9.8	million,	with	
employment	in	fossil	fuel	extraction	trending	down,	to	8.6	million.	
As	the	low-carbon	transition	gathers	pace,	high-carbon	industries	and	jobs	will	decline.	A	clear	
example	is	seen	in	fossil	fuel	extraction.	Some	fossil	fuel	extraction	activities,	such	as	coal	mining,	
have	substantial	impacts	on	human	health.	Coal	mining	accidents	led	to	over	1,000	deaths	in	2008	in	
China	alone	(a	rapid	decline	from	nearly	5,000	in	2003),	with	exposure	to	particulate	matter	and	
harmful	pollutants	responsible	for	elevated	levels	of	cardiovascular,	respiratory	and	kidney	disease,	
in	coal	mining	areas.178-181		The	low-carbon	transition	is	also	likely	to	stimulate	the	growth	of	new	
industries	and	employment	opportunities.	With	appropriate	planning	and	policy,	the	transition	from	
employment	in	high-carbon	to	low-carbon	industries	will	yield	positive	consequences	for	human	
health.	
This	indicator	tracks	global	employment	levels	in	fossil	fuel	extraction	industries	(coal	mining	and	oil	
and	gas	exploration	and	production),	and	in	renewable	energy.		Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	
presents	these	values	for	2012-2016	(see	Appendix	5	for	tabulated	data).	The	data	for	this	indicator	
is	sourced	from	IRENA	(renewables),	and	IBIS	World	(fossil	fuel	extraction).Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.,Error!	
Bookmark	not	defined.,Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.	
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Figure	4.4.	Employment	in	Renewable	Energy	and	Fossil	Fuel	Extraction182-184	
	
From	a	peak	of	9.1	million	in	2014,	global	fossil	fuel	extraction	industry	jobs	reduced	by	around	
250,000	to	2016	(to	8.6	million).	This	was	driven	by	a	reduction	of	over	700,000	jobs	in	the	coal	
mining	industry,	offset	by	an	increase	of	500,000	in	the	oil	and	gas	industry.		The	decline	in	the	coal	
industry	is	the	result	of	a	range	of	factors,	including	the	substitution	for	lower-cost	natural	gas	in	the	
power	sector	in	many	countries	reducing	the	demand	for	coal	and	leading	to	overcapacity,	industry	
consolidation,	and	the	rising	automation	of	extractive	activities.Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.	Whilst	delivering	
a	low-carbon	transition,	it	is	clearly	important	to	ensure	that	individuals	and	communities	do	not	
experience	protracted	economic	or	employment	hardship.	
By	contrast,	employment	in	the	renewable	energy	industry	increased	rapidly	from	over	7.1	million	
jobs	in	2012	to	over	9.3	million	in	2014,	and	reaching	9.8	million	in	2016.	This	growth	has	largely	
been	driven	by	the	solar	photo	voltaic	(PV)	industry,	which	added	over	1.7	million	jobs	between	
2012	and	2016.	Solar	PV	is	now	the	largest	renewable	energy	employer,	overtaking	bioenergy,	which	
has	experienced	a	reduction	in	250,000	jobs	since	2012.	
For	employment	in	both	fossil	fuel	extraction	and	renewables	industries	the	trend	to	2030	will	
depend	on	a	range	of	factors,	including	the	change	in	demand	for	energy,	the	relative	cost	of	
generating	energy	by	fossil	fuels	and	renewables,	climate	and	energy	policy,	and	the	spread	of	
automation	in	key	processes.	Broadly,	it	would	be	expected	(and	desired)	that	the	trends	illustrated	
in	Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	continue.		
0	
2	
4	
6	
8	
10	
12	
2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
M
ill
io
n	
Jo
bs
	
Large	Hydropower	 Solar	Hea/ng/Cooling	 Wind	Energy	 Bioenergy	
Solar	Photovoltaic	 Other	Technologies	 Fossil	Fuel	Extrac/on	
	 88	
	
	
Indicator	4.7:	Fossil	fuel	subsidies	
Headline	Finding:	In	2015,	fossil	fuel	consumption	subsidies	followed	a	trend	seen	since	2012,	
decreasing	markedly	to	$327	billion,	principally	as	a	result	of	declining	global	oil	prices.	
The	combustion	of	fossil	fuels	results	in	a	variety	of	harmful	consequences	for	human	health,	from	
climate	change	and	air	pollution,	to	potentially	dangerous	employment	involved	in	their	extraction	
(discussed	under	Indicator	4.6).	The	presence	of	subsidies	for	fossil	fuels,	either	for	its	production	
(e.g.	fossil	fuel	extraction)	or	consumption	(e.g.	regulated	gasoline	prices),	artificially	lowers	their	
price,	promoting	overconsumption.	This	indicator	tracks	the	global	value	of	fossil	fuel	consumption	
subsidies.	4.5	illustrates	the	value	of	fossil	fuel	consumption	subsidies	for	2010-2016	(tabulated	in	
Appendix	5	by	product	and	country	for	2012-2016).	
	
	
Figure	4.5.	Global	Fossil	Fuel	Consumption	Subsidies	-	2010-2015.185,186	
	
Despite	rising	from	$444	billion	in	2010	to	a	peak	of	$571	billion	in	2012,	fossil	fuel	consumption	
subsidies	have	decreased	markedly	to	$327	billion	in	2015	(in	US$2016).	The	principal	driver	for	this	
is	the	change	in	oil	price,	which	approximately	doubled	between	2010	and	2012,	after	which	it	
plateaued,	before	falling	rapidly	to	below	2010	levels	from	mid-2014.	Fossil	fuel	consumption	
subsidies	are	typically	applied	in	order	to	moderate	energy	costs	for	low-income	consumers	
(although	in	practice,	65%	of	such	subsidies	in	developing	countries	benefit	the	wealthiest	40%	of	
the	population).187	As	such,	rising	oil	(and	other	fossil	fuel)	prices	will	tend	to	increase	subsidy	levels,	
as	the	differences	between	market	and	regulated	consumer	prices	widen,	and	governments	take	
further	action	to	mitigate	the	impact	on	citizens.	When	fossil	fuel	prices	decrease,	the	gap	between	
market	and	regulated	prices	reduces,	and	governments	are	able	to	reform	fossil	fuel	subsidies	whilst	
keeping	overall	prices	relatively	constant.	
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Between	2014	and	2015	a	number	of	countries	took	advantage	of	this	opportunity,	particularly	
regarding	oil-based	fuels,	which	accounted	for	over	60%	of	the	reduction	in	total	fossil	fuel	
subsidisation	between	2012	and	2015	(followed	by	natural	gas,	which	often	mirrors	trends	in	oil	
prices,	at	around	25%).	This	included	India,	which	in	deregulating	diesel	prices	accounted	for	a	$19	
billion	subsidy	reduction	between	2014	and	2015	(~13%	of	the	global	total	reduction),	and	the	major	
oil	and	natural	gas	producing	nations	(e.g.	Angola,	Algeria,	Indonesia,	Iran,	Qatar,	Saudi	Arabia	and	
Venezuela),	in	which	reduced	hydrocarbon	revenue	created	pressure	for	fiscal	consolidation,	and	in	
turn	for	consumption	subsidy	reform.Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.	
However,	it	is	clear	that	fossil	fuel	consumption	is	still	subsidised	to	a	substantial	degree.	Despite	
subsidy	reforms,	Iran	provided	the	greatest	subsidy	at	over	$53	billion	in	2015,	-	a	rate	of	$662	per	
capita	(and	equivalent	to	13.5%	of	its	GDP).	Compare	to	renewable	investment	levels	when	data	
received.	
The	data	for	this	indicator	is	provided	by	the	IEA,	and	has	then	been	calculated	using	the	price-gap	
approach,	for	42	mostly	non-OECD	countries	(see	Appendix	5	for	further	details).	Fossil	fuel	
production	subsidies	and	consumption	subsidies	for	most	OECD	countries	are	not	included,	due	to	
the	lack	of	consistent	data.	However,	the	vast	majority	of	fossil	fuel	subsidies	are	consumer	subsidies	
in	non-OECD	countries.	In	2014,	consumer	subsidies	in	OECD	countries	were	worth	less	than	14%	of	
the	non-OECD	value	presented	in	,	with	producer	subsidies	worth	around	4%.188	As	such,	the	
indicator	presented	provides	a	suitable	overview	of	global	trends	in	fossil	fuel	subsidies.		
To	encourage	the	low-carbon	transition,	fossil	fuel	subsidies	should	be	phased	out	as	soon	as	
possible.	The	commitment	made	by	the	G7	in	2016	to	achieve	this	goal	by	2025	should	be	extended	
to	all	OECD	counties,	and	to	all	countries	globally	by	2030.189		
	
Indicator	4.8:	Coverage	and	strength	of	carbon	pricing	
Headline	Finding:	In	2017,	various	carbon	pricing	mechanisms	provided	coverage	for	13.1%	of	global	
anthropogenic	CO2	emissions,	up	from	12.1%	in	2016.	This	reflects	a	doubling	in	the	number	of	
national	and	sub-national	jurisdictions	with	a	carbon	pricing	mechanism	over	the	last	decade.	
This	indicator	tracks	the	extent	to	which	carbon	pricing	instruments	are	applied	around	to	the	world	
as	a	proportion	of	total	GHG	emissions,	and	the	weighted	average	carbon	price	such	instruments	
provide	(Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	–	see	Appendix	5	for	further	details).	
	
	 2016	 2017	
Global	Emissions	Coverage*	 12.1%	 13.1%	
Weighted	Average	Carbon	
Price	of	Instruments	(current	
prices,	US$)	
$7.79	 $8.81	
Global	Weighted	Average	
Carbon	Price	(current	prices,	
US$)	
$0.94	 $1.12	
Table	4.1.	Carbon	Pricing	-	Global	Coverage	and	Weighted	Average	Prices.	*Global	emissions	coverage	is	based	
on	2012	total	anthropogenic	CO2	emissions	(see	Appendix	5	for	further	details)190	
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Between	2016	and	2017	the	proportion	of	global	emissions	covered	by	carbon	pricing	instruments,	
and	the	weighted	average	price	of	these	instruments	(and	thus	the	global	weighted	average	price	for	
all	anthropogenic	GHG	emissions),	increased.	This	is	due	to	the	introduction	of	four	new	instruments	
in	2017	-	the	carbon	taxes	in	Alberta,	Chile	and	Colombia,	and	an	Emissions	Trading	System	(ETS)	in	
Ontario.	As	such,	over	40	national	and	25	sub-national	jurisdictions	now	put	a	price	on	at	least	some	
of	their	GHG	emissions	(with	substantially	varying	prices,	from	less	than	$1	in	Chongqing,	to	over	
$126	in	Sweden).	The	last	decade	has	seen	a	rapid	increase	in	the	number	of	carbon	pricing	
instruments	around	the	world,	with	the	number	of	jurisdictions	introducing	them	doubling	over	this	
time.191	Over	75%	of	the	GHG	emissions	covered	by	carbon	pricing	instruments	are	in	high-income	
countries,	with	the	majority	of	the	remainder	covered	by	the	8	pilot	pricing	instruments	in	China.	
The	World	Bank	provides	the	data	for	this	indicator.190,191	Prices	for	2016	and	2017	are	those	as	of	1st	
August	2016	and	1st	April	2017,	respectively.	For	2017,	the	indicator	includes	only	instruments	that	
had	been	introduced	by	1st	April	2017.	Baseline-and-credit	systems	are	excluded.	See	Appendix	5	for	
further	details.	
It	is	expected	that	the	number	of	carbon	pricing	instruments,	and	thus	the	global	emissions	coverage	
and	global	weighted	average	price,	will	continue	to	grow	as	policy	makers	seek	to	operationalise	
their	commitments	to	emission	reductions.	Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	illustrates	carbon	
pricing	instruments	already	implemented,	those	scheduled	for	implementation,	and	those	under	
consideration.	
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Figure	4.6.	Carbon	Pricing	Instruments	implemented,	scheduled	for	implementation	and	under	
consideration191	
	
In	total,	a	further	21	carbon	pricing	instruments	are	either	scheduled	for	implementation,	or	are	
under	consideration.	This	includes	the	commencement	of	a	national	ETS	in	China	in	the	second	half	
of	2017.	Although	this	would	replace	the	8	pilot	schemes	currently	in	place	in	China,	it	could	expand	
their	emissions	coverage	fourfold,	surpassing	the	European	ETS	to	become	the	largest	carbon	pricing	
instrument	in	the	world.Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.	Such	an	increase	in	emissions	coverage	should	continue	
to	2030,	and	be	accompanied	by	increasing	prices	in	both	new	and	existing	instruments,	in	order	to	
properly	incentivise	a	switch	in	investments	in	high-carbon	to	low-carbon	assets	and	behaviours.	
	
Indicator	4.9:	Use	of	carbon	pricing	revenues	
To	be	completed	when	the	rest	of	the	data	has	been	received.	2016	data	for	this	indicator	will	be	available	
during	the	first	week	of	July	(made	available	in	advance	of	its	scheduled	publication	date,	for	the	Lancet	
Countdown),	at	which	point,	this	will	be	added	to	the	draft	publication.	
Carbon	pricing	instruments	require	those	responsible	for	producing	the	emissions	concerned	to	pay	
for	the	ability	to	do,	so	in	one	form	or	another.	In	most	cases	this	generates	revenue	for	the	
governments	or	authorities	responsible	for	introducing	the	instrument.	Such	revenues	may	be	put	to	
a	range	of	uses,	including	investment	in	climate	change	mitigation	or	adaptation	or	environmental	
tax	reform	(ETR),	which	involves	shifting	the	burden	of	tax	from	positive	activities,	such	as	labour	or	
environmentally	beneficial	products	or	activities,	to	negative	activities,	such	as	the	generation	of	
pollution.	Such	options	may	produce	a	‘double	dividend’	of	environmental	improvement	with	social	
and	economic	benefits.192	This	indicator	tracks	the	total	government	revenue	from	carbon	pricing	
instruments,	and	how	such	income	is	allocated.	
	
Conclusions	
To	be	completed	when	most	indicators	are	completed.	
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5.	Public	and	Political	Engagement	
	
Introduction	
So	far,	this	report	has	presented	indicators	on	a	number	of	the	direct	and	indirect	health	impacts	of	
climate	hazards;	elucidated	levels	of	resilience	and	adaptation	among	populations	and	health	
systems	to	climate	change;	demonstrated	the	health	co-benefits	of	climate	change	mitigation;	and	
highlighted	the	importance	of	economics	and	finance	in	facilitating	a	transition	to	a	low-carbon	
economy.	
Policy	change	requires	public	support	and	government	action.	This	is	particularly	true	of	policies	with	
the	reach	and	impact	to	enable	societies	to	transition	to	a	low-carbon	future.193	The	overarching	
theme	of	this	section	is	therefore	the	importance	of	public	and	political	engagement	in	addressing	
health	and	climate	change,	and	the	consequent	need	for	indicators	that	track	engagement	in	the	
public	and	political	domains.	To	date,	most	evidence	on	public	and	political	engagement	focuses	
either	on	health	or	climate	change,	with	very	little	attention	given	to	these	as	combined	issues,	and	
with	most	evidence	deriving	primarily	from	cross-sectional	studies	in	high-income	countries.194	The	
indicators	presented	are	thus	opening	an	important	new	field	in	which	existing	research	is	limited	
and	international	data	sparse.	
The	aim	is	to	track	engagement	with	health	and	climate	change	in	the	public	and	political	domains	
and	identify	trends	since	2007.	In	selecting	indicators,	priority	was	given	to	high-level	indicators	
which	can	be	measured	globally,	tracked	over	time	and	provide	a	platform	for	more	detailed	analysis	
in	future	Lancet	Countdown	reports.	The	indicators	relate	to	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	
in	the	media,	science,	and	government.	Search	terms	for	the	indicators	are	aligned,	with	analyses	
based	on	a	common	set	of	health-related	and	climate-related	terms,	and	a	common	time-period	was	
selected	for	all	indicators:	2007-2016.		The	period	runs	from	before	the	resolution	on	health	and	
climate	change	by	the	2008	World	Health	Assembly,	which	marked	a	watershed	in	global	
engagement	in	health	and	climate	change;	for	the	first	time,	member	states	of	the	UN	made	a	
multilateral	commitment	to	protect	human	health	from	climate	change.195	
The	indicators	presented	in	this	section	are:	
• 5.1.	Media	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	
• 5.2.	Coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	in	scientific	journals	
• 5.3.	Engagement	with	health	and	climate	change	in	political	statements	in	the	United	
Nations	General	Assembly	
	
Corresponding	Appendix	6	provide	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	data	and	methods	used.	
Arguably,	the	final	section	of	the	Lancet	Countdown	is	the	most	important,	insofar	as	it	provides	the	
broader	context	within	which	all	the	other	indicators	operate.	This	echoes	back	to	one	of	the	key	
messages	of	the	2015	Lancet	Commission,	that	“achieving	a	decarbonised	global	economy	and	
securing	the	public	health	benefits	it	offers	is	longer	primarily	a	technical	or	economic	question	–	it	is	
now	a	political	one”.7p2.	Future	indicators	beyond	those	in	the	2017	report	may	include	measures	of	
health	and	climate	change	legislation;	direct	measures	of	public	opinion;	levels	of	private-sector	
engagement;	and	the	extent	to	which	health	is	explicitly	captured	in	the	UNFCCC	negotiations.	This	
full	complement	of	eventual	indicators	will	provide	a	robust	understanding	of	the	context	within	
which	all	of	the	other	indicators	are	operating,	and	the	political	barriers	and	enablers.		
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The	mass	media	is	an	increasingly	important	part	of	everyday	life	and	has	been	identified	as	a	major	
component	of	the	politics	of	climate	change.196	News	media	producers	have	shifted	to	multi-media	
news	platforms	(from	print	to	multiple	print,	online	and	mobile	formats),	a	process	facilitated	by	
recycling	of	content	across	platforms.197	Consequently,	while	the	public	is	increasingly	accessing	
information	from	non-print	media,	it	is	often	similar	to	and	repurposed	from	print	media.198	The	first	
indicator	tracks	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	in	major	national	newspapers,	many	of	which	
have	associated	multi-platform	formats.	An	analysis	of	a	set	of	English	and	Spanish	language	
newspapers	provides	a	broad	overview	of	global	media	coverage,	complemented	by	in-depth	
analysis	of	two	national	newspapers.	The	media	plays	a	key	role	in	the	public	understanding	of	
health	and	climate	change,	by	communicating	scientific	developments	and	evidence.	The	second	
indicator	focuses	directly	on	the	scientific	sphere,	tracking	scientific	engagement	with	health	and	
climate	change,	providing	important	insights	into	the	expertise	in	this	field.		
Surveys	point	to	widespread	concern	about	climate	change	and	its	health-related	risks,	including	
weather-related	exposures	(drought,	water	shortages,	floods	and	intense	storms),	agricultural	
impacts	and	food.199-201	Largely,	the	public	sees	the	main	responsibility	for	action	lying	with	
governments	and	other	powerful	institutions	and	most	believe	that	their	country	has	a	responsibility	
to	take	action	on	climate	change.199,202	In	most	countries,	people	believe	their	government	is	not	
doing	enough.200,203	The	final	indicator	shows	high-level	government	engagement	with	health	and	
climate	change,	by	tracking	references	to	health	and	climate	change	in	the	statements	made	by	
governments	at	the	annual	General	Debate	(GD)	of	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	(UNGA).	
The	GD	is	a	unique	international	forum	that	provides	all	UN	member	states	with	the	opportunity	to	
address	the	UNGA	on	issues	they	consider	important.204	These	government	UNGA	statements	
therefore	provide	a	measure	of	the	salience	of	climate	change	and	health	for	governments	globally.	
	
Indicator	5.1:	Media	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change		
Headline	Finding:	Global	newspaper	coverage	has	increased	78%	overall	since	2007,	with	marked	
spikes	in	2009	and	2015,	coinciding	with	COP15	and	COP21.	
The	media	plays	a	crucial	role	in	communicating	risks	associated	with	climate	change.205	Knowledge	
about	climate	change	(for	example,	an	appreciation	of	the	anthropogenic	causes	of	climate	change)	
is	related	to	perceptions	of	climate	change	risk	and	intentions	to	act	on	climate	change.206,207	Public	
perceptions	of	a	nation’s	values	and	identity	(for	example,	as	a	country	that	values	nature	and	the	
environment)	are	also	an	important	influence	on	public	support	for	national	action.208	Indicator	5.1	
will	therefore	track	media	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change,	with	a	global	indicator	on	
newspaper	coverage	on	health	and	climate	change	(5.1.1),	complemented	by	an	in-depth	analysis	of	
the	nature	of	newspaper	coverage	on	health	and	climate	change	for	two	national	newspapers	
(5.1.2).	
5.1.1.	Global	newspaper	reporting	on	health	and	climate	change	
Media	serves	as	a	critical	input	to	what	becomes	individual	to	collective	public	discourse	on	
contemporary	climate	challenges.	Focusing	on	English-language	and	Spanish-language	newspapers,	
this	indicator	tracks	global	coverage	of	climate	change	and	health	in	high-circulation	national	
newspapers	from	2007	to	2016.	Using	18	high-circulation	‘tracker’	newspapers,	global	trends	are	
shown	and	disaggregated	regionally	(Asia,	Europe,	N	America,	Oceania,	S.	America)	to	provide	a	
global	indicator	of	public	exposure	to	news	coverage	of	climate	change	and	health.	
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Since	2007,	global	newspaper	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	has	risen	globally	by	78%	
(Figure	5.1).	However,	this	trend	is	largely	driven	by	Asian	newspapers,	which	dominate	the	global	
trend.	Although	this	is	mostly	due	to	the	higher	number	of	Asian	newspapers	included	in	this	
analysis,	the	Asian	newspapers	here	did	have	a	higher	than	average	coverage	of	health	and	climate	
change	than	other	regions.	For	the	Middle	East,	North	America,	and	Oceania,	there	is	not	a	strong	
trend	in	the	media	reporting.	Some	spikes	are	notable	in	2009	in	Europe,	which	is	largely	maintained	
for	the	rest	of	the	time	series,	and	South	America,	which	drops	until	a	secondary	spike	between	
2012	and	2014.	The	first	major	spike	globally	was	in	2009;	coinciding	with	COP15	in	Copenhagen,	for	
which	there	was	high	expectation.	Newspaper	reporting	then	dropped	around	2010,	but	since	2011	
has	been	rising	overall	globally.	This	indicates	that	interest	in	the	links	between	health	and	climate	
change	has	increased.	
	
Figure	5.1.	Newspaper	reporting	on	health	and	climate	change	(for	18	newspapers)	from	2007	to	2016,	broken	
down	by	region.	
Data	was	assembled	by	accessing	archives	through	the	Lexis	Nexis,	Proquest	and	Factiva	databases.	
These	sources	were	selected	through	the	weighting	of	four	main	factors:	(1)	geographical	diversity	
(favouring	a	greater	geographical	range),	(2)	circulation	(favouring	higher	circulating	publications),	
(3)	national	sources	(rather	than	local/regional),	and	(4)	reliable	access	to	archives	over	time	
(favouring	those	accessible	consistently	for	longer	periods).	Search	terms	were	aligned	to	those	used	
for	our	indicators	of	scientific	and	political	engagement	and	searches,	with	Boolean	searches	done	in	
English	and	Spanish	(please	see	Appendix	6	for	details).	
There	are	some	cautions	with	these	findings.	With	this	extensive	Boolean	string,	there	may	be	some	
returns	that	do	not	centrally	address	climate	change	and	health	together,	but	rather	just	mention	
them.	Also,	in	working	with	newspapers,	as	opposed	to	say	UN	communications/documents,	a	
narrower	or	more	tailored	approach	might	more	effectively	reduce	the	possibilities	for	false	
positives	in	the	dataset.	However,	for	consistency	with	the	other	indicators	in	this	section,	the	
searches	were	done	with	the	established	terms	across	the	indicators.	Furthermore,	the	results	are	
skewed	by	the	higher	proportion	of	Asian	newspapers,	and	Oceania	newspapers	only	capture	
Australia	and	New	Zealand	newspaper	coverage.	
5.1.2.	In-depth	analysis	of	newspaper	coverage	on	health	and	climate	change	
The	second	part	of	this	indicator	provides	an	analysis	of	two	major	national	newspapers;	Le	Monde	
(France)	and	Frankfurter	Allgemeine	Zeitung	(FAZ)	(Germany),	are	reported.	The	analysis	has	shown	
that	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	increased	markedly	from	2007	to	2016	but	the	trend	is	
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non-linear.	Peaks	of	coverage	coincide	with	key	global	events	in	climate	change	action:	COP13	in	Bali	
(2007),	COP15	in	Copenhagen	(2009)	and	COP21	in	Paris	(2015).	Despite	this	increase	in	reporting,	
the	health	dimensions	of	climate	change	were	covered	in	only	a	small	proportion	of	articles	on	
climate	change.	Furthermore,	out	of	all	articles	on	climate	change,	only	5%	mentioned	the	links	
between	health	and	climate	change	in	Le	Monde	and	just	2%	in	FAZ.	There	were	also	important	
national	differences	in	how	health	and	climate	change	were	reported	on.	In	France,	70%	health	and	
climate	change	was	represented	as	an	environmental	issue	(with	a	predominance	of	references	to	
the	planet),	whereas	in	Germany	articles	have	mixed	references	to	the	economy	(23%),	local	news	
(20%)	and	politics	(17%).	Suggested	policy	responses	also	differed;	in	Le	Monde,	the	emphasis	was	
on	adaptation	strategies	(41%	of	articles),	while	FAZ	put	more	emphasis	on	the	mitigation	of	
greenhouse	gas	emissions	(40%	of	articles).	The	co-benefits	that	public	health	policies	can	represent	
for	mitigation	were	mentioned	by	17%	of	Le	Monde	articles	and	9%	of	FAZ	articles.	In	terms	of	the	
tone	of	the	articles	(i.e.	how	they	reported	on	climate	change),	the	highest	number	of	articles	in	Le	
Monde	and	FAZ	reported	on	health	and	climate	change	neutrally	(44%	and	49%,	respectively);	the	
negative	aspects	of	health	and	climate	change	were	the	next	highest	(32%	Le	Monde	and	19%	FAZ)	
(see	Appendix	6	for	more	details).	This	highlights	the	variety	in	the	content	of	articles	on	health	and	
climate	change	in	Le	Monde	and	FAZ,	which	has	important	implications	for	the	issues	the	public	are	
most	engaged	with.	
The	analysis	used	online	databases,	holding	both	printed	and	online	versions	of	Le	Monde	and	FAZ,	
and	was	conducted	in	two	stages.	Potential	articles	related	to	health	and	climate	change	were	
captured	through	an	initial	search,	a	more	detailed	keyword	search	within	each	text	then	identified	
articles	linking	health	and	climate	change.	This	second	stage	also	collected	information	on	the	
framing	of	health	and	climate	change	(for	instance,	as	an	environmental	or	economic	issue),	
potential	policy	responses	and	co-benefits.	The	tracking	analysis	relied	on	a	consistent	set	of	search	
terms	for	the	two	newspapers,	but	this	may	have	introduced	a	linguistic	bias.	Furthermore,	only	two	
newspapers	were	analysed	here	and	so	the	findings	here	cannot	be	used	to	indicate	the	nature	of	
newspaper	coverage	on	health	and	climate	change	globally,	or	even	regionally.		
Indicator	5.2:	Coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	in	scientific	journals	
Headline	Finding:	Since	2007,	the	number	of	scientific	papers	on	health	and	climate	change	has	
increased	by	more	than	three	times.	
Science	is	critical	to	increasing	public	and	political	understanding	of	the	links	between	climate	
change	and	health;	informing	mitigation	strategies;	and	accelerating	the	transition	to	low-carbon	
societies.209,210	This	indicator,	showing	scientific	engagement	with	health	and	climate	change,	tracks	
the	volume	of	peer-reviewed	publications	in	English-language	journals	from	PubMed	and	Web	of	
Science.	The	results	here	show	there	has	been	a	marked	increase	in	published	research	on	health	
and	climate	change	in	the	last	decade,	during	which	time	the	number	of	scientific	papers	rose	
threefold,	from	94	in	2007	to	over	300	published	in	2015,	and	in	2016.	Within	this	overall	upward	
trend,	the	volume	of	scientific	papers	increased	particularly	rapidly	from	2007-2009	and	from	2012,	
with	a	plateauing	between	these	periods	(Figure	5.2).	
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Figure	5.2.	Number	of	scientific	publication	on	climate	change	and	health	per	year	(2007-2016)	from	PubMed	
and	Web	of	Science	journals.	
The	two	periods	of	growth	in	scientific	outputs	coincided	with	the	run-up	to	the	UNFCCC	Conference	
of	the	Parties	(COP)	held	in	Copenhagen	in	2009	(COP15)	and	in	Paris	in	2015	(COP21).	This	pattern	
suggests	that	scientific	and	political	engagement	in	health	and	climate	change	are	closely	linked,	
with	the	scientific	community	responding	quickly	to	the	global	climate	change	agenda	and	the	need	
for	evidence.		
Most	publications	focus	on	the	impacts	of	climate	change	and	health	in	Europe	and	North	America.	
Overall,	more	than	2000	scientific	articles	were	identified,	of	which	30%	papers	focussed	on	Europe,	
followed	by	29%	on	the	Americas.	Within	the	Americas,	the	large	majority	(72%)	of	the	papers	
related	to	health	and	climate	change	in	North	America	(see	Figure	S5.1	in	Appendix	6).	By	contrast,	
only	10%	of	published	articles	had	a	focus	on	Africa	or	on	the	Eastern	Mediterranean	Region,	
demonstrating	a	marked	global	inequality	in	science	of	health	and	climate	change	(see	Figures	S5.1	
and	S5.2	in	Appendix	6).	While	most	of	the	evidence	relates	to	the	high-income	countries	that	have	
contributed	most	to	climate	change,	the	consequences	of	climate	change	will	disproportionately	fall	
on	LMICs.		
Among	reported	journals,	infectious	diseases	are	strongly	represented	in	the	health	outcomes	of	
climate	change.	Infectious	diseases,	particularly	dengue	fever	and	other	mosquito-transmitted	
infections,	are	the	most	frequently	investigated	health	outcomes;	approximately	30%	of	selected	
papers	covered	these	health-related	issues.	Important	gaps	in	the	scientific	evidence	base	were	
identified,	including	migration	and	mental	ill-health.	
This	indicator	points	to	the	rapid	growth	of	research	on	health	and	climate	change	across	the	last	
decade.	Investing	in	science	is	integral	to	addressing	the	threats	posed	by	climate	change	to	human	
health,	with	research	helping	to	inform	and	monitor	investments	in	climate	adaptation	and	
mitigation	strategies.	The	tracking	of	scientific	publications	on	climate	change	and	health	can	also	
help	in	identifying	research	gaps	and,	thereby,	informing	an	equity-oriented	research	agenda	to	
protect	global	health	in	the	face	of	a	rapidly	changing	climate.	
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For	this	indicator,	a	scoping	review	of	peer-reviewed	articles	on	health	and	climate	change,	
published	in	English	between	2007	and	2016,	was	conducted;	an	appropriate	approach	for	broad	
and	inter-disciplinary	research	fields.211	Two	databases	were	used,	PubMed	and	Web	of	Science,	to	
identify	papers	through	a	bibliometric	analysis	using	keyword	searches.212	Inclusion	and	exclusion	
criteria	were	applied	to	capture	the	most	relevant	literature	on	the	human	health	impacts	of	climate	
change	within	the	chosen	timeframe	and	papers	were	independently	reviewed	and	screened	three	
times	to	identify	relevant	publications.213	
From	2012,	the	trend	in	scientific	publications	has	been	consistently	upward.	To	sustain	global	
efforts	to	address	health	and	climate	change,	this	trend	should	continue	and	accelerate.	While	the	
COPs	in	2009	and	2015	instigated	increased	scientific	engagement	in	health	and	climate	change,	the	
continuing	upward	trend	points	to	deeper	shifts	in	scientific	activity.	Changes	in	the	strategies	and	
priorities	of	research	funders	are	likely	to	be	facilitating	this	process,	which	suggests	scientific	
engagement	with	health	and	climate	should	continue	growing.	Funders’	strategies	will	be	integral	to	
addressing	the	inequalities	in	the	global	distribution	of	research	identified	here.	These	inequalities	
are	likely	to	remain	pronounced	in	the	short-term,	requiring	sustained	changes	in	priorities	of	
research	national	and	global	funders	to	address	these	disparities.	
	
Indicator	5.3:	Engagement	with	health	and	climate	change	in	political	statements	in	the	
United	Nations	General	Assembly	
Headline	Finding:	There	is	no	overall	trend	in	UNGD	references	to	health	and	climate	change,	but	
two	significant	and	expected	peaks	occur	in	2009	and	2014.	
The	GD	takes	place	every	September	at	the	start	of	each	new	session	of	the	UNGA.		Governments	
use	their	annual	statements	to	present	their	perspective	on	events	and	issues	they	consider	the	
most	important	in	global	politics,	and	to	call	for	greater	action	from	the	international	community.	All	
UN	Member	States	can	address	the	UNGA,	free	from	external	constraints.	Therefore,	GD	statements	
provide	an	ideal	data	source	on	political	engagement	with	health	and	climate	change,	which	is	
comparable	spatially	and	temporally.	The	indicator	captures	the	extent	to	which	governments	
prioritise	health	and	climate	change	in	relation	to	other	issues	in	world	politics.	The	analysis	of	
UNGD	statements	focuses	on	the	extent	to	which	governments	refer	to	linkages	between	health	and	
climate	change	issues	in	their	annual	statements	in	the	GD.	Initially,	this	analysis	was	considered	for	
UNFCCC	statements	too,	but	favour	was	given	to	UNGD	statements,	as	these	are	open	to	any	
political	issue;	as	such,	the	reference	to	health	and	climate	change	within	these	statements	provides	
a	stronger	indicator	of	the	level	of	political	engagement	with	health	and	climate	change.	
Furthermore,	it	allows	the	analysis	of	trends	associated	with	external	influences,	such	as	significant	
UNFCCC	COPs.	
Health	and	climate	change	are	issues	frequently	raised	in	UNGD	statements.	However,	statements	
less	frequently	link	health	and	climate	change	together.	Across	the	2007	to	2016	period,	linked	
references	to	health	and	climate	change	in	the	annual	UNGD	ranged	from	44	to	124	(Figure	5.3).		
The	comparable	figures	for	references	to	climate	change	alone	were	378	and	989.	It	was	found	that	
there	is	no	overall	trend	in	conjoint	references	to	health	and	climate	change	across	the	period	
(Figure	5.3),	in	contrast	to	clear	trends	in	scientific	engagement	and	media	coverage	of	health	and	
climate	change.	
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Figure	5.3.	Political	engagement	with	the	intersection	of	health	and	climate	change,	represented	by	joint	
references	to	health	and	climate	change	in	the	UNGD.	
While	no	overall	trend	is	apparent,	there	are	two	distinct	peaks;	these	occurred	between	2009	and	
2011	and	in	2014.	In	both	2009	and	2014,	there	were	124	references	linking	health	and	climate	
change	in	the	GD	statements	(Figure	5.3).	The	2009	peak	occurred	after	the	2008	World	Health	Day,	
which	focussed	on	health	and	climate	change,	and	in	build-up	to	COP15	in	Copenhagen	in	2009.	The	
2014	peak	is	indicative	of	the	influence	of	the	large	UNGA	on	climate	change	in	2014	and	the	lead	up	
to	COP21	in	Paris	in	2015.	After	2014,	conjoint	references	to	health	and	climate	change	declined,	but	
notably	references	to	health	and	climate	change	linkages	in	2015	and	2016	were	particularly	made	
in	the	context	of	‘natural	disasters’,	with	a	number	of	UNGD	statements	making	direct	reference	to	
the	Sendai	Framework	for	Disaster	Risk	Reduction.214	
This	irregular	pattern	points	to	the	importance	of	key	events	in	the	global	governance	of	health	and	
climate	change	in	driving	high-level	political	engagement.	The	pattern	of	references	to	climate	
change	alone	(i.e.	without	linked	references	to	health)	again	suggest	the	importance	of	global	
institutions	and	the	UN	particularly.		
There	are	country-level	differences	in	the	attention	given	to	health	and	climate	change	in	UNGD	
statements	(Figure	5.4).	More	frequent	reference	is	made	to	the	issue	by	countries	in	the	Americas	
and	Oceania,	particularly	by	the	SIDS	in	these	regions,	a	noteworthy	pattern	given	the	relatively	
fewer	UN	member	states	in	Oceania.		In	contrast,	governments	in	Asia	and	Europe	tend	to	make	
fewer	references	to	health	and	climate	change.	
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Figure	5.4.	Regional	political	engagement	with	the	intersection	of	health	and	climate	change,	represented	by	
joint	references	to	health	and	climate	change	in	the	UNGD.	
	
This	indicator	is	based	on	the	application	of	keyword	searches	in	the	text	corpus	of	debates.	A	new	
dataset	of	GD	statements	was	used	(UNGD	corpus),	in	which	the	annual	UNGD	statements	have	
been	pre-processed	and	prepared	for	use	in	quantitative	text	analysis.215	The	dataset	contains	all	
country	speeches	made	in	the	UNGD	between	1970	and	2016.	Here,	the	frequency	of	references	to	
health	and	climate	change	in	annual	UNGD	statements	was	considered	between	2007	and	2016.	
Overall,	1,928	high	level	statements	were	examined.	The	keywords	used	are	based	on	a)	health-
related	terms	and	b)	climate	change-related	terms	(full	list	of	search	terms	is	provided	in	Appendix	6.	
To	capture	whether	UNGD	statements	referred	to	the	intersection	of	health	and	climate	change,	our	
analysis	focused	on	if	any	of	the	health-related	terms	appeared	immediately	before	or	after	any	
climate	change	terms	in	the	UNGD	statements.	This	was	based	on	a	search	of	the	10	words	before	
and	after	a	reference	to	a	climate	change	related	term.		
Caveats	for	this	indicator	include	the	narrow	range	of	search	terms,	which	excludes	reference	to	
many	of	indirect	links	between	health	and	climate	change.	Several	UNGD	statements	in	the	dataset	
refer	to	such	indirect	connections,	such	as	effects	of	climate	change	on	water	and	agriculture,	but	
these	are	not	included.	Therefore,	the	results	present	a	conservative	estimate	of	high-level	political	
engagement	with	the	intersecting	issues	of	health	and	climate	change.	Future	Lancet	Countdown	
reports	will	consider	political	engagement	with	these	indirect	links,	as	well	as	providing	additional	
forms	of	analysis.		
	
Conclusion	
A	key	message	from	this	analysis	is	the	importance	of	global	governance,	and	the	UN	in	particular,	in	
mobilising	public	and	political	engagement	in	health	and	climate	change.	As	this	report	
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demonstrates,	climate	change	is	a	global	challenge	demanding	collective	action	globally,	nationally	
and	locally.	It	requires	people	and	governments	to	act	as	one	global	community;	the	UN	stands	as	
the	embodiment	of	this	inter-connected	community,	with	all	193	of	its	Member	States	having	equal	
representation	under	the	UN	Charter.216	The	dimensions	of	public	and	political	engagement	
examined	in	this	section	–	in	the	media,	science	and	inter-governmental	forum	of	the	UNGD	–	points	
to	the	pivotal	importance	of	UN-led	processes,	and	most	especially	UNFCCC’s	COPs.			
Taking	the	indicator	of	political	engagement	as	an	example,	governments	clearly	prioritise	the	linked	
issues	of	health	and	climate	change	when	the	UN	has	successfully	mobilised	multilateral	action.	This	
has	both	negative	and	positive	implications.	Viewed	negatively,	it	suggests	that	public	and	political	
engagement	is	reactive	and	transitory,	stimulated	by	key	global	governance	events	from	a	steady-
state	of	much	lower	levels	of	engagement.	While	there	are	exceptions,	most	countries	in	the	UNGD	
analyses	did	not	consistently	engage	with	the	linked	challenges	of	health	and	climate	change.	
Conversely,	viewed	positively,	evidence	that	the	UNFCCC	COPs	are	central	to	the	dynamics	of	public	
and	political	engagement	suggests	that	ensuring	health	and	climate	change	are	on	the	agenda	of	a	
wide	range	of	key	multilateral	institutions/global	governance	events	may	help	to	sustain	longer-term	
engagement.	This	is	evidenced	in	newspaper	coverage	of	health	and	climate	change	that,	while	
showing	clear	spikes	around	COP15	(2009)	and	COP21	(2015),	also	show	an	increasing	trend	in	
coverage	over	time	since	2007.	
A	second	message	relates	to	the	uneven	patterns	of	public	and	political	engagement	in	health	and	
climate	change.	While	scientific	engagement	has	increased	rapidly	over	the	last	decade,	research	has	
disproportionately	focused	on	health	and	climate	change	in	high-income	and	high-emitting	countries	
(North	America	and	Europe),	rather	than	on	regions	bearing	the	brunt	of	the	health	impacts	of	
climate	change.	Indicator	5.3	on	political	engagement	again	points	to	global	inequalities	in	
engagement.	It	is	the	governments	of	Oceanic	countries,	a	group	consisting	of	SIDS,	who	use	their	
annual	statements	to	the	UNGA	to	speak	out	about	health	and	climate	change.		
Future	work	will	prioritise	expanding	the	indicator	set	on	public	and	political	engagement.	For	
instance,	an	indicator	of	corporate	engagement	is	under	development,	which	will	be	based	on	an	
analysis	of	corporate	social	responsibility	and	sustainability	reports	of	major	international	companies	
(see	Appendix	6	for	details).	Furthermore,	opportunities	for	an	indicator	of	public	engagement	that	
relates	more	directly	to	people’s	perceptions	of	health	and	climate	change	will	be	pursued,	as	public	
perceptions	are	key	to	building	support	for	policies	to	address	the	challenges	and	opportunities	
presented	by	health	and	climate	change.	Governments	are	known	to	both	shape	and	respond	to	
public	perceptions	of	environmental	and	health	risks;	in	addition,	many	policies	require	public	buy-
in,	through	support	for	public	investment	and	disinvestment,	public	regulation	and/or	lifestyle	
change.	An	indicator	on	professional	education,	originally	planned	for	inclusion	in	this	report,	is	also	
proposed	for	consideration	for	future	analysis	(see	appendices	for	details).	
Whilst	the	indicators	in	this	section	do	not	provide	a	complete	representation	of	public	and	political	
engagement,	they	provide	a	strong	baseline	from	which	to	build.	The	understanding	of	public	and	
political	engagement	in	health	and	climate	change	is	absolutely	critical.	The	previous	sections	in	this	
report	have	presented	findings	on	the	impacts	of	climate	hazards,	adaptation	and	resilience,	co-
benefits	of	mitigation,	and	finance	and	economics.	All	of	these	hinge	upon	policy,	which	in	turn	is	
dependent	upon	public	engagement.	Thus,	by	better	understanding	the	mechanisms	and	influences	
behind	public	and	political	engagement,	stronger	and	more	precise	policy	recommendations	can	be	
given	to	reduce	the	health	impacts	of	climate	hazards;	improve	resilience	and	adaptation;	maximise	
the	co-benefits	of	mitigation;	and	adopt	the	most	cost-effective	means	of	doing	so.	
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